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 Abstract 
 
 
 
Rural communities, physical landscapes and social relations have been deeply 
transformed in countries in Southeast Asia by the effects of the global land 
rush. The surge of initiatives around industrial development, hydropower pro-
jects, monocrop commercial plantations, mining and conservation has given 
way to a process of appropriation of land and natural resources unprece-
dented in scale, speed and scope. This has been underwritten by a favourable 
environment of neoliberal market-driven reforms, trade policies and invest-
ment flows that are the expression of the fast-track development model em-
braced by most countries in the region, including Cambodia and Myanmar. 
Today, the climate change agenda and the commitments to reduce emissions 
have created the conditions for an expanded menu of land and resource grabs 
justified in the name of the environmental good, so-called ‘green grabs’. 
Southeast Asia has thus become a “core region of concern in land grab stud-
ies”.  
 This body of work has also begun to integrate gender and, to a lesser ex-
tent, generational perspectives in analyses of agrarian and environmental 
transformations, advancing a more nuanced understanding of the impacts of 
land grabs. However, to date literature in these areas remains limited, while, 
as in land grabs studies, ‘local people’ and ‘local communities’ are often as-
sumed to be homogeneous groups of people with similar interests, identities 
and aspirations. This has not only severe analytical limitations but also politi-
cal implications.  
 This is a time in which different visions and pathways towards transfor-
mation and sustainability are confronting each other and shaping the politics 
of agrarian and environmental change. Increasing pressures on land and nat-
ural resources have given rise to political reactions and mobilization from 
below. New spaces for addressing power imbalances and structural inequali-
ties are being created within counter-visions of social justice, environmental 
sustainability and alternative economies. By engaging with a “politically 
 Abstract 16 
 
charged, high profile arena”, scholars and activists can thus open opportuni-
ties for centring gender and generational justice in the politics of land grabs, 
in the context of struggles for social justice. 
 Building on feminist political economy and with feminist political ecology 
as the overarching intellectual and political project, this thesis contributes to 
furthering the understanding of the implications of land grab in Southeast 
Asia with an analysis of gendered and ‘generationed’ patterns of rural dispos-
session, incorporation and political reactions from below with empirical evi-
dence from Cambodia and Myanmar. The thesis also aims to make the case for 
centring gender and generations into the politics of land grabs and argues that there can 
be no real social justice if attention is not paid to everyday struggles in diverse 
contexts and without a commitment to changing power relations that perpet-
uate social injustices. Finally, this thesis is the testimony of my personal and 
intellectual journey in search of ways to bring together my experience as a 
development practitioner and gender specialist, engaged researcher, and fem-
inist, and contribute to bridging divides towards meaningful transformation.  
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Gender, generatie en landbouwveranderingen: een 
casestudyonderzoek in Myanmar en Cambodja 
 
 Samenvatting 
 
 
 
Plattelandsgemeenschappen, fysieke landschappen en sociale relaties zijn in 
de landen in Zuidoost-Azië diepgaand veranderd door de gevolgen van de 
wereldwijde land rush. De golf van initiatieven rond industriële ontwikkeling, 
waterkrachtprojecten, commerciële monocultuurplantages, mijnbouw en na-
tuurbehoud heeft geleid tot een proces van toe-eigening van grond en natuur-
lijke hulpbronnen op ongekende schaal en met een niet eerder vertoonde 
snelheid en reikwijdte. Dit wordt gefaciliteerd door een gunstig klimaat van 
neoliberale marktgestuurde hervormingen, investeringsstromen en vormen 
van handelsbeleid die voortvloeien uit het snelle ontwikkelingsmodel dat door 
de meeste landen in de regio wordt omarmd. Tot deze landen behoren ook 
Cambodja en Myanmar. De huidige klimaatveranderingsagenda en toezeggin-
gen om de uitstoot te verminderen hebben de voorwaarden geschapen voor 
een grootschalige toe-eigening van grond en hulpbronnen uit naam van het 
milieu: de zogenaamde ‘groene landroof’. Zuidoost-Azië is daarmee een 
‘kernregio van zorg geworden in onderzoek naar landroof.’ 
 In dit onderzoek wordt tegenwoordig ook gekeken naar de rol die gen-
der en (in mindere mate) generatie spelen bij agrarische en ecologische trans-
formaties. Hierdoor ontstaat een genuanceerder inzicht in de effecten van 
landroof. Tot op heden is de literatuur op dit gebied echter nog steeds be-
perkt. Ook wordt in onderzoek naar landroof vaak aangenomen dat ‘lokale 
mensen' en 'lokale gemeenschappen' homogene groepen vormen waarvan de 
leden gelijksoortige belangen, identiteiten en aspiraties hebben. Dit leidt niet 
 Abstract 18 
 
alleen vanuit analytisch oogpunt tot ernstige beperkingen, maar heeft ook po-
litieke implicaties. 
 We leven in een tijd met verschillende tegenstrijdige visies op transfor-
matie en duurzaamheid en op de wegen daarnaartoe. Deze visies geven vorm 
aan de politiek van agrarische en ecologische verandering. De toenemende 
druk op grond en natuurlijke hulpbronnen heeft geleid tot politieke reacties 
en mobilisatie van onderaf. Een alternatieve kijk op sociale rechtvaardigheid, 
duurzaamheid en alternatieve economieën biedt nieuwe ruimte voor het aan-
pakken van machtsongelijkheid en structurele onevenwichtigheden. Door 
een ‘politiek geladen, spraakmakende arena’ te betreden, krijgen wetenschap-
pers en activisten de mogelijkheid om gender- en generatierechtvaardigheid 
centraal te stellen in de politiek van landroof binnen de context van de strijd 
om sociale rechtvaardigheid. 
 Op basis van de feministische politieke economie en met de feministi-
sche politieke ecologie als overkoepelend intellectueel en politiek project 
biedt dit onderzoek een analyse van gender- en generatiepatronen van ontei-
gening, incorporatie en politieke reacties van onderaf met empirische gege-
vens uit Cambodja en Myanmar. Daarmee draagt dit proefschrift bij tot een 
beter begrip van de implicaties van landroof in Zuidoost-Azië. Dit proef-
schrift is ook een pleidooi voor het inbedden van gender en generaties in de politiek van 
landroof. Er wordt betoogd dat er geen sprake kan zijn van werkelijke sociale 
rechtvaardigheid zonder aandacht te besteden aan de alledaagse strijd in di-
verse contexten en zonder zich in te zetten voor het veranderen van machts-
verhoudingen die sociale onrechtvaardigheid bestendigen. Tot slot is het 
proefschrift de getuigenis van mijn persoonlijke en intellectuele zoektocht 
naar wegen om mijn ervaring als ontwikkelingswerker en genderspecialist, ge-
engageerd onderzoeker en feminist samen te brengen en daarmee bij te dra-
gen aan het overbruggen van een kloof en te komen tot zinvolle transforma-
tie. 
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 Preface  
 
 
In 2008, when the global food prices crisis hit, I was consulting with the 
gender team of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), one of the 
specialized agencies of the United Nations (UN) working on the develop-
ment of a database on gender and land rights. In the emergent and growing 
proliferation of reports, journal articles, analyses and media headlines on 
the land grabbing phenomenon that followed immediately afterwards, 
gender was glaringly absent. This is when, in a forward-thinking move, my 
then supervisor had the intuition to suggest that it was critical to put gen-
der on the agenda of ‘land-based investments/land deals’, as they were 
referred to within FAO. The organization was involved in several initia-
tives to develop voluntary guidelines, including on governance of tenure 
and agricultural investments, and gender had to be there. As a first step 
and to raise awareness with the organization, we organized a first small 
workshop in 2011; Ruth Meinzen-Dick and Elizabeth Daley, among the 
first to write on the topic from a gender perspective, were invited to pre-
sent their work. Overall, the assessment was that there was not enough 
evidence. Soon after, a small research programme was initiated to conduct 
case studies in a few countries in Africa and Asia. I was supporting the 
overall management of the programme and was also part of the research 
team of two of the studies, one in each region. The aim of the programme 
was to explore the gender implications of land-based investments and pos-
sibly identify mitigating factors and good ‘practices’ – in inclusive business 
models, labour practices, consultations etc. - working collaboratively with 
willing investors. In 2013, at a workshop on land grabs held in Rome, I 
met Prof. Jun Borras. During the course of the project, I had become re-
ally interested in the topic, especially after the field work, and wanted to 
know more. I had always wanted to do a PhD and realized this could be a 
good opportunity. I had grown somewhat uncomfortable with the framing 
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of the programme, and with the language of good practices, good business 
models and win-win solutions. I contacted Prof. Borras and asked him 
whether he would be willing to supervise me, having explained my re-
search interests. Soon after I travelled to The Hague to attend a seminar 
organized under the umbrella of the Land Deal Politics Initiative where I 
met also Prof. Max Spoor and Prof. Ben White. I spent a few months at 
ISS in early 2014 and formally joined the PhD programme in April that 
year with a research proposal that back then focused only on Cambodia.   
 My intellectual, physical, emotional and personal journey since then has 
been long, tortuous, often uphill and strenuous, but also liberating and 
inspiring. In the course of it, I moved to Asia, joined the organization I 
had been consulting with as gender advisor and staff member, lost both 
of my beloved parents, and accompanied my two children through and 
out of turbulent teen years. Starting in 2015, I began to visit Myanmar 
more often and to do research, engaging with the teams and partners there. 
In both countries, I made many female and male friends, met bright schol-
ars, committed and inspiring activists, rural women and men who hosted 
me and shared with me their time, meals and stories. This journey has 
changed me in unimaginable ways, at a very profound personal level. I 
could no longer not interrogate the nature and politics of Development 
and, at a more practical level, the activities that I was engaged in in my 
professional life. At the same time, I was often pushed into questioning 
some forms of militant academe that dismisses as evil everything that de-
velopment organizations do. For instance, I saw grassroot activists make 
good and strategic use of voluntary instruments get sacked as ineffective 
by some scholars.  
 Having a history of volunteering and activism with women’s groups, 
when I started my new job as gender advisor, I approached the whole 
toolbox of gender mainstreaming with caution. But I also soon realized 
that in certain contexts, it was an effective way to put gender on the agenda 
of technical ministries and policies related to farming, land rights, forestry, 
fisheries. I could understand and appreciate in full the trajectory from the 
Women In Development (WID) to Gender and Development (GAD), 
and relate to the joys and sorrows of being a ‘femocrat’ (Cornwall, 2007). 
To put it in Anne Marie Goetz’s (2004: 137) eloquent words: 
The translation of a radical idea about social change into bureaucratic tar-
gets and procedures unavoidably results in something less world-shatter-
ing than the original revolutionary intention. Bureaucracies, whether of a 
21  
bilateral development agency, a multilateral economic institution, a devel-
oping state or a nongovernmental organisation (NGO), impose a disci-
pline of classification, ordering and above all, containment, that has tended 
to strip the gender and development project of its ambition to eliminate 
gendered power disparities, and instead to focus upon achievable practical 
projects – microfinance instead of employment and property rights, for 
instance. 
But it would be churlish to dismiss or denigrate the achievements of 
women and men who have pursued the gender mainstreaming project in-
side development bureaucracies. These bureaucracies are often deeply re-
sistant to gender-equity concerns, and the women-targeted or gender-sen-
sitive programmes that they may produce are the result of often intense 
internal struggle by committed staff members. 
Goetz also calls on all those feminists working in development to think 
about “credible alternative to current-market based orthodoxies” and 
break away from the neoliberal Washington consensus that considers mar-
kets the panacea for all problems of economic growth and resource distri-
bution (2004: 137).  
 I start this introduction with these personal insights in order to situate 
myself in this research and intellectual process (which I discuss more in 
detail later in the chapter) and to illuminate my journey, which has been 
an integral part of my PhD project.  
  
  
 
 
 
1 
Gender, generations and agrarian 
change: problem, questions, 
methodology and theoretical 
exploration  
 
1.1 Making the case for gender and generation in land grab 
studies 
 
“Heterogeneous and unequal encounters can lead to new arrangements of 
culture and power.” (Tsing, 2005)  
 
Rural communities, physical landscapes and social relations have been 
deeply transformed in countries in Southeast Asia by the effects of the 
global land rush – a massive push to grab “the power to control land and 
other associated resources such as water in order to derive benefit from 
such control of resources” (Borras et al., 2012: 850) away from legitimate 
and long-term users and people depending on them (see journal special 
issue edited by Schoenberger et al., 2017). The surge of initiatives around 
industrial development, hydropower projects, monocrop commercial 
plantations, mining and conservation have given way to a process of ap-
propriation of land and natural resources unprecedented in scale, speed 
and scope. This has been underwritten by a favourable environment of 
neoliberal market-driven reforms, trade policies and investment flows that 
are the expression of the fast-track development model embraced by most 
countries in the region. In Southeast Asia, with the exception of Thailand, 
countries have promoted models of agricultural development based on 
large-scale land concessions focused largely on export commodities (Hall 
et al., 2011; Ingalls et al., 2018) and boom crops, such as oil palm, sugar, 
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and rubber. Southeast Asia has thus quickly become a “core region of 
concern in land grab studies” (Schoenberger et al., 2017: 702).  
Today, the climate change agenda and the commitments to reduce 
emissions, pledged by countries through the 2015 Paris Agreement, have 
created the conditions for an expanded menu of land and resource grabs 
justified in the name of the environmental good, so-called ‘green grabs’ 
(Fairhead et al., 2012: 238). These include forest carbon stock initiatives 
through reforestation and afforestation, such as those under the mecha-
nism for “Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation” 
(REDD+)1, efforts to promote forest conservation and management, flex 
crop monoculture plantations, particularly palm oil – flex crops being 
crops that have “multiple and flexible uses” (Borras et al., 2012: 846) – 
and hydropower dams among others (Corbera et al., 2017; Hunsberger et 
al., 2017). Recently, Borras and Franco (2018) have also argued that main-
stream concepts of Climate Smart Agriculture2 (CSA) could be the latest 
discursive deception of the neoliberal agenda to commodify “nature’s 
products, places and processes” (Peluso, 2012: 74), and humans. By pro-
moting technocratic approaches to reducing emissions, increasing produc-
tivity and resilience, CSA endorses land uses that match neoliberal con-
cepts of efficiency that marginalize poor farmers, forest dwellers, and 
shifting cultivators whose land use may not be considered ‘smart’ enough 
(Borras and Franco, 2018). 
In a recent overview of the evolution of land grab studies in the South-
east Asian context, Schoenberger et al. state that the studies have estab-
lished themselves as a zone of engagement and “a politically charged, high-
profile, coherent, diverse and open arena” (2017: 702). They also note that 
Southeast Asian scholars working on agrarian and environmental trans-
formations have engaged in nuanced and creative ways with what they 
identify as the standardized package, which consists of three core ele-
ments: the ‘global land grab’, the ‘individual land grab or land deal’, and 
‘land grabbing’ highlighting “the importance of history, context-specificity 
and surprising, contingent or contradictory motivations for land grabbing, 
rather than one that emphasizes unification and common global drivers” 
(Schoenberger et al., 2017: 717). They highlight how, born as a field co-
produced by a wide range of actors, including activists, academics and pol-
icy practitioner, land grab studies have evolved and diversified from the 
focus on the global phenomenon, initially driven by NGOs, and overseas 
investments in land following the 2007-2008 food and fuel crisis, to be 
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seen as a manifestation of the advancement of neoliberal universals. Schol-
ars started to analyse individual land grabs to deconstruct the global land 
grab and investigate its nature, including the scope, the drivers and the 
scale. At the same time, growing increasingly uneasy with a narrow focus 
on measuring the phenomenon, scholars wanted to interrogate the politi-
cal economy, ecology and sociology of land grabbing. This process, that 
Schoenberger and colleagues define as the “construction” of land grab-
bing, “involved significant work of conceptual elaboration and typologis-
ing as ‘land grabbing’ was located in the broad context of land-use and 
agrarian change” and engagement with understandings of enclosure, prim-
itive accumulation, and accumulation by dispossession (Schoenberger, 
2017: 702). Researchers and academics also looked at the different shapes 
that land grabbing took, including green grabbing or ‘land grabbing for 
environmental ends’ (Bocarejo and Ojeda, 2016; Fairhead et al., 2012; 
Ojeda, 2012), water grabbing (for instance, see Mehta et al., 2012) and 
agrofuels and energy-related grabs (Borras et al., 2010; White and 
Dasgupta, 2010). The financial sector’s interest in farmland as a financial 
asset and the emergence of new types of investment management organi-
zations has also attracted research attention (Clapp et al., 2017; Clapp and 
Isakson, 2018; Fairbairn, 2014; Fairbairn et al., 2014; Visser et al., 2015).  
From different perspectives and whether subscribing to or confuting 
the uniqueness and unity of the phenomenon, all this scholarly work “pre-
served the core idea of a distinct, nameable, contemporary land rush as an 
object of study” (Schoenberger, 2017: 702). The power of having a con-
solidated ‘standardized package’ is that the core elements can be used 
“without having to worry about which precise conceptualization to use” 
(Ibid, 2017: 703), while engaging in an expanding, vibrant and “high pro-
file arena.”  
 
Gender and generations in land grab studies 
This body of work has also begun to integrate gender and, to a lesser ex-
tent, generational perspectives in analyses of agrarian and environmental 
transformations (Park and White, 2017: 1104), building on feminist schol-
arship in agrarian political economy, feminist political ecology, develop-
ment studies and cognate fields. In addition to several inspiring articles3 
published in academic journals in recent years, two special issues have fo-
cused on gender in Feminist Economics and on gender and generation in The 
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Journal of Peasant Studies 4, advancing a more nuanced understanding of the 
impacts of land grabs. However, to date, literature in these areas remains 
limited. This empirical and analytical gap has been highlighted several 
times as a key silence in the otherwise rich literature on land grabs, 
prompting several calls for increased attention (Doss, Meinzen-Dick, et 
al., 2014; Edelman et al., 2013; Hall, Edelman, Borras, et al., 2015), “not 
just in terms of possible differential impacts of displacement on women 
and men or on young or older populations, but also in relation to the pol-
itics of resistance” (Edelman et al., 2013: 1527).   
The assumption that land grabs studies have often made that ‘local 
people’ and ‘local communities’ are homogeneous groups of people with 
similar interests, identities and aspirations has serious analytical limitations 
(Borras and Franco, 2013). Far from being homogenous, local communi-
ties are made up of women and men who are differentiated along multiple 
intersecting axes of social difference including class, gender, sexuality, age, 
race, ethnicity, religion. Processes of resource access and control and eco-
logical change (Rocheleau et al., 1996: 4), including the struggles of men 
and women over nature and the environment, shape and are being funda-
mentally shaped by the power relations imbued in these intersecting dif-
ferences (Harcourt, 2018: 22), and “directly and indirectly affected by cap-
italist productions of nature” (Hawkins et al., 2011: 238). For instance, 
someone’s gender, age and ethnicity – alone or together - may determine 
if s/he is excluded from or incorporated, and how, into capitalist agricul-
ture (Park et al., 2015: 587).  
As the literature on gender and land has shown, the pre-existing situa-
tion in land tenure and production systems largely determines the out-
comes of land deals for women and men, with women more likely than 
men to be negatively impacted, and unlikely ever to be part of the emerg-
ing ‘progressive farmers’ class (Hall et al., 2011). For instance, a study by 
Daley (2011) – further elaborated by Daley and Pallas (2014) - analysing 
case studies conducted in different countries by the International Land 
Coalition (ILC), identifies four different dimensions of women’s vulnera-
bility to land deals related to land and productive resources, relative (cash) 
income poverty, physical vulnerability, and participation in decision-mak-
ing. In spite of their contribution to agriculture and food security, women 
face systemic discrimination in access to, control, and use over land. Such 
discrimination may stem from social and cultural norms and be sanctioned 
in statutory law. For example, in Myanmar, Chin women cannot own land 
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under customary law. Further, while joint ownership is not prohibited by 
law, the option of joint ownership was not stated anywhere until the 2016 
National Land Use Policy (NLUP). Therefore, in practice, it was widely 
assumed that land should be registered in the name of the male household 
head (Namati, 2016). In Southeast Asia, with the exception of Thailand, 
the share of women landholders scores well below 20 percent5 (FAO, 
2011). In turn, this contributes to exacerbating women’s income poverty 
due to limited access to credit due to a lack of collateral and markets (FAO, 
2011). Women’s physical vulnerability is exposed when land dispossession 
and evictions materialize together with rape and sexual abuse (see for 
example, Karen Human Rights Group, 2006, 2015). Finally, empirical ev-
idence confirms that women are often left out of decision-making pro-
cesses around land and land deals. For instance, in Indonesia, Julia and 
White (2012) found that taboos on women’s participation in community 
politics among Hibun Dayak communities put women in a more vulnera-
ble position when the oil palm company came, as they had not participated 
in community consultation prior to the establishment of the plantation 
and therefore had no knowledge about it (Julia and White, 2012). These 
vulnerabilities, in spite of differences among them, make women as a 
group more vulnerable and thus more likely than men to be negatively 
affected by the impacts of land deals and commercial pressure on land 
(Daley, 2011; Pallas and Daley, 2014).  
Similarly, Behrman et al. (2012: 51) argue that a gender perspective in 
crucial to understanding the impact of large-scale land deals “because 
women and men have different social roles, rights and opportunities and 
will be differentially affected by any major tenurial regimes, especially land 
transfers to extralocal investors”. This is why considering how gender con-
straints and differentials play out at different stages of a land deal is im-
portant. In addition to the pre-existing situation, which often sees women 
more disadvantaged than men in accessing and controlling land, it is also 
important to consider gender in consultation and negotiation, including 
around contractual agreements and compensation, and in the actual im-
plementation of the investment and consequent changes in land use and 
production systems. In line with currents that see large-scale land deals as 
possibly having positive outcomes if regulated properly,6 they conclude 
that large-scale land investments that “are properly executed with appro-
priate attention to gender dimensions … can provide transformative op-
portunities for both women and men through the introduction of new 
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employment and income generation opportunities, new technologies, and 
new services” (Behrman et al., 2012: 71). Furthermore, in the case of land 
deals for rural development, attention to gender might actually result in 
women’s increased access to and control over resources, which could in 
turn contribute to poverty reduction.  
Focusing on ‘gendered project impacts,’ Tsikata and Yaro (2014) used 
land and labour as analytical lenses to examine two commercial agriculture 
projects in Northern Ghana and conclude that a good business model is 
not enough to ensure that women benefit equally with men from agricul-
tural investments. Although the authors concede that some problems in 
delivering the anticipated benefits were due to the short-lived nature and 
failure of the projects examined, they hold that the nature of land acquisi-
tion and the business model also played a part. Their enquiry is based on 
the observation that while gender and land literature has often indicated 
that women are not in a position to benefit from projects because of the 
pre-existing inequalities, the opportunities themselves are also not gender 
neutral and likely not to be accessible to women. For instance, the projects 
analysed for their study all had supplementary initiatives under their cor-
porate social responsibility schemes, such as schools, health facilities and 
agro-processing technologies, which benefited women. However, more 
men than women accessed the more substantial and long-term benefits, 
including paid employment and participation in outgrower schemes. Thus 
gender differentials in commercial land transactions can arise from biases 
in the project design and implementation as well as gender inequalities in 
the division of productive and reproductive labour, resource control, and 
decision-making (Ibid 2014: 221, 202).  
Furthermore, in the agrarian communities affected by land grabs 
women and girls typically depend on access to land and natural resources 
for food crops cultivation, water fetching, and collection of firewood and 
non-timber forest products, including herbs, medicinal plants, vegetables 
and rattan. Therefore, reduced access to natural resources inevitably af-
fects women and girls in terms of food security and income while also 
increasing the time burden as they have to walk longer distances to access 
forests and water sources, and exposing them to heightened risks of at-
tacks and sexual violence (see Chapter 3, 4 and 5).  
The implications are also ‘generationed’7 as the encroachment of large-
scale agriculture, conservation and other commercial or development pro-
jects on forests and farmland decreases the availability of land that families 
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can pass on to their children or that can be cleared by for cultivation, de-
priving young women and men of their reproductive futures (see Chapter 
2). For instance, the study by Portilla (2017) in Champasak Province in 
Laos analyses rural youth’s aspirations in the context of agrarian transfor-
mation and encumbering large-scale land deals. Her findings challenge the 
idea that in agrarian transitions peasants and youth in particular will nec-
essarily want to abandon farming. The picture she depicts is one where 
youth’s aspirations for modernity coexist with the everyday reality of farm-
ing. In fact, the major stumbling block for young people’s farming future 
is the expansion of monoculture plantations and the decreased availability 
of land. Taking this further in her study of oil palm plantations in Indone-
sia, Tania Li (2017) argues that intergenerational ‘dispossessory mecha-
nisms’ are built-in in plantation development models and that the pro-
spects of young people “born into conditions of land scarcity is different 
from that of a generation living on a plantation frontier when new oppor-
tunities open up” (Li, 2017: 1160).  
As seen, the existing evidence also shows that more men than women 
have access to long-term waged employment and, as heads of house-
hold, to contract farming schemes. Formal sector jobs are also found to 
go predominantly to men, with external (migrant) workers being brought 
in and investors relying on mechanized production methods (Behrman et 
al., 2012). When wage employment opportunities exist for women, these 
tend to be highly insecure as it is the case with most plantation work; this 
means that the changes resulting from women’s engagement in these kinds 
of work are likely to erode social resilience in the long run (Tsikata and 
Yaro, 2011: 29).   
Feminist scholarship has also documented that in so far as women are 
pushed into wage labour due to economic hardships, they end up with 
poor pay and working conditions, face the double burden of reproductive 
work and continue to be more economically vulnerable than men: an in-
crease in paid employment does not produce net positive welfare effects 
for women (Elson, 1999). Not only is the gender division of domestic la-
bour inelastic, but also “women’s absolute or relative income do not nec-
essarily increase the power they have over domestic resources, budgets, 
decision-making and spending, despite – or because of – the fact that 
women’s expenditure decisions are more likely to benefit the entire house-
hold,” as noted by Harris-White (2003: 28). Feminist economists, such as 
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Pearson and Elson, have advanced critiques of the way in which “the pro-
duction boundary excludes domestic work” (Rai and Waylen, 2013: 9). 
The invisibility of women’s role in social reproduction contributes to its 
appropriation and commodification at the service of the state (Molyneux, 
2006; Razavi, 2007b), also determined by context and history (Kabeer, 
1994). Conversely, revaluing care as an “attentive consciousness of others 
(and self)” allows us to “think of options in which money doesn't play a 
central role anymore” (Agostino, 2015: 822).  
Among indigenous groups in Cambodia, the impacts of the external 
shocks that affect communities’ free access to natural resources and sub-
vert traditional food systems, where women’s knowledge as agriculturalists 
is highly valued, has produced new forms of marginalization of women 
and girls in the encounter with capitalist relations and mainstream patriar-
chal values (Chapter 4).  
 
Political reactions from below 
Political reactions to land grabs are also gendered and generationed, with 
different women and men responding, both individually and collectively, 
in diverse ways to the promises and threats of land deals (Hall et al. 2015, 
468). This, in turn, shapes the politics of land grabs in ways and with im-
plications that are beginning to be to investigated more within land grabs 
studies and have been the focus of feminist political analyses of environ-
mental struggles (see for example, Agostino, 2015; Deere, 2003; Krishna, 
2015; Resurrección, 2006; Rocheleau and Nirmal, 2015). While the partic-
ipation of rural youth in social movements has received little research at-
tention (Ghimire, 2002), that of women is well documented. Women of 
all ages have been at the forefront of struggles for livelihoods, and for 
agrarian, environmental and social justice, not only in the era of the global 
land grab (see for example, Brickell, 2014; Lamb et al., 2017; Morgan, 
2017; Park, 2018) but also historically. There are many well-known exam-
ples: Wangari Maathai’s Green Belt Movement in Kenya, established in 
1997 under the National Council of Women in Kenya, to support rural 
women’s struggles against environmental degradation, food insecurity, ex-
clusion and disempowerment, and the expansion of commercial agricul-
ture - to date, the movement promotes the idea of ecologically viable and 
socially just sustainable development rooted in human rights and especially 
women’s rights (Maathai, 2003); in India, the Chipko movement of the 
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western Himalaya, with women standing up to protect the forests, has be-
come an iconic ecofeminist story through Vandana Shiva’s (1988) account, 
promoting the idea of women’s innate closeness to nature by virtue of 
their reproductive capacity; peasant women’s struggles for land rights and 
contribution to agrarian social movements across Latin America have also 
been well documented; highlighting women’s role, the conditions in which 
their participation arose, and the extent to which it translated into advanc-
ing social justice and women’s rights (Deere, 2003; Potter and Zurita, 
2009; Stephen, 2006; Valle, 2009).  
It is clear that agrarian and environmental justice movements that con-
test “unsustainable extraction, trade and consumption of resources” play 
a key role “in politicizing and confronting such unsustainable resource 
uses” and, in so doing, in enhancing “ecological sustainability and social 
justice” (Scheidel et al., 2017: 1–2). While social justice, with gender and 
generational justice, have been integrated into transnational agrarian and 
environmental activism, there are still empirical and analytical gaps that 
could be filled within land grab studies that ought to inform advocacy, 
claim-making and the identification of alternative economies, ecologies 
and pathways of sustainability at local and national levels. Land grab stud-
ies, as a co-constructed intellectual and political arena, have the potential 
to contribute to the advancement of an alternative political project. If gen-
der and generational justice are not part of this political project, can there 
be real social justice? Probably not, as this study will show. As Andrea 
Cornwall indicates (2007: 77), ultimately using gender as a meaningful an-
alytical category calls for “a closer analysis of the power relations that cre-
ate and sustain social injustice – and on those social practices, including 
those of development agencies, that can offer liberating alternatives.”  
This thesis contributes to furthering the understanding of the implica-
tions of land grab in Southeast Asia with an analysis of gendered and ‘gen-
erationed’ patterns of rural dispossession, incorporation and political re-
actions from below with empirical evidence from Cambodia and 
Myanmar. The ultimate objective is to make the case for centring gender 
and generations into the politics of land grabs. The research objectives and 
questions will be further elaborated in Section 1.5. 
While conceptually gender and generation are both important, gender 
is given more weight in this thesis as empirically youth and generational 
relations are mainly addressed in Chapters 2 and 4.   
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1.2 Cambodia and Myanmar: ‘emerging bright spots’ or 
‘battlegrounds’ of Southeast Asia?  
 
In recent years, both Cambodia and Myanmar have witnessed a surge of 
land grabs8, driven by neoliberal agendas that prioritize fast-track eco-
nomic growth through the attraction of foreign capital and the transfor-
mation of “both human and nonhumans into resources for investment” 
(Tsing, 2015: 5). Though started at different times, in the early 2000s in 
Cambodia and in 1991 in Myanmar, with the passing of legislation that 
allowed large swaths of land to be given out to private investors, the pro-
cess reached a peak between 2006 and 2011 (Ingalls et al., 2018), at the 
same time when the 2007-2008 food, fuel, climate and financial crisis was 
in full swing and domestic and foreign capital started looking for ‘empty’ 
and ‘underutilized’ lands and natural resources that could be turned into 
assets for the generation of profit (Borras et al., 2012; Borras and Franco, 
2013). By then, legislation allowing land concessions was in place in both 
countries and the governments were proactively inviting foreign capital. 
In the World Investment Report 2013, Cambodia and Myanmar, together with 
Vietnam, were referred to as the “emerging bright spots of the subregion” 
(2013: 45), attracting investments in manufacturing, real and industrial es-
tate development, and telecommunications: a label well deserved and con-
firmed over time. In 2017, the two countries “continued to attract the 
lion’s share of aggregate FDI inflows to the region”, reaching USD 4.3 
billion in Myanmar - a record high for the sixth year consecutively - and 
USD 2.8 billion in Cambodia, respectively a 45 percent and 12 percent 
increase over 2016 (UNCTAD, 2018: 47, 68). The inflow of capital and 
the subsequent transformations must be understood as part of the broader 
process of ‘deagrarianization’ of Southeast Asia. A process that, however, 
goes hand in hand with countertendencies that speak to the resilience of 
small-scale farming – a ‘puzzle’ well studied in the context of East and 
Southeast Asia (Rigg et al., 2016) – and farmers’ claims for land and re-
sistance to different forms of ‘exclusion’. On their part, governments re-
strain and at the same time encourage farming and farmers (Hall et al., 
2011: 1–2) in efforts to maintain minimum political legitimacy (Fox, 1993; 
Harvey, 2003): for instance with policy statements that highlight the role 
of the agrarian sectors in poverty reduction and inclusive development, 
and by intervening to regulate land grabs when the “character and extent 
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of accumulation and dispossession processes threaten” the legitimacy of 
the state (Borras and Franco, 2013: 1730). 
In Cambodia, not only the number of land deals increased sharply after 
2005, but the area conceded also doubled twice between 2000 and 2012, 
from 0.5 million ha in 2000 to more than 1 million ha in 2008 and to over 
2 million ha in 2012 (Messerli et al., 2015: 141). In Myanmar, between 2010 
and 2013, land area allocated for large-scale private agriculture concessions 
increased by 170 percent, from 0.7 million ha (1.9 million acres) to 2.1 
million ha (5.2 million acres) (Woods, 2015a: viii). As a result, the agrarian 
structure has changed considerably, with concessions comprising 66 per-
cent and 16 percent of the area cultivated by small farmers in Cambodia 
and Myanmar respectively (Ingalls et al., 2018: 14).  
While having different histories and trajectories, the two countries also 
share similarities. Both countries have embraced broad socio-economic 
and political reform agendas in recent years but remain predominantly 
agrarian societies with a large portion of the population still relying on 
farming, fishing and access to forests for food, shelter and livelihoods. The 
contribution of agriculture to the gross domestic product (GDP) has de-
creased from almost 36 percent in 2001 to 23.4 percent in 2017 in Cam-
bodia and from 58 percent to 26.2 percent in Myanmar. Both have 
emerged from a recent past of conflict and war where land resources have 
been sites of contestation, exclusion and state-making, and with extraction 
strictly within the purview of domestic elites, cronies and the military. 
Both countries are attracting foreign capital in land-based investments es-
pecially from other countries in the region, including China, Thailand, Ja-
pan, Malaysia, Korea and Vietnam. Finally, both countries, albeit to dif-
ferent degrees, have adopted the language of gender equality in recent 
policies, signed up to the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and other major international 
governance instruments (see Chapter 6), and committed to the Agenda 
2030 for Sustainable Development. 
The literature on land grabs is much more abundant in Cambodia than 
in Myanmar, most likely due to the more recent opening up to the world 
of the latter, as noted by Schoenberger et al. (2017). In Cambodia, often 
referred to as a ‘hotspot for land grabs’, scholars have analysed several 
aspects and manifestations of land grabs, including the socio-economic 
and environmental impacts of Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) for 
agricultural development and initiatives for forest exploitation (Milne, 
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2015; Scheidel, 2016; Schoenberger, 2017), state politics of land use and 
control (Beban et al., 2017; Dwyer, 2015; Milne, 2013; Work and Beban, 
2016), the role of middle-income countries (Thuon, 2018), the intersection 
of different types of grabs (Baird and Barney, 2017), and climate change 
policies (Scheidel and Work, 2018; Work and Thuon, 2017). In contrast, 
in Myanmar the literature has focused largely on the land question as an 
optic to analyse changes in land use and agrarian and environmental trans-
formations more broadly (Woods, 2011, 2015a). With cases of land dis-
possession increasing from 2012 onwards, civil society organizations 
(CSO) have also produced several reports on land grabs, explicitly labelled 
as such, and on specific cases or sectors (Advancing Life and Regenerating 
Motherland et al., 2018; Land in Our Hands Network, 2015; Tarkapaw et 
al., 2016) including oil palm and conservation. The nexus of climate 
change policies and land grabs and the resulting politics and implications 
for agrarian and environmental justice have also been the focus of recent 
work (Borras and Franco, 2018; Franco et al., 2017; Woods, 2015b).  
In both Cambodia and Myanmar, land and natural resources have been 
historically the focus of extractivist initiatives that benefited colonial ad-
ministrations, central states, the military and powerful elites to the detri-
ment of small farmers, fishers and forest-dependent groups, including eth-
nic and indigenous groups, particularly women and girls (Brickell, 2014; 
Karen Human Rights Group, 2006, 2015; McGinn, 2015; Tavoyan 
Women’s Union, 2015), and youth in general, as elaborated in this thesis 
(Chapters 2 and 3). This exploitative tendency continued unabated under 
the neoliberal orientation of more recent governments, reinvigorated by 
agendas for sustainable development and climate change mitigation. This, 
in turn, has resulted in strengthening those “social forces opposed to social 
justice-oriented land policies of redistribution, recognition, restitution and 
fairer terms of incorporation of villagers” with potential political impacts 
that extend far beyond those of individual grabs or land deals (Borras and 
Franco, 2018: 5). For instance, in Myanmar, the REDD+ draft strategy 
identifies communities’ practices, including shifting cultivation, among the 
key drivers of deforestation, using the discourse of sustainability and 
greening development as its rationale.9 Rocheleau (2015a: 704) defines as 
‘dispossession by delegitimization’ the process where “members of peas-
ant and indigenous communities are cast as inefficient farmers who defor-
est the land, deplete soils, displace wildlife and live in misery. Alternatively, 
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they may be branded as culturally inauthentic, or falsely accused as violent 
criminals (especially in the case of leaders).”  
Within this process of delegitimization, evidence from this study shows 
that ethnic and indigenous women are being further marginalized, as the 
case from Ratanakiri in Cambodia illustrates (Chapter 4). A feminist polit-
ical ecology (FPE)10 analysis helps us to understand the implications of 
these processes in terms of access to resources, changes in gender and 
other power relations and restructuring of social and ecological relations 
in communities and households. Importantly FPE also highlights that a 
focus on women and gender is not enough; it matters how gender inter-
sects with and is shaped by other differences of race, ethnicity, class, age, 
disability and sexual orientation (Butler, 1990, 2004; Elmhirst, 2015; 
Nightingale, 2006) in conjunction with hegemonic processes that trans-
form social relations of production and reproduction, and with socio-na-
tures in what Anna Tsing refers to as “aspirations to fulfil universal dreams 
and schemes” (Tsing, 2015:1).  
What emerges is a picture where landscapes, rural livelihoods, gender 
power relations and social dynamics are being radically transformed, as 
White et al. (2012: 9) anticipated. Members of affected communities and 
grassroots groups have resisted and mobilized, with claims for restitution 
of land, incorporation in capitalist agriculture and alternative counter-vi-
sions of development, sustainability and social justice. Women and men, 
young and old, have taken active part in these struggles; women, notably, 
have been at the forefront of protests and diverse forms of activism, often 
at the cost of their bodily integrity and the breakdown in family relations 
(see for example, Brickell, 2014; Lamb et al., 2017; Park and Maffii, 2017; 
Tavoyan Women’s Union, 2015). The results of these struggles are as po-
litical as the struggles themselves and are shaped by the power dynamics, 
institutions and actors involved at multiple levels. The gendered implica-
tions of these processes are the main focus of this thesis, with their gen-
erational dimensions a second concern.  
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1.3 A feminist review of gender and generation in land grab 
studies 
   
Today there is an increasing body of work that focuses on the gender and 
generational dimensions of land grabs, although these have captured less 
research attention and journal space compared to land grab studies. In 
light of the existing evidence, Levien (2017) makes a compelling case for 
not overstating what we don’t know. It is true that there is little research 
on the “newest forms of land dispossession”, he argues, but there is also 
a conspicuous body of work on gendered dimensions of land tenure, land 
reform and land dispossession under earlier historical regimes that can in-
form current analyses. This is certainly a valuable point; at the same time, 
however, it is essential not to downplay the significance of engaging spe-
cifically with the land grab ‘arena’ at this particular historical juncture. I 
use the term ‘arena’ following Schoenberger and colleagues’ (2017) under-
standing of land grab studies as a co-produced field that has a political and 
activist agenda at its core.   
To illustrate the latter, - that is, the importance of engaging with the 
land grab arena - I elaborate on Levien’s point. I do this by reviewing work 
that has focused on gender and generational dimensions in current land 
grab studies in Southeast Asia, and on studies of agrarian and environmen-
tal transformations and struggles through the lens of feminist analyses, 
concepts and theories. The argument is that in order to account fully for 
social, agrarian and environmental change and inform related struggles, we 
need to consider gender and generational dimensions. Analytically, this is 
critically important not only to bridge a knowledge gap but because failure 
to do so can lead to wrong analyses about changes in land access, control 
and distribution, production, social reproduction, livelihoods strategies, 
and distribution of benefits. Politically, it is crucial for steering change in 
the direction of social justice.   
Along this line of thinking, it is important to ask ourselves: what is the 
status of the knowledge – that is, what do we know? And do we know 
enough?  
 
What do we know? Do we know enough?  
In the founding issue of Feminist Economics, Carmen Diana Deere took 
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seven widespread assumptions that plague peasant studies, namely: 1) 
male-headed peasant farm as the basic unit of production; 2) the undiffer-
entiated return to family labour; 3) peasant household strategies; 4) the 
competitive edge of peasant farms in capitalist markets; 5) peasant social 
differentiation; 6) the classic analysis of the peasantries; 7) and the deter-
minants of household reproduction. She debunks each of them and shows 
how gender analysis can illuminate important dimensions of social rela-
tions of production and reproduction (Deere, 1995: 53).  
 The first assumption does not take into account the differences that 
exist between male and female farming systems and the gendered division 
of labour of farm activities and tasks in different systems. In patriarchal 
systems, such as in the Andes, women do the work but have little control 
over decision-making and use of the products; conversely, in egalitarian 
systems, more common among poor households, women’s labour contri-
bution corresponds with their having more say and control. This finding 
is also strongly connected to the second assumption on the undifferenti-
ated return to family labour. Third, by invoking studies (for example, Hart, 
1986) that have shown how gender and generational hierarchies and strug-
gles are central to understanding household economy and strategies, 
Deere questions the unity of the peasant household and the assumption 
that household strategies reflect the interests of all and thus benefit all 
members equally. As a response to the fourth assumption and in line with 
other feminist analyses (see Section 1.4), Deere also points to the im-
portance of women’s care work in the re/production of households and 
their competitive edge in capitalist economies. Women’s contribution can 
also explain the persistence of peasant agriculture and provide a better 
understanding of social differentiation, while it might be distorted by a 
narrow focus on the productive potential of households that also ignores 
the existence of multiple sources of income. Likewise, with reference to 
the sixth assumption, ignoring the class positions of different household 
members and households as potential sites of class relations leads to dis-
torted analyses that overlook intrahousehold gender and age divisions of 
labour. Finally, Deere argues that gender relations are as important as class 
relations to explain social differentiation, that is, households’ reproduction 
over time and even their disintegration. For instance, the outmigration of 
men in highland rural Peru created higher dependence on wage income as 
women struggled to keep up with production as they lacked access to male 
labour for heavy tasks such as ploughing. At the same time, however, men 
 CHAPTER 1 37 
stopped pooling the cash income and receded from their familiar respon-
sibilities, often setting up second families. This meant that peasant house-
holds as such stopped existing as units of production and reproduction 
(Deere, 1994).  
An analysis informed by the first assumption - that is, the male-headed 
peasant farm is the sole and basic unit of production - would have over-
looked the gendered impacts of a case of corporate land acquisition and 
oil palm expansion in West Kalimantan, Indonesia analysed by Julia and 
White (2012). Due to the introduction of a system of smallholder registra-
tion under which smallholder plots were registered in the name of the male 
household head, women lost access to customarily inherited land in the 
formalization process. Formalization also translated in the masculinization 
of participation in farmers’ organizations and access to credit. Assumption 
2) is also shattered as we learn about the way in which the expansion of 
corporate palm oil interacted with local patriarchal structures, generating 
changes not only in patterns of land rights but also in the division of labour 
and livelihoods that affected women negatively and increased their de-
pendence on men. While working together with men on oil palm and be-
ing responsible for subsistence agriculture, women were also under pres-
sure to earn additional income as families increased their dependence on 
the cash economy for food following the decreased availability of land and 
forest resources. Therefore, not only did women not benefit on equal 
terms with men from the household’s participation in the smallholder 
scheme, but also changes in livelihood strategies gave them the burden of 
additional work, indicating that household strategies “do not necessarily 
reflect the interest of all household members” (Deere, 1995:58) – that is, 
assumption number 3).   
The same exercise can be applied to the study by Park and Daley (2015)  
who analysed the impacts of four agricultural investments in Lao PDR on 
local women and men’s access, use and management of land, and on in-
come-generating opportunities. They found that different groups of 
women and men, depending on existing land and labour relations, experi-
enced the investments differently. In particular, while a few women bene-
fited from the income opportunities generated by the investments, in gen-
eral more women were negatively affected by the reduced access to non-
timber forest products (NTFP) and increased labour burden as families 
engaged in new cash crops. The impacts of individual investments were 
found to depend on multiple variables, including the gendered nature of 
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the company and its practices, the labour requirements of the investment 
crop, and the age and status of the farmers - for instance, with elderly 
single women unable to keep up with production - the amount of land 
utilized, the socio-economic status of the household, and the intrahouse-
hold relations. It is clear that without taking gender, age and class into 
account, the analysis would not have picked up the substantial differences 
resulting from the way in which gender and other social differences inter-
act with modes of production, labour requirements and access to land.  
Similarly, in East Kalimantan, Indonesia, Rebecca Elmhirst and col-
leagues looked at the differentiated outcomes of the interplay between dif-
ferent modes of incorporation into the oil palm sector and at historical 
and ecological gender norms and social differences by comparing four 
case study communities (Elmhirst et al., 2017). Their study shows the an-
alytical power of intersectionality and post-structuralist conceptions of 
gender as process, where subjectivities are produced by the intersection of 
gender with other social differences and axes of power (Butler, 1990, 2004; 
Nightingale, 2006, 2015). The history of oil palm expansion in East Kali-
mantan has very a specific socio-ecological trajectory marked by different 
waves of large-scale resource extraction dating back to colonial times. The 
resulting current context is diverse, consisting of local communities whose 
gendered patterns of resource access and control, and livelihood have 
changed over time. The influx of migrants from other regions also con-
tributed to creating ethnic diversity and, as a result, “a continual redrawing 
of gender norms”, emphasizing “the need to recognise gender not simply 
as an essentialised and geographically bounded form of knowledge but as 
in process, produced through widening geographies of production, trade 
and communication” (Elmhirst et al., 2017: 1142). Therefore, gendered 
impacts and response also need to be understood with specific reference 
to the ecological, historical, cultural and political context in which they 
unfold. The study suggests that women and young men were excluded 
from negotiations over land and the introduction of a plasma scheme be-
cause of the construction of oil palm as a ‘men’s crop’ and the tendency 
to invite male household heads to represent the household at the meetings. 
The same biases afflicted the distribution of plasma dividends as the co-
operatives that were set up to handle relations with the company were 
joined by household heads and their management co-opted by elite men. 
Another well-known and widely cited example from outside Asia is Judith 
Carney’s study of the introduction of irrigation and contract farming in 
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rice and vegetables, which highlighted the significance of women’s labour 
in agrarian transformations in Gambia. Together with the reduction of 
women’s access to land for independent farming and increased labour de-
mands on women, the incorporation in these development-driven 
schemes for crops that had been traditionally women’s crops created in-
trahousehold conflicts (Carney, 1992). Together these illustrations empha-
size the limitation and unintended consequences of analyses and initiatives 
that do not take gender into account.  
Generational differences and tensions have been the focus of studies 
of agrarian change at other times and in different places, albeit not as much 
as in land grab studies (Park and White, 2017: 1104). Scholars have ana-
lysed the way in which generation can shape the outcomes of processes of 
agrarian change and the commodification of nature, affecting young peo-
ple’s likelihood to become farmers (Archambault, 2014; Berckmoes and 
White, 2014); and how rural youth are affected by the impacts of structural 
changes in economies and societies in developing countries (Barney, 2012; 
Huijsmans, 2013; Morarji, 2014). As Berckmoes and White (2014) main-
tain, generation should be part of all standard agrarian political economy 
analyses as a key dimension of social re/production. Nevertheless Sum-
berg et al. note (2012: 1) that, although youth and agriculture have become 
a prominent policy issue in Africa, there is a lack of “research and evidence 
that is theoretically and historically informed, conceptually sound and con-
text sensitive”, very limited empirical evidence, and very few researchers 
and advocates working on the issue. The same trend can be observed in 
Southeast Asia.  
Recently, a valuable contribution was made by a special issue of The 
Journal of Peasant Studies on ‘Gender and generation in Southeast Asia agrar-
ian transformations’ in which several authors illuminated gender and gen-
erational issues through cases from Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR and 
Myanmar. Focusing on youth, Großmann (2017) analysed the way in 
which engagement with a boom forest resource – gaharu (agarwood) - by 
providing material gains and enhanced status to gaharu searchers, shapes 
men’s masculine indigenous identity in specific ways, while triggering pro-
cesses of social differentiation among Punan Murung communities in 
Central Kalimantan. What this study highlights, together with that by Por-
tilla (2017) on rural youth’s aspirations in Champasak Province in Laos, 
and by Tania Li (2017) on intergenerational dispossession in oil palm plan-
tations in Indonesia referred to in the previous section, is that land grabs 
 Gender, generation and agrarian change 40 
 
have impacts that span across generations, affecting the reproduction of 
farming communities.   
Along these lines, in this study, ‘generation’ is understood in its rela-
tional and dynamic meaning as a social process which is co-constituted 
with other social differences. “This provides a way to capture the struc-
tures that set young people apart from other social groups, and constitute 
them as a social category through the working of particular relations of 
division, difference and inequality between this and other categories.” 
(White, 2012: 247) In this conceptualization, generation is ‘a moving tar-
get’, as Ben White notes. Hence, although often the focus might be on 
‘youth’ as a specific age and social group, “when we speak of changing 
generations or generational relations we are not talking of changes hap-
pening to a defined group of people, but of changes between one genera-
tional group and those that succeed it”. (Ibid, 2012: 247) 
Evidence from other research from the region, as well as from this 
study, confirms that the lack of transfer of family land and the mechanisms 
and means to access new land are important barriers for youth to become 
farmers. For instance, in rice-producing villages in West Java, Central Java 
and South Sulawesi, Indonesia, where landlessness is widespread and less 
than half of the farmers own the land they farm, the existing landholding 
structure was found to be the single most constraining factor for young 
people to enter and stay in farming. Youth from smallholder families may 
inherit a small piece of land one day but not while they are still young, 
while for those from landless and land-poor families, temporary migration 
or wage labour and sharecropping become the most likely fall-back option 
in the face of a lack of income-generating options (AKATIGA and White, 
2015).  
If we turn to the gender and generationed dynamics of political re-
sponses from below, we find that even fewer studies have focused on this 
(Borras and Franco, 2013: 1727). Work in land grab studies has tended to 
analyse the “impacts and vulnerabilities resulting from land deals rather 
than gendered agency, responses and resistance” (Hall, Edelman, Borras, 
et al., 2015: 482). In the special issue mentioned above, Miranda Morgan 
(2017) explored women’s involvement in a case of successful resistance in 
West Kalimantan, which resulted in the withdrawal of a 16,000-hectare 
corporate oil palm concession. Despite dominant gender relations and dis-
course that tend to exclude women from politics and cast them as apolit-
ical, their significant presence in protests shows how gender relations are 
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subject to continual renegotiation, and how “rural struggles around land 
and dispossession are also inevitably struggles over gender as well” 
(Morgan, 2017: 1193). Women’s key roles in protest, however, do not nec-
essarily translate into the promotion of women’s rights or their better ac-
cess to governance structures, as confirmed by findings from this study 
(see Chapters 2, 3 and 4). In the same issue, exploring gender roles in a 
case of rural dispossession and subsequent post-eviction in Khsem, Cam-
bodia, Lamb and colleagues (2017: 1230) noted that “a dichotomy is rein-
forced which places women in public not for the power of their minds to 
tackle issues of eviction and social justice, but for the power of their bodies 
to deflect harm”. As the community engaged in rebuilding, after being 
awarded a Social Land Concession, it is men who took on all governance 
activities and roles (Lamb et al., 2017). It is worth noting that neither Mor-
gan nor Lamb et al. say anything about the age of the female protesters, 
thus homogenizing women with regards to generation. These examples 
point out that efforts need to go into ensuring that women and youth are 
considered as equal actors in the politics of land grabs and that participa-
tion alone does not guarantee them a place at the table where decisions 
are made. 
Going back to the questions – What do we know? And do we know 
enough? – this overview has shown that there is a solid body of work that 
can inform our analyses, as Levien suggests, and, thanks to recent research 
in this area, we do have a better understanding of the gendered and gen-
erationed dynamics of land grabs to be able to identify some common 
characteristics and trends. At the same time, based on the understanding 
of gender and generation as being ‘in process’ and (re)produced through 
the encounter with changing landscapes of production, reproduction, so-
cio-nature, and capitalist relations, we have emphasized the importance of 
a systematic integration of gender and generational analyses in research 
into land grabs, especially when this can inform policy and politics from 
below. Not doing so would mean missing out on the fine grains and nu-
ances of the picture in the best-case scenario and in outright wrong anal-
yses in the worst case. This, in turn, would have severe implications in 
terms of the politics of land grabs. But why do the feminist analyses con-
tinue to be ignored in the land grab literature despite their significance?   
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Ignoring what we know: the politics of gender  
In the introduction to the special issue of Feminist Economics on ‘Land, Gen-
der and Food Security’, Cheryl Doss and colleagues (2014) argued that the 
reason for the neglect of feminist analyses in land grab studies can be ex-
plained in terms of two interconnected issues: research attention has 
mainly focused on assessing the extent (size and spread) of the phenome-
non and on the key players rather than on analysing the impacts on the 
affected social groups; and “the chronic gender blindness of mainstream 
literature (which has resulted in a parallel development of a gender litera-
ture)” (Doss, Summerfield, et al., 2014: 3). According to Shara Razavi 
(2009), who addresses the problem from a broader agrarian studies per-
spective, the issue goes far beyond the literature and speaks volumes about 
the systemic neglect, instrumentalization and neutralization of gender in 
agrarian studies and in development more broadly, as she illustrates at 
length:  
Over the past thirty odd years [as of 2009], the analysis of agrarian social re-
lations, institutions, and movements has benefited from the insights offered 
by feminist scholars whose intellectual project has been to bring into the po-
litical economy of agrarian change the pervasiveness of gender relations and 
their interconnections with broader processes of social change. The implications 
of this re-thinking are potentially radical. Gender analysis has interrogated some of 
the dominant orthodoxies in agrarian studies: in conceptualising peasant 
households and their connections to broader economic and political struc-
tures; in deepening the analysis of rural markets as social and political con-
structions with highly un-equalising tendencies; and in better understanding 
both the role and the limitations of different institutional arrangements (in-
volving states, markets, and ‘communities’) for the management of resources. 
However, the complexities of this research, as the paper argues, have been 
filtered out by neoclassical economists and powerful development organisa-
tions, as well as by some gender policy advocates keen to get their messages 
heard. Nor have political economists of agrarian change made a serious effort 
to engage with it... (Razavi, 2009: 197–198, emphasis added) 
According to some critics, the neglect is also rooted in the “fixation 
with the sphere of commodities where value is realised” (O’Laughlin, 
2008: 352) and the consequent failure of agrarian political economy and 
peasant studies to acknowledge and value women’s unpaid contribution 
to household reproduction (O’Laughlin, 2008; Razavi, 2009, 2011).  
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…the unpaid (non-commodified) forms of provisioning on a day-to-day basis 
– the washing, cleaning, cooking, feeding and caring of young, old, infirm and 
able-bodied alike – that reproduces labour on a day-to-day and generational 
basis, whether labeled as “labour reproduction” or unpaid provisioning of 
household needs. (Razavi, 2011: 50) 
In the development realm, on the one hand, with the transition from 
women in development (WID) to gender and development (GAD) ap-
proaches, gender equality has become an integral part of the development 
agenda and sustainability discourse, opening the door for feminists to en-
gage in high level political fora and processes – an opportunity that should, 
according to some, be used strategically by gender advocates and feminists 
so to avoid co-optation by powerful institutions (True, 2003). On the 
other hand, the mainstreaming and institutionalization of gender has 
meant sacrifices in terms of “its political and analytical bite” (Cornwall, 
2007: 69) for the easier uptake and use by development organizations and 
actors. The challenge to reconcile the goal of advancing gender equality 
while preserving its political nature continues to trouble feminists and gen-
der specialists to date and has been amply debated in feminist literature, 
including reference to environmental and climate change politics (see for 
example, Arora-Jonsson, 2011; Arora-Jonsson and Sijapati, 2017; Leach, 
2007; Leach et al., 2015; Resurrección, 2013).  
Thanks to emergence and advocacy of transnational women’s move-
ments and coalitions, such as the Global Gender and Climate Alliance, 
GenderCC: Women for Climate Justice and the Feminist Task Force (see 
Agostino, 2015; Resurrección, 2013), gender equality has made it firmly 
into the global environmental and climate change agenda, featuring in the 
language of main agreements and protocols, national policies and strate-
gies, and climate financing mechanisms albeit often in the form of simpli-
fied positivist approaches. While transnational feminism, comprising 
grassroots, rural and urban women, academics, and gender advocates, has 
worked actively to highlight the links between gender and climate change 
and between economic and social justice in different high level fora (Ago-
stino, 2015: 819), technical organizations have more easily embraced reas-
suring and simplified depictions of women as vulnerable or as having an 
intrinsic relation to nature (Resurrección, 2013). This can “deflect atten-
tion from power relations and inequalities reproduced in institutions at all 
levels and in discourses on climate change” (Arora-Jonsson, 2011: 745). 
 Gender, generation and agrarian change 44 
 
For instance, Andrea Collin’s (2018) recent review of the ‘Gender and Cli-
mate Smart Agriculture’ module of the Gender and Agriculture Sourcebook by 
the FAO, the World Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural De-
velopment (IFAD) highlights that in spite of advancing a fairly sophisti-
cated understanding of the gender dimensions of agricultural practices and 
community norms, by characterizing Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) as 
mainly state driven, the module fails to address the gender implications of 
market and corporate-led CSA and the power dynamics that also operate 
at meso and macro levels. It is likely that the prospects of any gender-
transformative change will be lost as corporate actors scale up CSA initia-
tives (Collins, 2018: 188–189).  
Feminist political ecology (FPE) scholarship warns against apolitical 
approaches to gender equality that ignore unequal power relations and pa-
triarchal agrarian and environmental agendas and promote essentializa-
tions and fixed ideas and segregation of the feminine and the masculine. 
These approaches promote the ‘othering’, including of nature, and exclu-
sion of what does not fit into a neoliberal model of growth, productivity 
and efficiency, as Christa Witcherich’s (2015) sharp critique highlights. 
Women and men peasants and indigenous peoples have to be recast and 
integrated as economic actors – albeit as unequal partners on unequal 
terms – or excluded or expelled. Indigenous farming practices are rejected 
as inefficient, land that is not under intensive and productive use can be 
acquired, rivers are exploited for their energy generating potential, and for-
ests are used for carbon sequestration. According to Witcherich, this dis-
course justifies and perpetuates domination (2015: 79). By the same token, 
care and household economy can be “externalized in a neo classical way 
out of the value production and constructed as the ‘other’ to market effi-
ciency and accumulation”, and women reconstructed as inferior. No won-
der the fight against ‘othering’ of women’s care economy and unpaid work 
has been a long-standing battleground of feminist political economy (El-
son, 1998).  
In both Cambodia and Myanmar, the neutralized version of the gender 
equality and social inclusion agenda has found its way into government 
policies and claims, thanks to pressure to abide by global governance in-
struments, international conventions and donors’ funding requirements. 
As one Myanmar women’s rights advocate pointed out, there have been 
some clear gains for women’s movements, as “before Cyclone Nargis [and 
the arrival of international aid and organizations], we could not even speak 
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about women’s rights but had to refer to protection of women.”11At the 
same time, women’s groups tend to be marginal to the political discussions 
around agrarian and environmental questions, and grassroots movements 
are siloed along gender lines. For example, representatives of Tavoy 
Women’s Union (TWU), based in Dawei, complained to me about their 
exclusion from consultations and strategic planning, and about the lack of 
information sharing among civil society organizations (CSOs), in spite of 
having their own track record of research and advocacy on land grabs. As 
one member put it: “Most people don’t think that gender is a problem - 
there’s overall lack of respect for women. In Dawei only TWU works on 
gender. We have to work harder than other organizations. Stereotypes are 
strong: women should not get involved in politics at community, regional 
and national level. And men discriminate. […] There’s also lack of promo-
tion of women’s activities in the media.”12 
Within this context, there has been a call for a renewed commitment 
to FPE as a way of doing “environmentalist, justice and feminism differ-
ently” in activism and academia (Harcourt and Nelson, 2015: 9), as well as 
a new push to identify alternative “gendered pathways” (Leach et al., 2015) 
to bridge the gap between the realm of mainstream environment and de-
velopment practice, and agrarian, environmental and social activism. This 
thesis, I hope, will be my personal intellectual and political contribution to 
this call.  
 
Land grab studies at a crossroad: informing the politics of land grabs  
While neoliberal states relentlessly advance their agenda of commodifica-
tion of humans and nonhumans (Tsing, 2015) for capital accumulation in 
the name of development, following the multiple crises of 2007-2008, 
there has been a global recognition that past patterns of growth have been 
environmentally unsustainable and socially unjust. As Diane Elson high-
lights, these crises were gendered because they rested on gendered eco-
nomic processes and institutions that ignored women’s voices and needs 
as producers and care givers (Elson, 2010: 252). On the one hand, the 
‘solution’ has been a proliferation of mainstream initiatives ‘to green’ the 
economy by way of top-down approaches that exclude diversity and dif-
ference (Wichterich, 2015: 79). On the other hand, there has also been an 
increase of alternatives from below that are being put forward through 
local, national and collective struggles of rural people.  
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As Leach and colleagues argue (2015: Section 3, para. 11), this conjunc-
ture highlights  
the need to interweave both feminist political economy critiques of macroe-
conomics, trade and labour relations, and feminist political ecology ap-
proaches that highlight gendered access to and control over resources and 
links with subjectivity, identities and the politics of knowledge…Using both 
approaches to revitalize debates concerning care, commons, commoning and 
cultures of sufficiency, solidarity or enough can thus provide powerful cri-
tiques of current growth-oriented paradigms and their destructive impacts on 
ecosystems and local people. 
Hence in certain academic and activist circles, there is a renewed sense 
of urgency of the importance of bringing together feminist agrarian polit-
ical economy and feminist political ecology in analyses of agrarian and en-
vironmental transformation, and women, youth, and the marginalized and 
oppressed in the politics therein. Failure to do so will have implications in 
terms of the development of socially just alternatives, in addition to the 
soundness of the analyses themselves. Through its engagement with land 
grab studies, this thesis aims to highlight the significance of gender and 
generational justice as core elements of visions of agrarian and environ-
mental justice.  
This is a time where different visions and pathways towards transfor-
mation and sustainability are confronting each other and shaping the pol-
itics of agrarian and environmental change (Leach et al., 2015; Scoones et 
al., 2015). At this critical historical juncture where neoliberal “universals” 
are aggressively making their way into rural areas of Southeast Asia, new 
spaces for addressing power imbalances and structural inequalities are be-
ing created within counter-visions of social justice, environmental sustain-
ability and alternative economies (Tsing, 2005, 2015). In times of crisis, in 
fact, “existing gender norms may be reinforced; or they may decompose, 
with individual men taking on roles normally associated with women, and 
vice versa; or they may be transformed through deliberate collective ac-
tion, by civil society groups, or by governments” (Elson, 2010: 204), de-
pending on how we collectively contribute to such a transformation.   
By engaging with a “politically charged, high profile arena” 
(Schoenberger et al., 2017: 702), scholars and activists can open opportu-
nities for centring gender and generational justice in the politics of land 
grabs, in the context of struggles for social justice. This also calls for a 
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careful recalibration of analysis and action of social justice-based solutions 
(Franco et al., 2017) (see Chapter 5). Ultimately, “current debates about 
‘land grabbing’ are in fact debates between different visions of the future 
shape of farming and the fate of rural populations”, women and men, 
younger and older (Park and White, 2017: 1107), and the social reorgani-
zation of nature. Using land grab studies as a broad umbrella, this thesis 
uses cases from Cambodia and Myanmar to illustrate how gender and gen-
erational power dynamics play out, transform and are transformed in pro-
cesses of agrarian and environmental change and rural politics. It does so 
through the lens of structure, institutions and agency analysed from a fem-
inist political ecology perspective, with handles from feminist political 
economy. Although the cases are put in conversation with each other, the 
thesis does not intend to offer a comparative analysis of the two countries. 
Rather than being chosen based on empirical factors following a positivist 
approach, the cases were selected for their theoretical relevance using an 
interpretive approach, as each illuminates a different angle to the same 
broader social process.  
 
1.4  Theorizing gender and generation in agrarian and 
environmental transformations 
 
Building on the previous section, this section frames the thesis in the con-
text of scholarship on agrarian political economy, political reactions from 
below, and peasant politics and state-society relations, with feminist polit-
ical ecology as the overarching intellectual and political project. The inten-
tion is to provide an overview of key concepts that have informed my 
research rather than attempting a comprehensive discussion of all these 
traditions and schools of thought.  
 
1.4.1 Land grabs through the lens of agrarian political economy  
Understanding agrarian change in the modern world centres on the analysis 
of capitalism and its development. (Bernstein, 2010: 1) 
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Gender is clearly implicated in all three aspect of the agrarian question, 
whether class, politics, or accumulation…There is, in short, a need to both 
engender the agrarian question and bring the issues raised by the agrarian 
question into the analysis of gender relations. (O’Laughlin, 2009: 191) 
 
Agrarian political economy, as defined in the mission statement of the 
Journal of Agrarian Change, “investigates the social relations and dynamics 
of production and reproduction, property and power in agrarian for-
mations and their processes of change, both historical and contemporary” 
(Bernstein, 2010: 1). Based on the discussion in Section 1.3, and informed 
by feminist critiques of agrarian political economy (Deere, 1995; Razavi, 
2009, 2011), I understand feminist agrarian political economy as an ap-
proach that investigates how gender, class social relations and dynamics of produc-
tion and reproduction, property and power are mutually constituted in agrarian for-
mations and their processes of change. Feminist political economy more broadly 
focuses on unpacking “the systemic relations between the domestic, eco-
nomic and political structures” (Razavi, 2009: 188) and, in the face of new 
emerging global challenges, it understands “economies as gendered struc-
tured and economic crises as crises in social reproduction, as well as in 
finance and production” (Rai and Waylen, 2013). 
Marxist inspired theories of agrarian change and politics have centred 
largely, but not exclusively, on the investigation of three interconnected 
questions, as Levien and colleagues note in a recent special issue of The 
Journal of Peasant Studies on “Agrarian Marxism” 13: “how capitalism seizes 
agricultural production and differentiates agrarian classes; the contribu-
tions of agriculture to industrialization or the overall establishment of a 
capitalist mode of production; and the implications of all this for the po-
litical behavior of agrarian classes.” (Levien et al., 2018: 854). As seen in 
Section 1.3, in general gender relations have received scant attention in 
Marxist analyses of agrarian change (O’Laughlin, 2009).  
To those wishing to undertake agrarian political economy analyses, the 
four classical questions formulated by Henry Bernstein have provided and 
continue to provide a helpful and practical approach to the basic research 
objectives of such analyses: who owns what, who does what, who gets what, and 
what do they do with it? (Bernstein, 2010: 22). A fifth question – what do they 
do to each other? - was also suggested by White and Dasgupta (2010: 600) 
“to capture the relational and political side of property and labour regimes, 
labour process and structures of accumulation”. In studying the expansion 
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of capitalism in rural areas, they argue, it is critically important “to analyse 
the social relations of production and reproduction and the structures of 
accumulation or (dis)accumulation that they generate. Also important is 
the change in agrarian structures and the accompanying processes of social 
differentiation and class formation that may result” (2010: 600). In this 
regard, they also remind us of the importance of considering gender dy-
namics.  
Many scholars have turned to Marx’s ‘primitive accumulation’ and Har-
vey’s ‘accumulation by dispossession’ as frameworks to understand land 
grabbing.14 As highlighted by Hall (2013), three main concepts in particu-
lar have been applied: the forceful separation and expulsion of people 
from land and their incorporation into capitalist social relations15; the re-
sponse to crises of over-accumulation16 (2003: 139); and the extra-eco-
nomic means of capital accumulation, especially political and legal power 
and violent force. A more casual use of these concepts deploys them as 
synonyms of enclosure and dispossession in general (Hall, 2013). Feminist 
Marxist analyses have highlighted that the gendered outcomes of primitive 
accumulation go in the direction of reinforcing patriarchy and (re)produc-
ing exploitative gender relations. For instance, when capitalist labour mar-
kets develop, the following three tendencies may manifest: intensification 
of existing forms of gender subordination; the decomposition of existing 
forms of gender subordination; and the emergence of new forms of gen-
der subordination. Women cannot participate as ‘free wage labourers’ be-
cause they are not free from domestic obligation, free to exercise control 
over their bodies and to be full members of society. The capitalist labour 
process is also premised on managerial hierarchies that typically see 
women at the bottom of the ladder. Furthermore, participation in the 
wage labour market does not translate into an improvement in women’s 
conditions in the household and in society as the social reproduction of 
labour is still achieved through women’s unpaid labour. (Elson and Pear-
son, 1981: 99)  
A major critique of accumulation by dispossession, especially in rela-
tion to land grabbing, has been related to its failure to fully acknowledge 
the role of extra-economic coercion in the process of accumulation, par-
ticularly the “deeply political role of states in orchestrating dispossession 
and the implications that follow from this” (Levien, 2013: 384). According 
to Levien (2013), dispossession cannot be explained only in terms of eco-
nomic factors, such as cycles of over-accumulation, or credit and financial 
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systems, because its nature and outcomes depend on socially and histori-
cally specific political and ideological factors, including class struggles. Un-
der advanced capitalism, in fact, various forms of dispossession can occur, 
which are sector-specific and geographically dispersed (Ibid, 2013). Using 
the framing of ‘exclusion’, Hall and colleagues (2011) elaborate on the dif-
ferent ways in which changes in land relations occur across Southeast Asia 
and emphasize “the need to situate [land] dilemmas…within the specific 
historical, geographic, social economic and political contexts that frame 
them, in order to analyse them in ways that yield some insight into the 
factors at work in different sites and conjunctures.” (Ibid, 2014:199) Marx 
himself recognized that there can be multiple paths to agrarian change, 
and that agrarian transformations cannot be considered as a standard for-
mula that applies equally to all contexts. This was more explicitly ad-
dressed and elaborated on by Lenin and Kautsky who indicated that be-
cause of the very nature of agriculture and peasant social organization, 
including the capacity of farming households to depress real wages by 
working longer and harder, agrarian capital could develop in different 
forms and along different paths (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2009; Kautsky, 
1988; Lenin, 1964). However, none of them unpacked farming house-
holds: a neglect which has been critiqued by radical Marxist feminists who 
identified in the appropriation of the care work of women a necessary 
condition for the existence of capitalism (see for instance, Federici, 2004). 
In a useful discussion of doing empirical analyses of agrarian differen-
tiation, Ben White advocates the use of an open, flexible framework that 
allows us to analyse agrarian transformations in concrete situations and 
from a broader perspective, accounting for seemingly contradictory 
tendencies – i.e. land concentration and capitalist farming, and landless-
ness and proletarianization coexisting with Asian small-scale farmers’ te-
nacity and resistance to differentiation. Simplistic analyses and models are 
doomed to fail in capturing the complexities and dynamics of change in-
volved in any point in time and local context (White, 1989: 28). More re-
cently, White and Dasgupta also reminded us that a “‘modern’ and flexible 
agrarian political economy also incorporates … dimensions that were rel-
atively neglected in classical agrarian studies such as the dynamics of gen-
der, ethnicity, livelihoods diversity, mobility, rural-urban links and envi-
ronment.” (2010:600). To offer a truly politically and analytically 
meaningful account of social change in contemporary rural settings, schol-
ars need to be attentive to the interaction of social differences, including 
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ethnicity, race and ability, beyond the class and gender dimensions advo-
cated by Bridget O’Laughin (2009). A focus on intersectionality17 that un-
derstands the interconnections among various dimensions of social rela-
tionships and subject formation as produced by everyday practices is what 
“opens up possibilities to understand how power operates not only in two 
dimensions, but rather in multiple dimensions that can have lateral and 
unexpected consequences for bodies and subjectivities.” (Nightingale, 
2011: 155)  
The agrarian transformations in contemporary Cambodia and Myan-
mar implicate a whole range of actors and sectors that are in (e.g. sugar, 
palm oil) and around agriculture (e.g. conservation, hydropower) and which 
are intertwined with processes of environmental change. These transfor-
mations and processes have gendered and generationed implications on 
agrarian structures of land and labour, on the politics of accumulation, and 
on resistance and social relations of production and reproduction. A nar-
row focus on the expansion of agribusinesses and an increase in FDI, for 
instance, may obfuscate the presence of other initiatives, such as those 
linked to climate change and land reform, or keep us from seeing historical 
continuities in the reproduction of gender inequalities and difference (in-
cluding ethnic based) through land-based social relations but also through 
discursively constructed gender roles and differences, for instance by per-
petuating imageries of women as care takers and vulnerable, or indigenous 
peoples as backward and their practices as destructive for the environ-
ment. 
Under the important rubric of the social reproduction of the ‘condi-
tions of farming’, Bernstein emphasizes the significance of ‘generational 
reproduction’, defined as the act of “producing the next generation of pro-
ducers”, in addition to the reproduction of the means of the production 
and of social relations among producer (Bernstein, 2010:19). He cautions 
that, apart from the act of bearing children and breastfeeding them, there 
is no natural order that women should be exclusively responsible for do-
mestic labour (Ibid, 2010). While social reproduction has, surprisingly, re-
ceived little attention in recent literature on agrarian change in the South 
(Cousins et al., 2018; Jacka, 2017; Levien et al., 2018); Cousins et al. 
(2018:1601) welcome ongoing efforts to transcend “the dualism between 
‘accumulation’ and ‘social reproduction’, as well as problematic analytical 
distinctions between ‘public’/‘private’ and ‘commodified’/ ‘non-com-
modified’ domains.” This is a dichotomy that has plagued both neoliberal 
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and Marxist traditions, having located the dynamics of accumulation ex-
clusively in the commodified domain. In contrast, as seen above, feminist 
political economy emphasizes not only the importance of non-commodi-
fied work for the reproduction of farmers but also, and significantly, the 
“fluidity of the boundaries” between the two spheres. (O’Laughlin, 2009: 
204) 
The idea of generation is central to social reproduction (Ansell 2014, 
284). The literature that conceptualizes generation as a social process un-
derstands young people’s lives as imbricated in generational (and gender 
power) relations at various scales, and their agency as situated generation-
ally (Huijsmans et al. 2014; Huijsmans 2018) - that is, youth are not only 
defined by their relationship with adults but also by the specific forms that 
this relationship takes (White, 2012). Nicola Ansell elaborates at length on 
the importance of the concept of generation in understanding the dynam-
ics of agrarian change. Generation,  
serves as an exercise of power …. This power is not only discursive but also 
material, shaping people’s economic contributions and access to resources. 
… It shapes people’s identities (intersecting with other relationships including 
gender and class), is lived by individuals and groups and has material effects. 
Inevitably, generationing is contested: the outcomes of contestations often 
lead to change – in some cases, arguably, to development. (Ansell, 2016: 315, 
first cit. in Park and White, 2017) 
In his study of youth outmigration across the Lao-Thai border, Barney 
(2012) found that large-scale investments and resource rents captured by 
the state and other powerful actors played a key role in engendering co-
erced rural youth migration and shaping patterns of social reproduction 
and agrarian change, similarly to Portilla’s findings discussed earlier (2017). 
Jonathan Rigg (1998: 503) highlighted the generational dimension of the 
diversification of rural livelihoods towards non-agricultural activities in the 
agrarian transition of Southeast Asia. While existing studies on youth mi-
gration reveal both cases of young people willingly leaving rural areas and 
agriculture, or being ‘expelled’ because of a lack of access to land and op-
portunities, Rigg argues that this might be a fictitious separation. In fact, 
households and individuals resort to a generational diversification of live-
lihoods that keeps the older generations/individuals closer to the land and 
farming as a source of stability, while younger individuals seek paid work. 
This strategy may also involve the same individual at different stages of 
his/her life. Rigg also underscores that households should not be assumed 
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to be homogeneous as especially youth, and young women in particular, 
have often been found to contest and negotiate their ascribed roles, refus-
ing to passively accept their parents’ wishes (Rigg, 1998). This is evident 
in Gillian Hart’s study of agrarian transitions in Muda rice-growing areas 
of Malaysia, where the “diversification of ‘household’ income sources is 
the outward manifestation of shifts in the structure and exercise of power 
between men and women and between elders and juniors” (Hart, 1994: 
49).  
Agrarian change comes with inherent processes of class formation and 
social differentiation, defined by Ben White (1989: 19–20) as the “dynamic 
process involving the emergence or sharpening of ‘differences’ within the 
rural population”, which may or may not involve income inequalities in 
the short-term. Furthermore, agrarian change is more about the “changing 
kinds of relations…in the context of the development of commodity re-
lations in rural economy.” These processes are embedded in social power 
relations in households and communities, as we will see in the empirical 
chapters. Social differentiation happens along trajectories that are different 
for different people, with multiple forms of oppression and inequality pos-
sibly compounding and reinforcing each other, and informing different 
political reactions to changes such as in the case of land grabs (Borras and 
Franco, 2013). In some cases a (re)masculinization of ‘rural space’ has 
been observed (Archambault and Zoomers, 2015) in conjunction with the 
expansion of corporate farming, extractive industry concessions and tour-
ism development. In Morocco, for instance, the disarticulation of family 
farming coupled with the increased valuation of land has redefined farm-
ing as an entrepreneurial and masculine activity where young men con-
struct their subjectivities in association with ideas of modernity and mas-
culinity through a process of “professionalization and masculinization of 
farming activities” (Bossenbroek and Zwarteveen, 2015: 162). Further-
more, it has resulted in the emergence of a new class of agricultural entre-
preneurs, similarly to the case of agarwood collectors discussed earlier 
(Großmann, 2017). In some cases, this leaves women with less access to 
resources, but with increased workloads and responsibilities (Archambault 
and Zoomers, 2015). Not only are processes of class formation embedded 
in agrarian transitions, but they are also gendered and generationed, so-
cially differentiated and differentiating, and dependant on the specific con-
ditions in which they develop.  
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The issue of whether women, particularly rural women, can be consid-
ered a class in themselves has been hotly debated by both Marxist and 
socialist feminists (Hennessy, 2003: 65; Tong, 2009: 100) and an in-depth 
discussion is beyond the scope of this section. Bernstein notes that social 
relations and instances of inequality, such as, for instance, gender identi-
ties, are experienced not “self-evidently and exclusively as class exploita-
tion in general but in terms of specific identities” (Bernstein, 2010: 117). 
Despite the challenges in conducting empirical analyses that focus on the 
intersection of class and gender (Rao, 2018), feminist scholars have inves-
tigated the extent to which pre-existing gender and social inequalities and 
power relations shape the production of new structures and determine 
processes of social differentiation. Analysing women’s land rights in the 
context of the agrarian question in South Africa, O’Laughlin (2009: 209) 
observed that many women did not have the same status as their husbands 
because they did not get an equal share of household and community re-
sources.18 Research conducted in Lao PDR on the gender implications of 
land-based agricultural investments highlights that paths of social differ-
entiations may be different for women and men, even within the same 
household (Park and Daley, 2015). In spite of remarkable differences be-
tween capitalist tobacco contract farmers - as per Bernstein’s definition 
(Ibid, 2010: 14) - who were hiring in labour and renting additional land,19 
and medium or petty commodity producing farmers, no notable differ-
ences could be found between the status of their wives. In both cases the 
women bore the burden of the additional production for the market with 
no more money or immediate benefits directly available to them (Daley et 
al., 2013; Park and Daley, 2015). According to Agarwal (2014b), rural 
women across classes hold the same responsibilities with respect to do-
mestic work as they are subjected to the same division of labour. Con-
versely, Rao’s study of women’s labour force participation in India high-
lights that rural women from the poorest households are those most 
affected by the combined effects of the lack of income-generating oppor-
tunities and the decreasing access to common water and fuel resources, 
intensified under capitalist expansion. The consequent increase in 
women’s work burden affects their participation in the labour market, as 
intrahousehold power relations and patriarchal norms shape decisions 
about how to ensure the generation of surplus (Rao, 2018). Thus while 
there can be arguments both against and in favour of the likelihood of 
women having similar interests across economic and social differences, 
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what is more analytically useful here is the extent to which this may or may 
not have an effect on their participation in politics from below, as these 
examples have shown.  
 
Agriculture, farming, farmers and peasants 
Reflections on agrarian transformation cannot be complete without an 
analysis of agriculture or the agricultural sector, and the “transformation 
or non-transformation, or indeed even partial transformation – of petty 
commodity producing peasants into wage labour, and hence labour 
power” vis-à-vis the expansion of capital (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2009: 
20).  
In contexts such as Cambodia and Myanmar, where agriculture is still 
dominated by smallholder farmers,20 it is useful to refer to Bernstein’s dis-
tinction between farming – “what farmers do and have always done” 
(Bernstein, 2010: 62) -, and agriculture, which encompasses “farming to-
gether with all those economic interests, and their specialized institutions 
and activities, ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ of farming, that affect the ac-
tivities and reproduction of farmers”. Agriculture in modern capitalist so-
cieties developed distinctive features such and the “social divisions of la-
bour” and became the object of public policy (Bernstein, 2010: 65, first 
cit. in Park et al., 2015). This distinction, which is not always made, is an-
alytically important, especially in the context of transformations that ac-
centuate diversities in “contemporary ‘farming’ and ‘agriculture’; the het-
erogeneity of rural ‘communities’ and of ‘rural women’; and the gendered 
relations in which they are involved” (Park et al., 2015: 586), as also em-
phasized in Ben White’s definition of social differentiation above. 
The vast majority of the world’s farms – more than 570 million globally 
– are small or very small, according to the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation of the United Nations (FAO). They are run by an individual or a 
family, and rely primarily on family labour. Specifically, 72 percent of all 
farms are less than 1 hectare and cover 8 percent of all agricultural land. 
Farms of between 1 and 2 hectares account for 12 percent of the total 
number of farms and cover 4 percent of the land, and farms of between 2 
to 5 hectares represent 10 percent of all farms and control 7 percent of 
the land. In contrast, 1 percent of all farms are larger than 50 hectares, but 
control 65 percent of the world’s agricultural land (FAO, 2014: xii). It is 
estimated that on average women comprise 43 percent21 of the agricultural 
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labour force in developing countries, not including the unreported contri-
bution of their unpaid labour on family farms (FAO, 2011). While data on 
rural youth – those living in rural areas – and agricultural youth – those 
involved in agricultural activities - is difficult to obtain, most of the pro-
jected population growth in the next decades is expected to occur in de-
veloping countries in Asia and Africa, where a large portion of the popu-
lation is still rural (van der Geest, 2010; World Coordinating Committee 
of the IYFF+10, 2018). Currently over 40 percent of the world population 
consists of people aged 15-24. With youth unemployment soaring and the 
farming population ageing, attracting youth in agriculture has become a 
key concern of governments and peasant movements alike.22 
In spite of processes of de-agrarianization, worldwide there are still 
many agrarian societies – that is “societies based on farming and processes 
of change in farming” (Bernstein, 2010: 61) – although countries as a 
whole may be at different stages of their integration in the global market 
economy and development of capitalism. In such countries and societies, 
the majority of farmers tend to be small, marginal, and women (Agarwal, 
2014a).  
Figure 1.1 
Rural-urban population Cambodia 
Source: UN 2017 World Population Prospects and 2018 World Urbanization Prospects 
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In 2017 in Cambodia and in Myanmar, the rural population was esti-
mated to be 78.8 percent and 64.8 percent respectively of the total popu-
lation (FAO, n.d.), while the respective share of the labour force in agri-
culture stood at 33 percent and 51 percent of the total, of which 33 percent 
and 50 percent was female (ILO, n.d.). The contribution of the agricultural 
sector on the GDP has been steadily declining in both countries as seen 
in Section 1.2 (see Figure 1.3 and 1.4).  
In Myanmar, agriculture employs about 56 percent of the labour force, 
according to government statistics, and 54.2 percent of those engaged in 
agriculture fall below the poverty line (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock 
and Irrigation, 2018: 6). The Myanmar Agriculture Development Strategy 
2018-2022, noting that 80 percent of farmers have less than 10 acres, 
acknowledges the success of smallholder agriculture in driving the growth 
of the production and export of pulses, and states that “while an approach 
based on smallholder agriculture is vital on equity grounds as a way of 
ensuring inclusive growth, it may also be justified on efficiency grounds.” 
(Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation, 2018: 12) The diver-
gence between GDP contribution and the labour force engaged seems to 
indicate (Agarwal, 2014a) the prevalence of “farming” over “agriculture” 
in both countries. 
Figure 1.2 
Rural-urban population Myanmar 
Source: UN 2017 World Population Prospects and 2018 World Urbanization Prospects 
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It is important to acknowledge that ‘farming’ itself may be an evolving 
concept, no longer strictly limited to “what farmers do and have always 
done” (Bernstein, 2010: 62). The engagement of faming households in 
‘pluriactivity’, including agricultural and non-agricultural wage labour, 
temporary outmigration and small-scale businesses (White, 2018) – a ten-
dency that Kay (2008) refers to as ‘new rurality’ - has been pointed to as 
one of the reasons explaining the persistence of smallholders in Asia, in 
addition to their capacity to be highly productive on relatively small plots 
of land (White, 2018). Small farmers are also increasingly dependent on 
various types of corporate actors to create linkages with the market at dif-
ferent loci in the value chain (Park et al., 2015). This means that in pro-
cesses of agrarian change, farmers are likely to experience a reduction of 
their autonomous food production and an increase in their engagement 
with corporate agriculture, thus making the distinction between farming 
and agriculture increasingly blurred. Based on work in Thailand, Yos San-
tasombat introduces the concept of ‘flexiblepeasants’. Moving beyond es-
sentialized and static conceptualizations of the peasantry, this concept 
aims to capture the increasing diversity of the agricultural sector and ways 
in which peasants might engage in the rural economy (peasant-workers, 
wage labourers, petty producers, trans-migrant peasants, contract farmers, 
etc.). In addition, by exposing the neglected link between peasants and 
biological diversity, Santasombat suggests that a reconceptualization of 
peasants as flexible peasants should also include their identities as the ‘for-
est conservationist’, the ‘indigenous person’ and the ‘genetic manager’. In 
the context of resource conflicts and transnational environmental social 
movements, this highlights “the significance of the peasantry as a social force 
relevant to concerns of the future.” (Santasombat, 2008: 34 emphasis in original). 
This is supported by Hall and colleagues who assert that: “identity not 
defined in class terms, but in terms of ethnicity, culture or attachment to 
a place, is prominent as the grounds on which people mobilize to contest 
exclusions and assert claims.” (Hall et al., 2011: 171) 
In the cases analysed for this study, pluriactivity, engagement with the 
cash economy and the significance of ‘flexible peasants’ were evident, al-
beit to different extents and shaped by specific contexts, histories and ge-
ographies. Within this context and following Bernstein (2010), in this 
study I refer to farmers rather than peasants, although many of the com-
munities I visited, especially in Tanintharyi, displayed many peasant-like 
features such as a family farm as the basic unit of reproduction, livelihoods 
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based mainly on subsistence agriculture and community solidarity and rec-
iprocity.23 When the term “peasant” is used instead, it is done for the pur-
pose of referring deliberately to its normative use (Bernstein 2010) in the 
context of peasant politics.  
Figure 1.3 
Evolution of value added by sector as of % of GDP in Cambodia 
Data source: World Development Indicators, elaborated by Lorenzo Pastore 
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Figure 1.4 
Evolution of value added by sector Myanmar as % of GDP 
Data source: World Development Indicators, elaborated by Lorenzo Pastore 
(data for the service sector not available) 
  
1.4.2  Political reactions ‘from below’ and peasant politics 
How do those most affected actually perceive and react to these large-scale 
land deals and why?  (Borras and Franco, 2013: 1724)  
 
The question above is one that has not been sufficiently addressed in land 
grab studies, according to Borras and Franco (2013) who have been 
among the most prolific contributors to theoretical debates around land 
grabbing. To research the topic, they offer a broad analytical framework 
that looks at the ‘location’ of contention in the broader context of pro-
cesses of agrarian transformation and the ‘axis’ of the origin of political 
conflict and the trajectory of political contention. They argue that in order 
to capture the complexities on the ground, which may involve struggles 
for incorporation, against dispossession, labour-related claims as well as 
conflicts among poor people, “the unit of inquiry should be the dynamics 
of change in social relations as a result of large-scale land deals” (Borras and 
Franco, 2013: 1741, emphasis in original). In addition, they highlight the 
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importance of looking at land and the social relations embedded in it; the 
role of the state as broker, land grabber, and gatekeeper; and at different 
types of contestations and struggles around and beyond land grabbing, 
including struggles against expulsion and struggles for, and/or around the 
terms of incorporation, as well as other land-related issues such as redis-
tribution, recognition of tenurial rights, and against concentration. More 
recently, they have also called for attention to “the broader political-institu-
tional impacts of land grabbing on society more widely, that is, on the society 
wide land questions including those pertaining to the social function of 
land” (Borras and Franco, 2018: 2–3). They highlight that recent models 
of development and capital accumulation, including land grabs, have pro-
duced new agrarian structures and redefined the social groups who depend 
on land for their livelihood, challenging the social function of land and 
aggravating poverty and exclusion.  
In the same article, Borras and Franco also argue that the impacts of 
land grabs could only be redressed by “deep social reforms, i.e. system-
wide structural and social justice-oriented land policies” (Borras and 
Franco, 2018: 3). This brings to the fore the role of the state and state-
society relations. Both are essential to understand the political-institutional 
processes underwriting historical and current trajectories of agrarian and 
environmental change. As Hall et al. (2011:170) note, the state is often the 
preferred target of complaints about “harmful policies and broken prom-
ises”, injustices and murky deals that favour the powerful at the expense 
of the local claimants. Two main contending framings of state-society in-
teractions have been used for understanding the state and state policy 
making. State-centred approaches view the state as an autonomous and 
independent actor/variable (Weber), while society-centred approaches 
consider the state to be a dependent actor/variable and thus emphasize 
structural and inherent constraints on state action which is controlled by 
the ruling class (Lenin).   
An alternative approach is the interactive state-society framework, 
which conceives state action as resulting from a “reciprocal cause and ef-
fect relationship between changes in balance of power within states and 
shifts in the balance of power within society” (Fox, 1993: 22). This means 
that not only are the outcomes of policies and of state action not pre-
determined, but also that a variety of ‘social actors’ can contribute to shap-
ing the outcomes of a reform process. In the context of this thesis, this 
framework allows for an account of the interactions between a multiplicity 
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of state and non-state actors involved in and shaping policy making, in-
cluding foreign capital, development organizations, international non-gov-
ernmental organizations (INGO), grassroot organizations, rural women 
and men, and, in Myanmar, notably, ethnic armed organizations. Taking 
into account hierarchies of power and power relations among different 
actors can then help to understand the gendered and generationed out-
comes of state action and state-society interactions, including the ways in 
which land grab politics are mediated by patriarchal institutions - families, 
communities, labour markets, social movements, and the state itself. This 
is confirmed by the findings of this research that also highlights the role 
of grassroots organizations and NGOs. For instance, in cases of dispos-
session that affected indigenous communities in Ratanakiri, Cambodia, 
grassroots organizations failed to put indigenous women’s rights on their 
agendas (see Chapter 4). In contrast, in Myanmar, civil society and land 
movements strongly advocated for the inclusion of explicit reference to 
gender equality and women’s land rights in the language of the National 
Land Use Policy (NLUP), contributing to a much stronger final draft 
(Transnational Institute, 2015b) (see Chapter 2). 
The concept of political opportunity structure, understood as “con-
sistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the po-
litical struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics”,24 
has been widely used to analyse the strategies and success of social move-
ments. Tarrow (1994: 1) argued that “movements are created when polit-
ical opportunities open up for social actors who usually lack them. They 
draw people into collective action through known repertories of conten-
tion and by creating innovations around their margins.” Social movements 
further develop their repertoires of ‘contentious performances’ dynami-
cally and in conversation with the political, social and economic context 
in which they are immersed (Tilly, 2002, 2004). An example of this can be 
seen in the confluence of interests and mobilization from below around 
the land question in Myanmar, as the government opened in an unprece-
dented move the consultation process over the NLUP to civil society (see 
Chapter 2).  
Scholarly interest in mobilization and peasants’ collective action falls 
into three main paradigms and schools of thought: classical collective ac-
tion based on the neoclassical economics premise of the rational profit-
maximizing individual; Marxist class-based analysis; and theories of social 
movements partially based on radical agrarian populism. In the case of 
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classical collective action, peasants decide to engage or not in mobilization 
based on a profit-maximizing value judgment. And since mobilization is 
risky, peasants will most likely avoid engaging in any action that can 
threaten such profit-maximizing behaviour. For instance, according to 
Popkin (1979: 22), peasants are mobilized by self-interest, and village 
norms “are malleable, renegotiated, and shifting in accord with consider-
ations of power an strategic interaction among individual” instead of being 
fixed and culturally determined as posed by moral economy analyses. 
Marxists see struggles as class-based and a result of the tensions inherent 
in processes of social differentiation and in the development of capitalism. 
The conditions for mobilization will be in place when and if classes of 
farmers transition from the state of “class in itself” to “class for itself” – 
that is, when the structural/material and objective conditions of existence 
turn into a consciousness of class interests and ignite farmers’ political 
action to pursue these interests. However, with respect to politics, being 
animated largely by petty bourgeois aspirations, peasants are generally con-
sidered as unreliable and backward ‘sacks of potatoes’ (in Marx’s own 
words) who cannot represent themselves but have to be represented. Ac-
cording to Marxists scholars, political action around land grabs is currently 
catalysed around two main struggles or fronts: the struggle against dispos-
session (see Harvey, 2003); and the struggle against expulsion from or for 
incorporation into the capitalist system.  
In contrast, moral economy analyses, influenced by Chayanov’s con-
ceptualization of peasants and peasant communities, see threats to “sub-
sistence ethics” as triggers for “everyday forms of peasant resistance”, 
conceptualized in James Scott’s analysis of rural resistance in Malaysia. 
This happens typically when the penetration of capital or state initiatives 
alter what are considered to be acceptable forms of surplus extraction thus 
undermining collective food security. Such collective understanding of 
what is acceptable is based on the existence of “collective identities,” a 
concept that new social movement theorists use to explain how people 
mobilize together (Rocheleau and Nirmal, 2015: 794). Scott identifies the 
potentials for peasant rebellion (not revolution) in the structural vulnera-
bilities of the peasantry to shocks; in turn, the absence of revolt can be 
explained in terms of adaptive and survival strategies (Scott, 1976). Ac-
cording to Brass’ analysis (2000: 313), populist and neo-populist framings 
of collective action replace “class/consciousness/struggle by ethnic/na-
tional identity/antagonism” and use a mobilizing discourse that “focuses 
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on the presentation/projection of issues and identity in a non-class man-
ner” based on essentialized ideas of peasants. None of these frameworks, 
however, takes into consideration gender and other power dynamics that 
are re-inscribed in such struggles (Razavi, 2009).  
While theories about agrarian politics and peasant mobilization are im-
portant to understand the politics of land grabs, what matters most for 
this thesis is how they influence and support the mobilization strategies 
and struggles of local claimants of diverse classes, ethnicities, genders (to 
be discussed in Section 1.4.3) and ages. For instance, Ghimire (2002) high-
lighted the neglected issue of ‘marginalized rural youth’ as a potential new 
social force in the countryside, but found that their marginality was not 
reflected in social movements. 
For feminist analyses the starting point is to refute the ‘androcentrism’ 
of gender and power-blind accounts of rural and peasant households and 
communities. As Hart highlights: “A gender-informed analysis provokes 
a fundamental rethinking of ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’.” (Hart, 
1998: 116) By deconstructing institutions like households and communi-
ties, feminist scholars expose these as sites of contestation and resistance 
as well as cooperation, advancing a better understanding of collective ac-
tion and mobilization. Such deconstruction is supported by the recogni-
tion that a person is simultaneously an individual and a social being and 
her/his interests and identities are shaped by individual agency but also 
constrained by social relations, thus “experiencing well-being which is 
both personal and conditional on the well-being of significant others.” 
(Jackson, 2006: 243). In a review of cases of women’s mobilization across 
Latin America, Stephen (2006: Chapter 1, Section 3, para. 3) points to the 
existence of a wide variety of individual experiences that form women’s 
lived experience of mobilization and their resulting sense of identity/iden-
tities, which can also shift over time, thus contesting the concept of “col-
lective identities” used by new social movements theorists.   
Resistance is also shaped by how women and men’s identities and po-
sitions are constructed according to conventional notions of their place in 
society (Elmhirst, 2002: 83), and to the emotional work, predominantly 
performed by women, and the burden of it, invisible and unrecognized, 
but crucial to transformative politics. Research for this thesis and other 
work confirm that women often stepped into the frontline of protests as 
they felt it was their duty as wives and mothers to protect their husbands 
and sons (see for example, Brickell, 2014; Lamb et al., 2017; Park and 
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Maffii, 2017). Identity and positioning, in turn, circumscribe and shape the 
space in which women and men can exercise their agency in everyday life, 
for instance as it relates to the state (Resurrección, 2006: 384) or mobili-
zation against land grabs. In a state programme that granted ancestral do-
main tenurial rights in northern Philippines, Resurrección found that, hav-
ing access to market, women were not interested in land struggles and did 
not want to be identified as natural resource managers. Therefore, they 
strategically used their identity as ‘non-state actors’ to fade out of the pro-
gramme. Hence, “women’s interests, withdrawals and engagements 
should be examined as having been constructed from their own particular 
contexts and histories of gender, class and ethnic relations” (Resurrección, 
2006: 384). This can help explain participation or lack of participation in 
different types of acts of resistance and mobilization. This study also 
shows that positions and identities vary for different age groups, and par-
ticipation in land politics opens up spaces for young women and men to 
negotiate their positions and expected gender roles within their commu-
nities (see Chapter 2). 
In her analysis of gendered patterns of everyday resistance in rural Ma-
laysia, Gillian Hart also highlights that identities and interests are not fixed 
but shaped by political struggle on diverse and intersecting sites as well as 
by representations of masculinity and femininity (Hart, 1991). Contrary to 
common assumptions on women’s docile behaviour, women in the Muda 
region of Malaysia were able to organize collectively and challenge the in-
terests of large landowners, thanks to their marginal position vis-à-vis pat-
ronage and formal power structures, and to the gendered patterns of la-
bour organization, which promoted women-only labour gangs. Hart’s 
contribution, which problematizes Scott’s ‘androcentric focus’ in Weapons 
of the Weak, underscores the importance of taking into account “larger 
configurations of political and economic forces” when focusing on agency 
and resistance, unpacking homogeneous notions of peasants and peas-
antry and re-appropriating issues related to the form and class character 
of the state (Hart, 1991).  
Overall, evidence from across the world shows that historically agrarian 
movements have tended to side-line gender equality and women’s rights. 
In Latin America for example, being “discriminated against for being peas-
ants, for being poor and for being women” (Valle, 2009: 221), rural and 
rural indigenous women had to fight their way through patriarchy in 
households and communities, and in social movements (see for example 
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Potter and Zurita, 2009; Valle, 2009), in many instances creating their own 
movements. In Myanmar the dichotomy and divide between women’s 
groups and agrarian and environmental groups is quite evident and speaks 
to a gendered division of space where the political space is still dominated 
by men, affecting who gets to sit at what table to discuss what on behalf 
of whom.  
While this thesis focuses on current forms of land grabbing, it is im-
portant to acknowledge that these are the result of “historical repertoires 
of class and gender contention and state repression that shape land con-
flicts and facilitate or impede large-scale deals” (Edelman and León, 2013: 
1698). By recognizing these underlining power struggles, we can conceive 
of the agency of “contending social classes”, and the individuals and their 
actions within them, as not merely determined by or reacting to land grabs, 
and thus recognize the class and patriarchal character of the state.  
 
1.4.3  Women and gender in Cambodia and Myanmar  
 
Attempting a thorough discussion of women and gender in Cambodia and 
Myanmar is beyond the scope of this research. This section aims to pro-
vide an overall sense of where current discourses and practices around 
gender are rooted so to inform a better understanding of how these might 
shape in practice the lived experiences of the women and men who are 
the main actors of this research. The country-specific contexts are dis-
cussed in the empirical chapters, while here I focus on the broader picture 
to thread back the discussion to the “historical repertories” mentioned by 
Edelman and Léon above. The key point is to  
analyse the ways in which politics construct gender and gender constructs 
politics. Feminist history then becomes not the recounting of the great deeds 
performed by women but the exposure of the often silent and hidden opera-
tions of gender that are nonetheless present and defining forces in the organ-
isation of most societies.” (Scott, 1999: 25)  
Historian Barbara Watson Andaya, author of the seminal book The 
Flaming Womb: Repositioning Women in Early Modern Southeast Asia, has long 
highlighted the women gap in histories of Southeast Asia (Andaya, 2006, 
2007). She finds this a surprising gap, given the widespread narrative 
among colonial writers and historians of women’s relatively “high status” 
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and key roles in Southeast Asian societies, and attributes it to the lack of 
sources, specialists, and the bias of history in this region towards nation 
building. The post-war emergence of the academic field of “Southeast 
Asia”, with its focus on nationalism, independence and political leader-
ship, relegated women in “footnotes and marginalia” and ignored their 
agency. When it did not, it tended to include women in celebratory tones 
as heroines and saviours, which ghettoized women’s histories in yet dif-
ferent ways (Andaya, 2007: 115). While this has improved and is improv-
ing, despite significant challenges related to the paucity of sources, the key 
point here is that the dominant construction of women and femininity 
relied hardly at all on women’s own account of their experiences and how 
these shaped and were shaped by the socio-economic, political and cul-
tural landscape in which they lived.   
The idea that women enjoy high status in the household and society 
continues to permeate public discourse and private perceptions at various 
levels in Myanmar, thus providing a rationale for dismissing gender equal-
ity and women’s rights. For instance, Than (2013: 3) writes: “The percep-
tion that Burmese women enjoyed equality and suffered little prejudice 
removed gender from understandings of Burmese society. In other words, 
a male/female dichotomy was deemed irrelevant in Burma studies, since 
both men and women were thought to have enjoyed equal status histori-
cally.” In practice, however, women’s marginalization is sanctioned by tra-
ditional patriarchal codes of conduct, norms and religion (see for instance, 
Ikeya, 2012; Than, 2013; Than Than Nwe, 2003). 
In Cambodia, where the influence of the Chbab Srey, the traditional 
code for women, is still strong (see Chapter 3), Jacobsen identifies two 
major obstacles to the realization of gender equality. The first one is the 
principle that men dominate the public space, while women are relegated 
to the private/domestic space (see Chapter 2 for a similar discussion in 
Myanmar). For instance, Art. 16 of the Constitution prohibits the Queen 
from assuming any political role.25 The second one is the social norm that 
classifies women as either good or bad. ‘Good’ women are subservient 
daughters, faithful wives and caring mothers. In practice, for girls this 
means “agree to whichever marriage partner is selected for them, drop out 
of school in order to assume responsibilities in the household (rice plant-
ing, the care of younger siblings or farm animals, domestic tasks, weaving, 
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marketing) or take whatever cash jobs are available, and not put them-
selves in positions wherein the honour of the family could be compro-
mised” (Jacobsen, 2008: 262).  
These deep-rooted beliefs and the material inequalities they create are 
also reflected in the national gender indicators. In spite of state commit-
ments to international instruments and laws to advance human rights and 
gender equality (see Chapter 5), including the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), both 
countries lag behind in a number of indicators, particularly political and 
labour force participation, as captured by the Gender Development Index 
(GDI) and Gender Inequality Index (GII). The GDI, computed for 164 
countries, measures gender inequalities in achievement in health, educa-
tion and control over economic resources.26 The GII measures gender in-
equalities in three domains: reproductive health, empowerment and eco-
nomic status. The higher the GII value the more disparities between 
females and males27. The GII is calculated for 160 countries. 
Table 1.1 
Cambodia and Myanmar 2017 Gender Development Index 
 
 
Life expec-
tancy at birth  
Expected years 
of schooling  
Mean years 
of schooling  
GNI per capita HDI values  
F-M ra-
tio 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
GDI 
value 
Cambodia  71.3 67.1 11.2 12.2 3.8 5.6 2,970 3,878 0.553 0.605 0.914 
Myanmar  69.1 64.4 10.3 9.8 4.9 4.8 3,860 7,355 0.563 0.586 0.959 
East Asia 
and the 
Pacific  
76.7 72.8 13.5 13.2 7.6 8.3 10,689 16,568 0.717 0.750 0.957 
Medium 
HDI  
71.1 67.2 12.2 11.8 5.6 7.9 3,673 9,906 0.598 0.680 0.878 
Source: Global Human Development Indicators 
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Table 1.2 
Cambodia and Myanmar 2017 Gender Inequality Index 
 GII 
value  
GII 
Rank  
Maternal 
mortality 
ratio  
Adolescent 
birth rate  
Female 
seats in 
parliament 
(%)  
Population with at 
least some second-
ary education (%)  
Labour force partic-
ipation rate (%)  
  
  
  Female Male Female Male 
Cambodia  0.473 161 161 50.2 18.5 15.1 28.1 80.9 88.7 
Myanmar  
0.456 
 
106 178 28.7 10.2 28.7 22.3 51.3 79.9 
East Asia 
and the 
Pacific  
0.312  62 22.4 19.8 67.8 75.5 60.1 77.3 
Medium 
HDI  
0.489 
 
176 41.3 21.8 42.9 59.4 36.8 78.9 
 
Source: Global Human Development Indicators 
 
Although there is no data that disaggregates by locality or ethnicity, it 
is not far-fetched to assume that the inequalities will be heightened for 
rural and ethnic women. A CSO Shadow Report prepared to report on 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) (Women’s League of Burma, 2016: 6) lists a 
number of discriminatory practices that affect ethnic women in Burma 
including women listed as dependent on identity cards, even when they 
are employed; children’s identification cards needing the father’s signature; 
listing men as heads of households at government offices; women’s land 
rights curtailed in a number of ethnic groups (Kayan, Karenni/Kayah, 
Kayaw and Kuki); women being victims of sexual violence and abuse, es-
pecially IDP women; the seclusion of menstruating women. The report 
also calls for the immediate repeal of discriminatory laws such as the 2015 
Law on the Protection of Race and Religion, which imposes limitations 
on women’s right to choose a partner and the number and spacing of chil-
dren.28 In Cambodia, the penetration of ‘modernity’ in ethnic areas has 
amplified “the double burden of racial and gender discrimination” (Maffii, 
2009) as discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
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 It is within this context that this research investigates gendered and 
generationed patterns of agrarian and environmental change.  
 
1.4.4 The significance of feminist political ecology  
Earlier, in Section 1.3, I argued for the importance of embedding gender 
and generational analyses in land grab studies. I also emphasized that it is 
crucial to invoke and make use of insights from feminist political economy 
and feminist political ecology. This is necessary for the purpose of im-
proving our understanding of the long-term and profound implications of 
land grabs, as well as to expose and address the power dynamics in land 
grab politics so to promote social, gender and generational justice. In this 
section I expand on the significance of feminist political ecology scholar-
ship and approaches to my research project and journey.  
Emerged as a subfield of political ecology in the 1990s (Elmhirst, 2011) 
feminist political ecology (FPE) brought together feminist scholars and 
activists from a broad range of disciplines working on gender and agricul-
ture, gender and development, and gender and environment. The first col-
lection of empirical studies under the label of FPE was edited by Dianne 
Rocheleau, Barbara Thomas-Slayter, and Esther Wangari (Rocheleau et 
al., 1996) – Feminist Political Ecology: Global Issues and Local Experiences – and 
contributed a broad conceptual framework that used gender as an optic 
for analysing power and social relations in the politics of resources access 
and control, and processes of ecological change. FPE provided critical in-
puts into debates about development, sustainability and conservation, and 
created “an intellectual space to engage with the contributions of women 
and feminists to understanding the complex interactions among class, 
race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality and the environment in terms of rights, 
responsibilities, knowledges, and social movements” (Rocheleau and 
Nirmal, 2015: 794). 
In time FPE evolved significantly in response to new feminist theories 
and conceptualizations of gender, including notably feminist post-struc-
turalist and performative approaches that questioned the idea of gender as 
consisting of fixed and immutable social structures. These new conceptu-
alizations highlighted the constitution of gender as a socio-political pro-
cess produced by specific discursive and material practices (Butler, 1990, 
2004; Elmhirst, 2011; Nightingale, 2006). Intersectionality served as a 
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common framework for analysing the production of subjectivities through 
the intersection of gender with various social differences and axes of 
power including race, caste and ethnicity (Lykke, 2010). Scholars have also 
looked at how gendered subjectivities and bodily, spatial and social prac-
tices and nature are mutually constituted (Nightingale, 2006, 2011), and 
how these shape women’s place-based politics (Harcourt and Escobar, 
2002). The acknowledgement that nature and culture (Haraway, 2008), and 
social and natural processes are intertwined has also opened new avenues 
of exploration, such as the recognition of “everyday, embodied and emotional 
relations to resources and ‘natures’” (Harris, 2015: 158, emphasis in origi-
nal) including “direct bearing on how resources are accessed, used and 
fought over” (Sultana, 2011: 163), and how these relations may inform 
feelings of injustice and political activism (Wright, 2010); and the im-
portance of acknowledging that multiple ways of knowing and being exist 
and are at the core of lived ‘naturecultures’ (Haraway, 2008) and struggles 
for alternative cosmo-visions (Di Chiro, 2008, 2015; Walsh, 2015) towards 
the decolonization of knowledge. New areas of research interests have 
also emerged as a result of the rise of priority areas of global policy and 
governance (Nightingale, 2006; Resurrección and Elmhirst, 2008), includ-
ing climate change (Arora-Jonsson, 2011; Arora-Jonsson and Sijapati, 
2017; Nightingale, 2015), and environmental sustainability and conserva-
tion (Ojeda, 2012). In turn, the interest in global governance has fore-
grounded the importance of analyses that engage on multiple levels 
(Harris, 2015; Hawkins et al., 2011; Nightingale, 2015), generating debates 
among feminist scholars and activists about the need to pay greater atten-
tion to the gendered dimensions of “complex and multi-scalar processes 
of neoliberalization shifts…greater focus on gender, inequality and social 
difference in discussions of neoliberalized natures” (Harris, 2009: 388), 
and to ensure that gender justice is part of these alternatives (Harris, 2015). 
While comprising different approaches, methods and interests, femi-
nist political ecology shares a basic “commitment to feminist epistemol-
ogy, methods and values, where dominant, (colonial) masculinist concep-
tions of knowledge and authority are recognized and challenged” 
(Elmhirst 2015, 519). Wendy Harcourt has recently defined it as “the study 
of the conflicts and convergences between development conservation, 
cultural survival, body politics, gender equality and political autonomy. 
And it is also the politics and practice in the search for environmental 
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sustainability, social justice and economic transformation” (Harcourt, 
2018: 23).  
Feminist political ecology is thus an important project to “open up the 
space to learn through the body and other epistemologies and cosmovi-
sions” as highlighted in an edited volume on Practicing Feminist Political Ecol-
ogies (Harcourt and Nelson, 2015: 6). As such, feminist political ecology is 
a lived practice that rejects business as usual and takes up Donna Hara-
way’s call “to stay with the trouble” (Haraway, 2016; Harcourt and Nelson, 
2015), asking uneasy questions and continuously interrogating the re-
searcher’s and the research participants’ positionality, situatedness and 
power differences. Reflecting on her own journey, Rocheleau highlights 
that feminist political ecology should be considered as “an ongoing explo-
ration” rather than a fixed approach and as “work in process (not pro-
gress) and hopefully on a path, however circuitous, to decolonization” 
(Rocheleau, 2015b: 57), and calls on women’s movements, women in so-
cial justice and environmental movements, and scholars who have not 
identified themselves with feminist political ecology to join.    
Reflecting on the above, the reasons why a feminist political ecology 
approach is important for my research and project are manifold. At the 
analytical level, feminist political ecology allows me to combine the classi-
cal questions of agrarian political economy with concerns about the social 
reproduction of nature. At the theoretical and political levels, the follow-
ing concepts and positionalities have resonated with my own research and 
project. First, FPE questions assumptions about development, efficiency, 
productivity, and green economy and instead highlights “the other” – the 
care work of women, the personal and the private, indigenous practices of 
shifting cultivation and natural resource management, and labour ex-
change and reciprocity (see for instance, Wichterich 2015, Wright 2010). 
Second, with its attention to the production of power and dominance, FPE 
highlights the importance of putting gender and generational dimensions 
at the centre of alternative visions of development, especially in relation 
to land grab politics. Third, through the use of intersectionality, FPE en-
courages attention to the ways in which subjectivities and social differ-
ences, including gender, intersect and are produced through changing 
ecologies and agrarian and environmental transformations. Fourth, FPE 
challenges us to explore connections and actions across scales and beyond 
difference, particularly vis-à-vis global threats such as climate change 
(Nightingale, 2015: 206) and land grabs, and “to engage with others to 
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transform local economies here and now in an everyday ethical and polit-
ical practice of constructing community economies in the face of globali-
zation” (Gibson-Graham, 2008: 662). This can only be advanced through 
approaches that put “people, power and gender” at the centre of agrarian 
and environmental justice and steer away from engaging with “life and the 
Earth in silos of ‘energy’, ‘water’, ‘agriculture’, etc., as if they were not con-
nected” (Harcourt and Nelson, 2015: 5). Finally, taking FPE as “work in 
process”, as per Rocheleau’s point above, has encouraged me to reflect on 
how my experience as a development practitioner and gender specialist, 
an engaged researcher, and feminist could come together and contribute 
to bridging divides towards meaningful transformation.  
 
1.5  Research questions and objectives 
 
Informed by the critique above, and in the context of agrarian and envi-
ronmental changes driven by land grabs in Myanmar and Cambodia, this 
study aims to answer the following research question: 
 
How are gender and generational roles and relations shaping 
and being shaped by land grabbing and land grab politics?  
 
This central research question is addressed by disaggregating it into the 
following sub-questions: 
1) What are the main agrarian and environmental changes driven by 
land grabbing in Myanmar and Cambodia? 
2) What are their gendered and generationed impacts on access to the 
use, control and transfer of land and other natural resources; liveli-
hoods; labour (employment opportunities, labour requirements, 
work burden); voice/decision-making; conflicts within households 
and communities? 
3) What kinds of political reactions from below do different women 
and men engage in?  
4) What are the outcomes of women’s and youth’s participation on 
social justice and women’s and youth’s agency?  
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5) What are the conditions, material and non-material, that shape 
women’s and youth’s engagement in political reactions from below?  
6) What is the role of the state, civil society, grassroots movements and 
other actors in shaping women’s and youth’s mobilization?  
7) What strategies and instruments can grassroots social movements 
adopt in their strategies to promote more socially just outcomes?  
 
By answering the central research question, the thesis aims to: 1) con-
tribute to gendered and generationed analyses of agrarian and environ-
mental transformations in Cambodia and Myanmar; 2) make the case that 
addressing gender and generational justice must be central to all struggles 
for agrarian and environmental justice.  
Ultimately, with this thesis I hope to contribute to ongoing efforts to 
make a commitment to feminist inquiries of power and make them a 
standard practice for all scholars and activists interested in agrarian, envi-
ronmental and social justice. 
 
1.6  Doing feminist research 
I would like a doctrine of embodied objectivity that accommodates paradox-
ical and feminist science projects: Feminist objectivity means quite simply sit-
uated knowledges. (Haraway, 1988: 581, emphasis in original) 
 
Building on the discussion of feminist political ecology, the aim of this 
section is to illustrate my approach to doing feminist research. To this end, I 
draw on key concepts that have informed my research process to explain 
my situatedness, choices and methods.  
1.6.1 Feminist research ethics 
Ackerly and True (2010: 22) define feminist research ethics “a commit-
ment to inquiry about how we inquiry” that requires paying attention to 
“the power of knowledge and epistemology; boundaries, marginalization, 
silences and intersections; relationships and their power differentials; and 
your own socio-political location (or “situatedness”).” 
 Feminist epistemologies, as part of postpositivist reflections that advo-
cate studying the effects of power in knowledge creation and how these 
 CHAPTER 1 75 
shape social relations (Harding and Norberg, 2005), reject the idea of neu-
trality and objectivity. Knowledge is always socially constructed and thus 
gendered, according to feminist standpoint theory, which discards the idea 
of an essentialized woman. Even so-called neutral sciences are premised 
on conceptual frameworks situated in historical and social contexts that 
promote the distinctive interests of a few, thus ignoring the voices of the 
others, the women, the youth, the indigenous, the oppressed (Harding, 
2004). While acknowledging the different positions existing in standpoint 
epistemologies, I am interested in feminist standpoint epistemology’s “fo-
cus on the historical and social locatedness of knowledge projects and on 
the way collective political and intellectual work can transform a source of 
oppression into a source of knowledge and potential liberation”, making 
this kind of knowledge “a distinctive contribution to social justice projects 
as well as to our understanding of preconditions for the production of 
knowledge” (Harding, 2004: 10). My research is committed to feminist 
ethics and knowledge-generation by giving a space for women and youth, 
indigenous and not, to narrate their struggles and lived experiences of the 
grabs and to explain their visions of development, while exposing the 
power dynamics that might obstruct their voices from being heard. The 
study aimed to fill the gender silences with voices, recognize, respect and 
treasure difference, and denounce oppression, with the ultimate objective 
of shaping land grab politics in the direction of greater social justice. Fol-
lowing Ackerly and True (2010a), as a feminist, challenging the ‘androcen-
trism’ of land grab studies was a necessary step towards highlighting the 
political significance of my feminist project, as other eminent feminist 
scholars have done in authoritative ways (e.g. Hart on rural mobilization 
and Deere and Razavi on gender-blind agrarian political economy). Ques-
tioning what constitutes knowledge, and whose knowledge counts and 
gets used has thus been a fundamental part of my research approach.  
Standpoint thinking also encouraged me to recognize that the different 
situatedness and positionalities of the research participants, particularly 
women and youth, shaped their own standpoints and thus their under-
standing of women, youth, and gender equality, and which could therefore 
be different from mine. While I was committed to attentiveness to power, 
boundaries and situatedness, and to transforming “the social order in or-
der to promote gender justice” (Ackerly and True, 2010b: 2), I often found 
myself questioning what I was doing, having to step back, deconstructing 
my own assumptions and re-learning. In essence, I had to be willing to 
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“stay with the trouble” (Haraway, 2016), letting myself befriend uncer-
tainty and uneasiness and accept that the process could be far from perfect 
and linear. Importantly, I needed to acknowledge my situatedness and my 
positionality within the context of the MOSAIC project (discussed below), 
my own research project and my organization. This has also implied an 
ongoing engagement in self-reflectivity as to my own socio-political loca-
tion and socio-economic privilege (Ackerly and True, 2010b), triggering 
also reflections on how the knowledge I gained could help change the 
everyday practices and conceptual frameworks that are dominant within 
my development work towards more socially transformative outcomes 
(Harding and Norberg, 2005) .  
I am Korean middle-aged educated woman, daughter of migrant par-
ents, born and raised in Italy. Growing up, I often experienced my race 
and ethnicity with discomfort, always being the only Asian and foreigner 
in school and in my social network. My first timid encounters with femi-
nism happened at high school at student collectives and occasional 
marches. At that time, it was more out of collegiality and solidarity that I 
joined those events, without deeply interrogating the meaning of the 
claims that we were making nor how they would relate to my own identify 
as a Korean-Italian. Nonetheless, along with my friends, I claimed to be a 
feminist and happily joined public marches on March 8th. This was in the 
early 80s, the last part of the Italian so-called ‘anni di piombo’ (lead years), 
where socio-political turmoil manifested in terror attacks, killings and 
deaths both in extremist right wing and left-wing factions. My high school, 
a well-known liberal leftist school in a far-right bourgeois neighbourhood, 
was often the arena of students’ clashes and once the crime scene of the 
assassination of a policeman. In those years, we could share laughter and 
beers with friends and schoolmates but be highly divided by political affil-
iation. Friends on either side of the political spectrum could be beaten up 
or even killed during urban clashes, as sadly happened. In my ‘otherness’, 
while having a loose affiliation with the leftist side of the student crowd, I 
was torn between the desire to conform to my parents’ Korean expecta-
tions to have an obedient daughter, and to be socially integrated by being 
‘where the action was’. Most of the time caution prevailed. After all, the 
heyday of feminism was over and women’s rights were not in bad shape 
thanks to all the gains achieved by the hard work of feminists of the pre-
vious generation.    
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It was not until decades later that I was drawn back to feminism by my 
lived experience of being a single breadwinning mother. I had divorced, 
moved to Rome with my two young children and was struggling my way 
from one ill-paid, insecure job to another. Volunteering with a women’s 
group, I found a place where I felt at home and from where I was awoken 
to multiple realities of oppression, discrimination and injustice in my own 
countries and everywhere. As a small CSO, we ran a news agency and 
several projects to promote gender equality in government organizations 
and society. We also offered legal support and advisory services to migrant 
women. Researching and reporting on women’s rights in Italy and else-
where, I learned about wage differentials, denied reproductive rights, gen-
der based violence, and negation of basic human rights, but also about 
solidarity, sisterhood, diversity. Feminism took on a whole different mean-
ing and spin, as I realized that the gains made in the past could not be 
taken for granted and that not all women could exercise their basic human 
rights in the same way. Those years changed me in profound ways and 
determined my decision to make the struggle for gender equality my pri-
ority and occupation, firstly on a voluntary basis, then as casual worker.  
After years of consultancies, I now hold a staff position with the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations as regional 
gender specialist for the Asia Pacific office. Although rewarding in many 
ways, including from the perspective of economic stability, this transition 
has not been easy. Am I a ‘femocrat’ (Cornwall, 2007)? Or do I belong to 
the transnational activist class, “composed of educated and professional 
men and women of the middle class, mostly from the Global North but 
also drawn significantly from select countries of the Global South, who 
move freely back and forth between the UN, international NGOs, the 
academy and government” (Conway, 2011: 37)? And to what extent does 
this shape who I am, my research and my work? I have discussed this at 
length in the Prologue. Here I wish to highlight that I am aware of the 
privileges that come with my job, class, race, and socio-economic status 
and of my multiple identities and positionalities in the field, within the 
MOSAIC project described below, my organization, my academic insti-
tute, and vis-à-vis partners, subject-participants, colleagues and counter-
parts.  
In-country, my UN identity has given me privileged access to certain 
information and actors, especially in government – access which I used. 
The boundaries between my thesis and other work that I was doing in the 
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two countries sometimes overlapped and blurred, making it difficult to 
situate myself clearly. I was aware that this could create ethical issues; at 
the same time, given the sensitivity of the topic, I sometimes had to be 
strategic about the way I deployed my identities. This depended on the 
context, people and sources, and it sometimes meant choosing not to say 
too much – for example, I would say that I was doing research on gender 
and land but not mention land grabbing. Overall, the approach I adopted 
was to always let people know who I was - FAO gender officer also doing 
her PhD research - and the purpose of the meeting or interview (research, 
project preparation etc.) but emphasizing one aspect or the other as nec-
essary or appropriate. When working with consortium partners and com-
munities, I always made sure people knew who I was and what I was doing 
and spent time introducing myself thoroughly and responding to any ques-
tions that people wanted to ask. Parts of my research and writings have 
also been shared with the grassroot partners for the sake of accuracy and 
transparency.  
My situatedness and identities shaped my interaction with local com-
munities and local partners in the way I was with them, thought about 
them and was perceived by them. In particular, being a ‘gender specialist’, 
I was received by people, including some women, with mixed emotions 
including curiosity, resistance, scorn or simply scepticism. I was often told 
“we don’t have gender issues here. This is our culture”, as the opening line 
of interviews with people in government but also in exchanges with vil-
lagers. This, in turn, led me to find ways to ask questions around gender 
roles and relations. Having privileged access to local partners via the 
MOSAIC project, and through them to communities, I also made efforts 
to create an awareness of the hidden meaning of statements such as the 
one above through trainings, presentations and informal discussions. 
In the villages, introducing myself as researcher and FAO staff mem-
ber, sometimes created expectations in the people I met regarding what I 
could do to help them solve their problems or simply the ‘superior’ 
knowledge I had that I could share with them. More often than not, having 
my local partners as gatekeepers and facilitators, I was recognized as a 
‘welcome’ foreigner. On only a few occasions was I also questioned about 
my motives for doing such research and how I felt as a Korean about the 
MAC company (discussed in Chapter 2) which is also Korean. On the 
positive side, my Korean identity helped me to open channels for com-
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munication, as many people, especially women and youth, eagerly fol-
lowed Korean soap operas and were curious to learn more about Korean 
culture and the way of life, but also about the ‘Korean miracle’.29 Being a 
woman, sharing stories about my children and showing their pictures also 
became routine practice at the end of group discussions with women once 
they felt more comfortable to ask me questions about my age, my marital 
status and children. With young people, on the other hand, taking selfies 
and pictures together and befriending them on social media became the 
new norm.  
I realize that it must have been difficult for people to work out my 
multiple positionalities, as development UN professional, as PhD re-
searcher and as an activist working with local grassroots organizations. 
While this often made me feel uneasy, I did not engage in self-ethnogra-
phy. Instead, I used feminist ethnics and thinking to “stay with the trou-
ble”, reflecting on how my own and other people’s expectations and biases 
could affect the research findings.  
 
1.6.2 Fieldwork and data collection  
Situating my project 
The research for this thesis was carried out under the umbrella of the 
MOSAIC project30 - Climate change mitigation policies, land grabbing and conflicts 
in fragile states: understanding intersections, exploring transformations in Myanmar 
and Cambodia - implemented in 2014-2018 by a consortium of partners 
from academia, including the International Institute of Social Studies, as 
well as activist and grassroots groups from the Global North and the 
Global South. In the context of resurgent climate change mitigation poli-
cies, land grabs and historical conflicts (across scales) in Cambodia and 
Myanmar, the project consortium partners worked together to create op-
portunities for civil society, grassroots organizations and villagers to polit-
ically engage (Fox, 2006) ‘from below’ as a means to resolve conflicts. By 
promoting exchange among consortium partners and knowledge-genera-
tion especially with and for local partners, the project committed to par-
ticipatory action research and to addressing the power dynamics deriving 
from asymmetries of knowledge. The project also supported political 
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strategies and the participation of local partners in national and interna-
tional policy fora. In this sense, it aimed to de-colonialize hierarchies of 
knowledge and refute the privilege associated with academe, especially 
from the Global North. Participatory action research was undertaken 
mainly by the local consortium partners, while the academic and Global 
North partners had more of a supporting role. MOSAIC also aimed to be 
a ‘scholar-activist’/research-advocacy project in which different team 
members – individually and collectively – engaged in research and activ-
ism. Scholar activism is understood as “rigorous academic work that aims 
to change the world, or committed activist work that is informed by rig-
orous academic research, which is explicitly and unapologetically con-
nected to a political project or movement.” (Borras, 2016: 5) 
Attention to gender was not embedded in the design of the project 
from the onset and there was no explicit reference as to how the project 
would uncover and deal with issues of power asymmetries, or ethnic and 
gender discrimination in order to ensure that the voices of all people, 
women and men, old and young, could be heard and taken into account. 
While on the one hand the open-ended frame of the project allowed the 
local partners to set their priorities and develop their own workplans 
freely, on the other hand this meant that issues like gender would not be 
prioritized in the local plans, especially in the face of more pressing issues 
and new struggles coming up almost every day. Within the project team, I 
sometimes felt that there was an expectation that ‘doing the gender’ was 
my responsibility only, but I also struggled because of my limited time. 
The gender activities in the MOSAIC project consisted mainly of trainings 
and awareness-raising sessions organized with the consortium partners, 
and drafting the papers that also form the basis of this thesis. There was 
also a lot of informal talking and motivating on the side lines in my inter-
actions with local partners. The local group that I worked more closely 
with has now included sessions on gender in their community trainings 
and youth camps.  
The MOSAIC project also had a global dimension that aimed to create 
connections across scales, countries and actors and to link up with global 
fights while keeping the focus on local struggles. As Borras et al. (2008) 
have argued, ‘global-local complex processes’ of agrarian change also af-
fect agrarian movements’ strategies and responses, including their use of 
international governance instruments, as illustrated in Chapter 5. While 
keeping the focus on local struggles and power dynamics, my research 
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conversed with the national socio-cultural-economic and policy level, and 
with the global land grab context, voicing the perspective of the subject-
participants to inform a feminist political ecology of agrarian and environ-
mental change in Cambodia and Myanmar.  
It is worth spending some time clarifying how this research engages the 
idea of landscape, which is central to the MOSAIC project, although I did 
not use it systematically in this thesis (mainly in Chapters 2 and 5). The 
first collaborative intellectual endeavour of the MOSAIC project states 
that in order to study “the interactions between climate change mitigation 
initiatives, land grabs and resulting patterns of conflict” and “support ac-
tions to promote socially just conflict resolutions”, it is necessary to adopt 
a “landscape-level perspective and involve affected people as co-produc-
ers of knowledge”. It then proceeds to elaborate on the importance of 
expanding the analyses from a site-specific to a landscape scale so to “re-
veal patterns and cumulative impacts that remain invisible when smaller 
geographical areas are viewed separately”. (Hunsberger et al., 2017: 2). The 
landscape is then defined 
as a “place” in which physical and socio-cultural elements occur in localized, 
spatially specific combinations and in which human actors dynamically inter-
act. A landscape is both ecologically and socially fluid and changeable, but 
also holds continuities (Antrop 2005; Zimmerer 2006). A landscape is thus a 
space larger than a farm but smaller than a region, in which physical, ecolog-
ical and human dimensions co-exist as a product of socio-ecological and cul-
tural co-evolution (Batterbury and Bebbington 1999; Vaccaro and Norman 
2008)… These considerations suggest, on the one hand, that the analytical 
boundaries of a landscape should be defined not only according to ecological 
units (watersheds) or political administrative units (municipalities) but using 
both, informed by the purpose of enquiry. On the other hand, they reveal that 
landscapes are heterogeneous; they include a mixture of land uses, resources 
and institutions at any given moment. (Hunsberger et al., 2017: 10). 
The difficulty of operationalizing this broad and fluid understanding of 
landscape left many of us in the project grappling with concepts and liter-
ature from different disciplines including critical geography, territorialisa-
tion, and governmentality. At the very least, ‘the landscape’ encouraged us 
to elevate our sights from the single site to multiple sites and to explore 
their intersections - physical, ecological, social and political. In my own 
process of elaborating on the landscape, I turned to Doreen Massey’s dis-
cussion of space for inspiration. Her argument that in order to counter the 
idea of the “ineluctability of this globalisation” we need a different concept 
 Gender, generation and agrarian change 82 
 
of space and time resonated with me, as the way in which we think about 
space also shapes our view of ourselves, of others, of the world and of 
politics. Massey puts forward the following propositions:  
First, that we recognise space as the product of interrelations; as constituted 
through interactions, from the immensity of the global to the intimately 
tiny…Second, that we understand space as the sphere of the possibility of the 
existence of multiplicity in the sense of contemporaneous plurality; as the 
sphere where different trajectories coexist; as the sphere of coexisting heter-
ogeneity. Third, that we recognise space as always under construction. Pre-
cisely because space on this reading is a product of relations-between, rela-
tions which are necessarily embedded material practices which have to be 
carried out, it is always in the process of being made. (Massey, 2005: 9) 
The conceptualization of space as a configuration of social relations 
also leaves room for elaboration about power, “since social relations are 
inevitably and everywhere imbued with power and meaning and symbol-
ism, this view of the spatial is as an ever-shifting social geometry of power 
and signification” (Massey, 1994: 3). This need not be in contrast with the 
politics of place that ethnic communities are enacting in their struggles, 
nor with the centrality of place “in the creation of culture, nature, and 
economy” (Escobar, 2008: 30), as the concept of space that Massey puts 
forward is relational and dynamic. By seeing the local as part of and trans-
formative of the larger socio-political-ecological space, ethnic communi-
ties are deploying their politics of place and advancing the potential for 
their ‘other’ visions (see Chapter 2).   
Finally, another important influence of the MOSAIC framework has 
been its scholar-activist orientation, which also speaks to the intellectual 
and political legacy of FPE. In the two-way, interactive approach to agrar-
ian movements and scholar-activist relationships described by Borras 
(2016: 37), the movements recognize how the expertise of scholar-activists 
can help them to “…extend the reach of[,] their political struggles”, while 
the scholar-activists value and respect the autonomy of agrarian move-
ments. Both parties realize the “great potential for mutually reinforcing 
synergies in joining forces”. In a provocative way Frances Fox Piven 
(2010) states that “we should try to limit the influence of the academy not 
just because activism is important for our society, but because political 
activism can mean a more fulfilling life, built on comradeship and the pos-
sibility of making an imprint on the world.” We can achieve this by being 
“self-conscious and self-questioning about the political significance of the 
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questions we ask as academics” and by paying attention to “our own role 
in choosing and creating the environment that comes to influence us.”  
 
Methods and data collection 
Primary data was collected in Cambodia and Myanmar between April 2014 
and May 2018, mostly but not exclusively under the umbrella of the 
MOSAIC project.31 While I benefited from working with consortium part-
ners, with whom I engaged in many moments of knowledge-sharing, my 
fieldwork did not follow the footsteps of MOSAIC at all times. For in-
stance, in Cambodia, the research sites were not the same as those chosen 
by MOSAIC. I followed the lead of consortium partners, did background 
research and talked with other researchers in Cambodia prior to deciding 
where I could more sensibly explore my research questions. To visit the 
communities, I relied on consortium partners as facilitators, but had my 
own translator, a young Khmer woman whose contact I was given by a 
fellow researcher, as well as an older indigenous woman in Ratanakiri. In 
contrast, in Myanmar, because of the restrictions in accessing certain areas, 
especially those controlled by ethnic armed groups, and of the closer rela-
tionship that I established with local MOSAIC partners, I relied on con-
sortium partners to act as facilitators. In particular, I worked closely with 
one local CSO, an ethnic youth organization active in my areas of focus. 
Both prior to going to the villages with them and once there, I could say 
who in the community I wished to talk to (e.g. youth, women’s group, 
men’s group, village leader); however, I was also flexible enough to ac-
commodate unexpected turnouts, people’s time availability and interest in 
meeting etc. In both countries, at the central level where mobility was less 
of a restriction, I also relied on my personal network and initiative to iden-
tify and access key informants.  
During the course of the MOSAIC project, several CSO and consor-
tium partner meetings were organized both in Cambodia and Myanmar, 
many of which I joined. These provided an opportunity for partners and 
community representatives to discuss the different projects and invest-
ments that were ongoing or being planned in the two project landscapes 
and their mobilization and (dis)engagement strategies. These meetings 
were also an opportunity for me to get to know people and to let them get 
to know me, and to familiarize myself with the issues and contexts. Work-
ing with FAO wearing my ‘gender, rural and social development’ expert 
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‘hat’, I also had privileged access to information, situations, networks and 
people at both the country and regional level. I thus participated in several 
meetings organized in Cambodia and Myanmar around gender, land and 
agriculture in my institutional position, discussed in more detail from the 
perspective of situatedness and identity in Section 1.6.1 above (see also 
Preface and concerns raised above).  
In Cambodia, the field work for Chapter 3 was carried out in Kampong 
Speu and Ratakaniri provinces as well as in Phnom Penh between March 
and November 2014. Kampong Speu has been heavily affected by the ex-
pansion of Economic Land Concessions (ELC), particularly sugar planta-
tions, and communities there by dispossession, eviction, and relocation. 
Adverse incorporation has also taken place, as farming household mem-
bers, including children, engage as casual workers on the sugar plantations. 
Kampong Speu has also been the site of various forms of political reac-
tions, ranging from everyday forms of resistance, to roadblocks and pro-
tests sometimes leading to violent confrontations with the police and the 
military. Women have participated actively, and there are signs that with 
the support of several NGOs and trainings received, some of them are 
emerging as community leaders and/or activists. However, there are also 
people, including women, who have not engaged and who see protesting 
as either useless or potentially dangerous, given how powerful some of the 
politicians–turned-investors are.32 Furthermore, Kampong Speu is rela-
tively close to Phnom Penh, offering some people, including women, op-
portunities and better linkages with Phnom Penh-based NGOs and orga-
nized groups of urban land activists. Kampong Speu thus offered the 
scope to explore how all these dynamics interact and what might be the 
conditions that shape women’s engagement in politics and what the out-
comes of such engagement might be. In total I visited five communities 
and conducted six in-depth individual interviews with women and two fo-
cus group discussions, one in Andong Meas District in Ratanakiri and one 
in Thporng district in Kampong Speu, between March and April 2014. I 
also conducted individual interviews with the community leader of the vil-
lage in Ratanakiri, the local indigenous facilitator, and NGO staff in 
Ratanakiri and Phnom Penh, was able to carry out participant observation 
during several community meetings. The analysis also benefited from in-
terviews I conducted with two women land activists in Phnom Penh, with 
representatives of a women’s group that was supporting land activism, and 
with researchers and NGO staff. If also benefited from my participation 
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in workshops and fora which included government representatives, inter-
national organizations, researchers and local NGOs.  
The fieldwork for Chapter 4 was conducted in Andong Meas, Oyadaw, 
O’Chum, Borkeo and Veunsay districts33 in Ratanakiri between 2006 and 
2016 in the context of various projects involving research, consultations 
and activities with indigenous women. All such activities were meant to 
collect information about changes in gender roles and relations, while re-
search from 2014 onwards had a specific focus on the expansion of ELCs 
and the impact of land titling initiatives. Ratanikiri in the northeast of 
Cambodia is one of the ‘frontier’ provinces, inhabited until a few decades 
ago mainly by indigenous groups. While the more recent expansion of 
ELCs, mainly for rubber, has affected communities intensely, the com-
modification of land and nature had already started in the 1990s and has 
been accelerated by the recent surge in monocrop plantations and by ti-
tling initiatives to formalize individual access to land (see Chapter 5). The 
opening of the land frontier in Ratanakiri has thus triggered a slow but 
steady process of commodification and market integration. The analysis is 
based on research carried out in different communities and ethnic groups, 
rather than on a more thorough ethnographic study of a single commu-
nity. While this means some sacrifice of depth and detail, the intention was 
to capture a transformation that has affected the whole province and is 
not limited to a specific ethnic group or geographical location. The meth-
ods used allowed for the collection of experiences, stories, feelings and 
concerns on a wide range of issues in a number of communities over time. 
Chapter 4 also benefited from research conducted prior to 2014 by the co-
author of the article it is based on.  
In Myanmar, the fieldwork was carried out in various areas in Tanin-
thary, two of them where controversial oil palm plantations operate and 
one that has been earmarked for the development of a national park. In 
2017, I spent three longer periods of time in the field, staying with my 
youth partners based in Myek with a few day trips to the villages. With my 
youth partners, I was able to visit six villages located south of Myek in an 
area that spans two oil palm plantations and a national park and is under 
the mixed control of the Union Government and the Karen National Un-
ion (KNU) (see map), with some communities under exclusive or mixed 
governance arrangements. In 2018, I did the last part of my field work, 
spending an additional full month in the country. During that time, I was 
able to interview government representatives at different departments 
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within the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MOALI), 
which is also responsible for the management of agricultural land; with the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation 
(MONREC), which has a mandate that covers the management of forest 
land and conservation; and with the Ministry of Social Welfare Relief and 
Resettlement, which houses the women’s development department. In ad-
dition, I interviewed representatives of several other gender/women 
CSOs and environmental/land/agrarian justice CSOs. Finally, I went back 
to the field in Taninthary and visited four villages where I carried out Fo-
cus Group Discussions (FGD) and interviews. In total, I conducted 14 
FGDs with a total number of 79 male participants and 36 female partici-
pants. In addition, to complement and triangulate the information, I held 
37 individual interviews with people in various contexts, including villages, 
CSOs, local and central government, EAO representatives, international 
and national NGOs, and the media.  
For the collection of primary data, I used qualitative methods including 
semi-structured interviews, life histories, focus group discussions with 
subject-participants, and participant observation in different settings such 
as houses and communities, but also at the margins of trainings, work-
shops and consultation meetings that involved the participation of com-
munity-based organizations and social movements. The choice of qualita-
tive methods was driven by the desire to give subject-participants a safe 
space and time to articulate their experiences and views. For example, 
whenever possible the focus group discussions were segregated to ensure 
that women and youth would feel comfortable to share. I thus embraced 
the view that “we make a method into a feminist method” by the way in 
which we use it and adapt it (Ackerly and True, 2010b: 163). I also carried 
out a documentary review of news, reports, academic papers, NGO re-
ports and government policies and strategies in order to collect relevant 
background information on ELCs, concessions and other investments, 
and on initiatives, land reform and agriculture sector strategies and poli-
cies, and the socio-economic context, etc. It is important to highlight that, 
holding a full-time job, I was not able to spend extensive and prolonged 
periods of time in the field. Therefore, ethnography was not intended to 
be the primary means of data production, but to complement, enrich and 
validate data collected otherwise with insights and testimonies from the 
subject-participants.  
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I used the ethnographic approach to analyse the impact of land grab-
bing and changes in access to land and natural resources on different 
women and men in the selected communities in Cambodia and Myanmar. 
Here I used individual and group discussions (mixed and segregated by 
sex and age group) to get information on different people’s experiences of 
dispossession, incorporation and/or expulsion, as well as on participation 
in and motivations for resistance and mobilization. Furthermore, semi-
structured, in-depth interviews with a selected and limited number of 
women and youth to gain subjective reflections. As is the case with oral 
histories, these provided “insights into how people think about certain 
events and what they perceive their own role to have been…an expression 
of the personality of the interviewees, of their cultural values, and of the 
particular historical circumstance which shaped their point of view” 
(Hareven, 1992: 275). As Hareven (1992) points out, rather than a means 
for getting information, these interviews have to be considered a 
knowledge-generation process. Moreover, these oral histories captured 
the temporal dimension of the changes, that is, what it was like before, 
during and after the land grab and, in the case of Tanintharyi, also prior 
and after the ceasefire. At the same time, factual information about events 
and situations was triangulated by asking other participants the same ques-
tions, checking media and NGO reports, etc. I gained many insights 
through participant observation of communities’ and partners’ everyday 
lives, routines (Ackerly and True, 2010b) and practices at trainings, com-
munity-based organization strategy meetings, on the road, in the field, and 
during meals and discussions which typically took place during downtimes 
in the field.  
Semi-structured interviews with representatives of local and interna-
tional non-governmental organizations, including women’s organizations, 
grassroots organizations, famers groups and unions, as well as local au-
thorities, and central government representatives provided information on 
the institutional and political context surrounding land grabbing, and pro-
vided access to information on specific cases and episodes. CSOs in Cam-
bodia and Myanmar have been particularly active in producing knowledge 
and raising awareness about land grabbing as well as providing legal sup-
port and training to communities affected by land grabbing and dispos-
session.  
The interviews were based on a question guide that identified a number 
of questions and themes. However, I kept the structure of the interviews 
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open in order to build in ample space for the subject-participants to freely 
and openly express related areas of exploration and discussion. The format 
also allowed me to ask additional, unplanned questions: “The open ended 
nature of the questions posed defines the topic under investigation but 
provides opportunities for both interviewer and interviewee to discuss one 
topics in more detail” (Hancock et al., 2009: 16), allowing spontaneity on 
the part of the researcher and the interviewee.  The questions guides were 
prepared and shared with the interpreters/facilitators ahead of time to en-
able translation and clarification of doubts about methods, terminology 
and concepts, particularly when the meaning needed to be interpreted cul-
turally. For instance, most languages in Asia, including Khmer, Myanmar 
and local languages, do not have an equivalent term for gender.  
As observed earlier, I held segregated group discussions, but when pos-
sible, I combined them with mixed groups. It was clear that power dynam-
ics affected the likelihood of different people speaking up in a group dis-
cussion, although not always in the same way. This was particularly true 
for women, and younger women and men even more so. At the same time, 
focus group discussions brought up group dynamics emerge and made 
them observable. “Often multiple people who have shared the same ex-
perience can come to a different understanding of the experience if they 
arrive at that understanding through shared conversation than they might 
if arrived at it through individual reflection” (Ackerly and True, 2010b: 
172).  
I used participant observation, which implies engaging in the “life and 
activities of the context of the study’’ (Ackerly and True, 2010b: 202) as 
much as possible in order to gain further insights into intra-group and 
intra-community dynamics. I made use of several types of documentation, 
including memos, photographs and, occasionally, short videos. However, 
to respect respondents’ privacy and safety, I have chosen not to use pic-
tures of people in this thesis and have blurred the faces in the only one 
photo that I have included in Chapter 3. 
My situatedness and experience as a development practitioner and fem-
inist scholar have influenced my reflectivity as a researcher (Hawkins et 
al., 2011), encouraging me to be alert to power differentials, assumptions, 
and the situatedness of the subject-participants and partners, and to chal-
lenge my own assumptions. I also strived to ensure the reflexivity of re-
search participants, making room for adjustments during the research pro-
cess, staying away from pre-conceptions and being aware of situations in 
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which joint knowledge production was ongoing. This was true with re-
spect to work with community women and men and especially with grass-
roots partners who are also to be considered subject-participants.  
All the information produced through interviews, group discussions 
and participant observation was collected using note taking. The notes 
were read, transcribed and validated with the partners and/or interpreters. 
In order to ensure that I did not distort the voices and views of the subject-
participants, I went over my notes with them after the interviews, asking 
questions on doubts that I may have had. My notes did not contain only 
the field notes of the interviews/discussions, but also included personal 
reflections and observations about the environment, the context, the body 
language and interactions among subject-participants in order to capture 
some of the non-verbal scripts, including those dictated by power dynam-
ics (see for example Chapter 2), and give as full an account as possible.   
The writing process was also a key part of the analysis and personal 
process of ‘making sense’. As other authors have argued (Richardson, 
2000), writing can be considered a form of analysis when it involves “a 
thinking process that suggests new categories and ways of structuring” the 
analysis and reveal new analytical insights (Ackerly and True, 2010b: 197). 
Although of secondary relevance relative to other aspects and methods 
of the research, I used the Grounded Theory Approach, in combination 
with Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), to investigate dominant dis-
courses about gender, women, ethnicity and youth in, among others, pub-
lic policies and strategies, media reports, and available literature, including 
that on land grab cases. Grounded Theory is useful for “studying ques-
tions that themselves have been concealed by dominant discourses, con-
ceptualization, and notions of what questions are important… the aim is 
to see beyond the obvious and dominant readings of a problem or situa-
tion and to generate new and innovative interpretation of these.” (Ackerly 
and True, 2010b: 204). CDA “focuses on the role of discourse in the pro-
duction and reproduction of power abuse or domination. Wherever pos-
sible, it does so from a perspective that is consistent with the best interest 
of dominated groups…it supports their struggle against inequality” (van 
Dijk, 2001: 96). 
The names of all villages and people interviewed have been anony-
mized to protect people’s identity, security and privacy.  
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1.6.3 Limitations  
My fieldwork was limited in several ways. First, doing research in the con-
text of an extraordinarily fluid political situation, both nationally and lo-
cally, was challenging. The political volatility of the context was such that 
it forced all grassroots partners to engage in a constant process of reaction 
and recalibration of action. This, compounded by the time constraints and 
responsibilities of my full-time job, had obvious implications in term of 
planning the research.  
 Second, in Myanmar, especially in remote rural areas, access to the vil-
lages is still restricted and has to be authorized by government authorities 
or ethnic armed organizations (EAO), such as the Karen National Union 
(KNU). In this respect, as noted above, I benefited enormously from 
working with local grassroots groups, especially the ethnic youth group, 
without which I could not have travelled to or stayed in remote villages 
and locations. Conversely, this also meant that, especially at first, I would 
follow their lead in villages to visit, knowing that these were all villages 
affected by either the oil palm concessions or the conservation project or 
both. Later in the process I was able to suggest in which villages I wished 
to make follow up visits and interviews. I am also indebted for facilitation 
to my youth group for their preferential access to Karen villages and for 
translation. Translation proved challenging at times, because only three 
staff members, one young woman and two young men, were semi-profi-
cient in English, meaning that they could understand my questions, trans-
late them and also translate the answers back to me with relative ease. 
However, often this required several rounds of confirming and validating 
that we had understood each other.  
 Third, because of the restrictions illustrated above, my desire not to 
overburden my partners-friends, and efforts to accommodate my work 
and schedule to theirs, what we planned in the field was also contingent 
to what trainings, visits and activities they had already planned. I was also 
often asked to join and participate in their activities, for instance youth 
camps and trainings, which I happily did realizing that a process of co-
creation and sharing of knowledge and transformation was triggered each 
and every time.  
The fourth related limitation was that I did not speak the local lan-
guages. I do not speak Khmer and had to rely on a research assistant/in-
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terpreter for field work in Cambodia, along with a local indigenous facili-
tator in Ratanakiri. While I studied some Burmese, I only attained a very 
basic level of introducing myself and picking up a few words here and 
there. Furthermore, the majority of the communities I visited in Tanintha-
ryi were Karen and many people, particularly women, could not speak or 
understand anything but their own Karen dialect.34  
The fifth limitation was my full-time job, which limited my time as well 
as my freedom to plan, as indicated above. The fieldwork had to be 
planned taking my work load and schedule into account and necessitated 
taking leave of absence from the office. This also meant that instead of 
spending long stretches of time in the field, I had to do multiple shorter 
trips, the longest being four weeks of uninterrupted stay. Luckily, being 
based in Bangkok made these kinds of trips easy and feasible.  
Finally, while I was both limited and advantaged by my job in the ways 
that I have described at length, the process challenged me to think and act 
beyond binaries. Instead of separating and compartmentalizing, I tried to 
focus on building bridges between my work as a development practitioner 
and as an engaged scholar and activist, gender specialist and feminist, 
across disciplines and practices, identifying ways in which one can inform 
and improve the other. 
 
1.7  Organization and rationale of the thesis  
 
Following Chapter 1, the study presents the empirical findings, which are 
all based on published articles, with the only exception being Chapter 2. 
As mentioned, the cases were chosen to illustrate different facets and is-
sues that fall under the umbrella of land grabbing, with the aim of provid-
ing an account which reflects the perspectives and voices of those who are 
less likely to be heard. By representing the experiences of those who are 
‘othered’ because of their sex, age and ethnicity, with my research I tried 
to bridge a knowledge and voice gap. The reminder of the study is orga-
nized as follows:  
Chapter 2 addresses gender and, focusing on youth, on the genera-
tional impacts of three cases of dispossession and exclusion – two oil palm 
plantations and one conservation project – on Karen ethnic communities 
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in Tanintharyi, Southern Myanmar. Preliminary findings from this re-
search were presented at the International Conference of Critical Asia 
Studies, held at Chang Mai University in Thailand, 19-23 July 2017.  
Chapter 3 traces women’s participation in political reactions from be-
low in two cases of land grabs driven by the expansion of rubber and sugar 
plantations respectively in Ratanakiri and Kampong Speu, Cambodia. 
These are also put in conversation with cases of women’s urban activism 
in order to identify ways in which participation could translate into per-
sonal material and social gains for women, and prospects for increased 
agency. This chapter is based on a single-authored article published online 
in Feminist Economics, 4 October, 2018. 
Chapter 4 takes a longitudinal perspective on agrarian and environ-
mental transformation among indigenous groups in Ratanakiri, Cambodia. 
Changes in gender roles and relations are analysed in relation to the recent 
expansion of Economic Land Concessions, but also to the process of 
commodification started with the opening of the northern frontier in the 
90s and the subsequent establishment of a land market and the introduc-
tion of cash crops. These processes, exacerbated by the individualization 
of access to land introduced by land titling exercises, have had gendered 
impacts on indigenous women and girls. This chapter is based on a co-
authored article published in 2017 as part of a special issue of The Journal 
of Peasant Studies, 44:6.   
From the perspective of agrarian and environmental social movements 
and struggles for social justice, Chapter 5 asks questions about the effec-
tiveness of international governance instruments to respond to the chal-
lenges posed by intersecting multiple initiatives encroaching on the same 
landscape. It also assesses the instruments based on their social justice ori-
entation and concludes that human rights based gender equality and Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent should be at the core of any instrument and 
strategy to advance social and environmental justice, particularly at this 
particular historical juncture. This chapter is based on a co-authored article 
published in 2017 in the Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 38:3, 341-
359. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the research findings, discusses their 
broader implications and offers reflections on implications for future re-
search.  
The published articles (Chapter 3-5) have been slightly edited to ensure 
better coherence and flow of the study, and to provide linkages with the 
overall theoretical framing. However, no changes have been made that 
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would alter the original substance and analysis, especially in the case of co-
authored pieces.  
An article-based thesis such as this one might have some limitations in 
the coherence and flow of the empirical findings. Nevertheless, I believe 
the study captures the essence of the issues and endeavours to present 
them in a rigorous way. Finally, following Ackerly and True’s (2010: 22) 
indication that “feminist-informed research is self-reflective, critical, po-
litical, and versed in multiple theoretical frameworks in order to enable the 
researcher to ‘see’ those people and processes lost in gaps, silences, mar-
gins, and peripheries”, I also hope to have exposed convincingly my gen-
uine attempts to bridge disciplines, approaches and perspectives in my en-
deavour to contribute to a feminist political ecology of land grabs.   
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Notes 
1 Reducing emissions from reforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) is a 
mechanism developed by the countries that are parties to the United Nations Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCC), which offers incentives for the reduction 
of emissions from forests and investments in low-carbon solutions by attaching a 
financial value for the carbon stocks in forests. The UN-REDD programme, 
jointly implemented by FAO, UNDP and UNEP, supports countries to develop 
the capacity to meet the REDD+ requirements (https://unredd.net/about/what-
is-redd-plus.html, accessed 24 October 2018).  
2 Climate-smart agriculture (CSA), as defined and presented by FAO at the Hague 
Conference on Agriculture, Food Security and Climate Change in 2010, is “agri-
culture that sustainably increases productivity, resilience (adaptation), reduces/re-
moves GHGs (mitigation), and enhances achievement of national food security 
and development goals.” (FAO, 2010: ii). Along the same lines, the World Bank 
defines it as “an integrated approach to managing landscapes—cropland, livestock, 
forests and fisheries--that address the interlinked challenges of food security and 
climate change” and states that it is “committed to working with countries to de-
liver climate-smart agriculture that achieves the triple win of increased productivity, 
enhanced resilience, and reduced emissions.” (World Bank, n.d.). Both definitions 
draw on the World Development Report 2008 message of investment in agricul-
ture as a driver for efficiency-based economic growth (Borras and Franco, 2018). 
3 For instance: Chu J, 2011. Gender and ‘Land Grabbing’ in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Women’s land rights and customary land tenure. Development, 54(1), 35–39; Beh-
rman J, Meinzen-Dick R and Quisumbing A, 2012. The gender implications of 
large-scale land deal. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(1), 49–79; Julia & White B, 2012. 
Gendered experiences of dispossession: oil palm expansion in a Dayak Hibun 
community in West Kalimantan. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3-4), 995–1016. 
4 Special issue on “Land, Gender and Food Security” of Feminist Economics, vol. 
20(1), 2014; special issue on “Gender and generation in Southeast Asian agrarian 
transformations”, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 44(6), 2017. 
5 Data from agricultural censuses for countries where data is available.  
6 Borras et al. (2013: 168) identified the emergence of the following three tenden-
cies in the global governance of land deals, each corresponding to different political 
stances and interests: “(a) regulate to facilitate land deals; (b) regulate to mitigate the negative 
impacts and maximize the opportunities; and (c) regulate to spot and rollback land grabbing”. 
7 I use the emphasis only at first use. 
8 In this thesis, I refer to Borras et al.’s (2012) definition and use the terms land 
grab and land grabbing interchangeably.  
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9 The strategy states: “The government of Myanmar has recognized the potential 
of the REDD+ initiative to contribute to green development by protecting global 
environmental resources (forest carbon stocks, but also biodiversity), helping to 
reverse land degradation, helping to improve the livelihoods of the rural poor and 
aiding adaptation to climate change.” (Myanmar REDD+ Programme, n.d.).  
10 For a recent definition of Feminist Political Ecology see Elhmirst (2018): “Fem-
inist Political Ecology has grown into an expansive and open-ended field that em-
braces and contributes to diverse theorisations of social relations of power associ-
ated with natures, culture and economies. Whilst FPE embraces a diversity of 
approaches and subject matters, there is a shared (if often implicit) commitment to 
feminist epistemology, methods and values, where dominant, masculinist concep-
tions and practices of knowledge and authority are recognised and challenged, and 
where emphasis is given to research and practice that empowers and promotes 
social and ecological transformation for women and other marginalized groups.” 
11 Interview with founder of Gender Equality Network, Myanmar, Naw Pyi Taw, 
May 8, 2018. 
12 Interview with Executive Committee Member of Tavoyan Women’s Union, 
Dawei, 12 May 2016. 
13 In the special issue of The Journal of Peasant Studies, 45:56, 2018, released on the 
occasion of Marx’s 200th date of birth. Levien et al. identify as Agrarian Marxism 
the long tradition of “work in the Marxist theoretical tradition on the ‘agrarian 
question,’ rooted in the foundational work of Marx and Engels, elaborated by the 
‘classical’ theorists such as Kautsky, Luxemburg, Lenin and Gramsci, and beyond 
Europe, Mao; and inspiring many decades of scholarship and debate since then on 
the development of capitalism in agrarian societies and the political potential of 
peasantries across the world.” (Levien et al., 2018: 854) 
14 See Derek Hall for an overview and discussion of how different scholars have 
used primitive accumulation and accumulation for dispossession in relation to 
land grabs (Hall, 2013). 
15 Marx clearly indicated that primitive accumulation is linked to a specific his-
torical juncture of pre-capitalist England. As such, he considers it the basis “in-
stead of the historic result of specifically capitalist production”. (Marx, 2010: 434) 
Marx refers to primitive accumulation as the original sin of political economy: 
“The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the histor-
ical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears 
as primitive, because it forms the prehistoric stage of capital and of the mode of 
production corresponding with it.” (Marx, 2010: 501) 
16 According to Harvey, overaccumulation can be counteracted by opening new, 
non-capitalist territories to trade and to enterprises that use “cheaper labour 
power, raw materials, low-cost land, and the like” (Harvey, 2003: 139). These 
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assets, which are released at very low cost, can then be seized by overaccumulated 
capital  which can “turn them to profitable use”. (Harvey, 2003: 149). 
17 This approach in Feminist Political Ecology focuses on the process by which 
subjectivities are produced and change over time through the ways axes of power 
(gender, race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, age, (dis)ability) intersect and are 
shaped by one another (Lykke, 2010; Nightingale, 2011). 
18 Through an intersectional approach, Feminist Political Ecology would also see 
culture and history as key dimensions to consider. 
19 Tobacco farmers in Pakse Village, as opposed to those in Somsanook Village, 
both situated in Pakkading District, Borikhamxai Province, lived in an area with 
more fertile lands and easier access to water and roads.  
20 The Myanmar Agricultural Development Strategy and Investment Plan (2017) 
notes that 80 percent of farm holders have less than 10 acres of land.  
21 This is certainly an underestimate considering how the data were collected, ask-
ing only for the individual’s main occupation. 
22 Prioritizing youth’s engagement in agriculture has been a returning priority 
agenda item in the latest FAO Asia Pacific Regional Conferences, 
http://www.fao.org/about/meetings/regional-conferences/aprc34/docu-
ments/en/. Similarly, but from a different perspective, agrarian movements have 
youth chapters and manifestos (see for example, https://viacampesina.org/en/vii-
international-conference-youth-assembly-declaration/ ).   
23 Chayanov’s peasant economy, resurrected by Shanin and advocates of the ‘peas-
ant way’, centred on the organisation of family labour and its ability to resort to 
‘self-exploitation’ in adverse conditions. Chayanov focused exclusively on the fam-
ily labour farm which is wageless and thus does not produce profit but can still be 
embedded in a broader system of capitalist relations (Chayanov et al., 1986; White, 
2018). In this regards, van der Ploeg clarifies that “the amount and quality of labour 
that a particular peasant family (located in a particular situation) is able and willing 
to deliver” is what matters (va der Ploeg, 2014: 3). However, even Chayanov-in-
spired literature, “despite all the talk of reproduction and decommoditisation … 
completely ignores the great amount of uncommodified work that is carried out in 
all farming households (as in non-farming households) and largely by women” (Ra-
zavi, 2011: 49). 
24 McAdam et al. (2009: 261) define contentious politics as the “public, collective 
making of consequential claims by connected clusters of persons on other clusters 
of persons or on major political actors, when at least one government is a claimant, 
an object of claims, or a third party to the claims”. 
25 Article 16: The Queen of Cambodia shall have no right to engage in politics, to 
assume a leading function in State or Government affairs, or to assume an admin-
istrative or political role. 
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The Queen of Cambodia shall devote herself in tasks of social, humanitarian, reli-
gious interests, and assist the King in protocol and diplomatic obligations. 
26 Health is measured by female and male life expectancy at birth; education by 
female and male expected years of schooling for children and mean years for adults 
aged 25 years and older; and control over economic resources by female and male 
estimated GNI per capita. 
27 Reproductive health is measured by maternal mortality and adolescent birth 
rates; empowerment is measured by the share of parliamentary seats held by 
women and attainment in secondary and higher education by each gender; and 
economic activity is measured by the labour market participation rate for women 
and men. See, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries.  
28 For more information see, “23/01/2019 18:47:00 Protection for whom? Viola-
tion of International Law in Myanmar’s New ‘Race and Religion Protection’ Laws” 
(White, 2015). 
29 On South Korea’s recent history of development see for instance Wade (1996) 
and Amsden (1989) as well as Evans (1995). Peter Evans, although not focusing 
only on South Korea, refers to the East Asian miracle countries in his piece on the 
role of state-society synergy in advancing developmental goals.  
30 The MOSAIC project “Climate change mitigation policies, land grabbing and 
conflicts in fragile states: understanding intersections, exploring transformations in 
Myanmar and Cambodia” was implemented from 2014 to 2018 by a consortium 
of partners from academia, activist and grassroots groups from the Global North 
and from the Global South. These included: the International Institute of Social 
Sciences of Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Regional Center for Sustainable 
Development at Chang Mai University, the Transnational Institute. At the country 
level in Myanmar: the Land Core Group, Dawei Development Association (DDA), 
Metta Foundation and Southern Youth; in Cambodia: Equitable Cambodia, the 
Cambodia Peacebuilding Network and the Prey Lang Community Network. 
31 Chapter 3 also includes research conducted in Cambodia by the co-author of the 
article on which the chapter is based, prior to MOSAIC and this thesis.  
32 Personal comment by female interviewee, 1 April 2014, Orale Commune. 
33 The principal sites include 15 villages in Banlung, Andong Meas, Oyadaw, 
O’chum, Borkeo and Veunsay districts. The names of the villages have been omit-
ted to protect the identity of the women and men we interviewed and consulted.  
34 Several dialects are in use among the Karen, depending on which ethnic sub-
group they belong to. In my areas the groups and dialects were mostly Sgaw Karen 
and Pwo Karen.  
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Abstract 
This Chapter explores the compounded gendered and generationed impli-
cations of accelerated paths of agrarian and environmental transformation 
in Southern Myanmar, drawing on three cases of land grabs. In this Chap-
ter the level of analysis moves between different scales, exploring the local, 
the investments, the regional and the national. The three cases describe 
effects on local Karen communities in terms of dispossession, decreased 
access to land, and social reproduction, impacting in particular young 
women and men and their prospects of becoming farmers. Engagement 
in community politics and reactions from below is also gendered and gen-
erationed, with women and youth less likely to have a say in decision-mak-
ing. Grassroots organizations play a key role in ethnic politics and other-
visioning from below, with the potential to promote gender equality too. 
Engagement with and exposure to place and ethnic politics also provides 
a space for the renegotiation of gender roles and generational relations.  
 
2.1  Introduction  
 
Even the big trees have been disappeared and only the small trees are left so 
we will protect them and have shadow for us… 
From our ancestor time we played under the big tree shadow, now for our 
generation we no longer have them… 
The remaining shadow is of small tree so it is time to protect it 
Tree of shadow we have be connected with  
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The small tree is the shadow for us 
We should be protected and protect 
(from “Tree of shadow”, Karen song) 
 
Today youth will be the light of country… 
Wake up, be alive and our youth will serve to develop our country… 
(Youth of today) will be serving and helping, between struggle and starvation 
…come to give the light together for our country… 
(from “Youth of today”, Karen song) 
 
Drawing on empirical findings from Southern Myanmar, this chapter ex-
plores the gender and generationed impacts of the expansion of palm oil 
and conservation initiatives on Karen communities in the Tanintharyi re-
gion. The intersection of these initiatives over the same landscape has cre-
ated conflicts and changes in social relations and has intensified the com-
modification of nature as land formerly held customarily is secured 
through formal titles. The chapter also shows how gender and genera-
tioned roles and scripts, particularly of young women and men, are being 
renegotiated within households and villages during processes of agrarian 
and environmental transformation, and through participation in rural pol-
itics. The role of local ethnic grassroots organizations is also explored with 
respect to grassroots politics, including the formulation of local alterna-
tives and other visions of development, and the promotion (or lack) of 
gender and generational justice therein. I refer to current formulations of 
FPE which recognize that nature, in its interconnectedness of resources, 
culture (Haraway, 2008) and society co-create each other. I further analyse 
agrarian and environmental transformation processes and struggles in 
their embeddedness in the “everyday, embodied and emotional relations to re-
sources and ‘natures’” (Harris, 2015: 158), social hierarchies of power, and 
specific geographical and historical contexts.  
While the broader methodology, including that for this chapter, is ad-
dressed in Chapter 1, it is important to note that I am referring to either 
young women or young men when I point to participants in youth focus 
group discussions. These groups were organized with support from my 
grassroots partners, following my request to meet young people in the vil-
lage. With the exception of a limited number of improvised group discus-
sions, for all the FGDs I collected information about the age, sex, marital 
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status, religion and ethnic group of all participants. In the specific case of 
the youth groups, while their composition varied, the participants’ age was 
always below 30. Much of the literature on youth and generation does not 
analytically differentiate clearly between the two, partially because these 
concepts have been interpreted in many different ways (Huijsmans et al., 
2014). In this thesis, and in this chapter specifically, chronological age is 
not as important as social age. What ‘makes age’ in fact is largely marital 
status. At the same time, we will also see that youth are able to establish 
their social age in ways that go beyond chronological age and marital sta-
tus, as other research has also shown (Clark-Kazak, 2009; Utrata, 2011). 
According to Clark-Kazak (2009: 5), social age is a term that includes intra- 
and intergenerational relationships and also “refers to the social meanings 
and roles ascribed to different stages in the human life cycle. In other 
words, social age is a broader term that includes but is not limited to gen-
erational considerations.”  
Since 2011 the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 
(UG henceforth) has embraced a series of reforms in the areas of land use, 
land conversion, and investments, attracting international capital and in-
vestors. Concurrently, the 2012 preliminary ceasefire between the UG and 
several Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) has facilitated access to fron-
tier territories, including Tanintharyi region in the South, which had long 
been hotspots of conflict and ethnic insurgency (Bryant, 1994; Malseed, 
2009; Woods, 2015a, 2015b). Designated in 1999 to be the ‘palm oil bowl’ 
of the country, until the ceasefire Tanintharyi had largely remained within 
the purview of selected operations and agribusinesses run by the military 
and domestic cronies. Home to around 2.5 million hectares of Sundaic 
lowland forests, the largest in the Indo-Burma sub-region (Baskett, 2016), 
and several thousand hectares designated as protected areas (PA), the re-
gion is also a darling of international conservation non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGO) and targeted for projects funded under the Global En-
vironmental Facility (GEF).  
Tanintharyi is thus a locus where different types of land grabs – under-
stood as ‘control grabs’ (Borras et al., 2012) - driven by environmental, 
climate change, agricultural, and economic development agendas, run in 
parallel to each other but also overlap and intersect over the same land-
scape, exacerbating existing conflicts and creating new ones (Corbera et 
al., 2017: 299; Hunsberger et al., 2017). With cases of land eviction, dis-
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possession and exclusion increasing, communities and CSOs in Tanintha-
ryi have mobilized to raise public attention of the impacts of these grabs 
on the rights and livelihoods of local communities, particularly ethnic 
groups who depend on access to forests and natural resources for their 
livelihoods, identity and reproduction. A CSO report highlights that land 
grabs have affected ethnic Karen women, particularly widows, dispropor-
tionately in terms of loss of independent livelihoods, access to food and 
physical security.  
Women have taken action to mitigate and protest against abuse, with 
actions including complaint letters, registration of land, negotiation of 
compensation or refusal to move. In some cases these actions have been 
successful but the majority of women face significant obstacles in access-
ing justice (Karen Human Rights Group, 2016). The analysis of an INGO-
led project that involved paralegals found that only 20 percent of those 
seeking paralegal support were women. Additionally, fewer women had 
land documents of any sort, including tax receipts, and this made them 
more vulnerable to land confiscation.1 According to a report by Namati, 
women were also less likely to benefit equally from compensation and res-
titution, while also being impacted negatively by the changes in intra-
household power dynamics that occur when they are forced into casual 
labour as a result of land dispossession (Namati, 2016). Overall, however, 
both gender and generational dimensions have been relatively neglected in 
Southeast Asian land grab studies (Park and White, 2017) and in Myanmar 
in particular: with the exception of a few CSO and NGO publications 
(Karen Human Rights Group, 2016; Namati, 2016; see for instance, Ta-
voyan Women’s Union, 2015), there has been scarce attention to either or 
both when compared to other countries in the region, such as Cambodia, 
Laos and Indonesia.2  
The field work for this chapter took place between 2014 and 2018 in 
Myek and Tanintharyi townships in Myek district, one of the three districts 
of Tanintharyi division3, in villages affected by the expansion of two major 
oil palm concessions and a national park (see Map 3.1). Most of the villages 
and communities visited are predominantly if not entirely inhabited by 
Karen (or Kayin) ethnic groups. However, the population of the division 
is highly diverse, including Bamar, Dawei, Rakhine, Mon, Shan, Burmese-
Thai, Kayin, Salone and Malay ethnicities. The areas are also sites of con-
tested or rather ‘fragmented sovereignty’ (Lund, 2011) and subject to the 
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authority of either the Union Government (UG) and/or the Karen Na-
tional Union (KNU), the political organization representing the Karen 
people of Myanmar.  
 
2.2  Land, agriculture, farming and ethnicity in Myanmar 
 
In 2014, the government embarked on a series of major reforms, including 
the drafting of the National Land Use Policy (NLUP). Both the process 
and the policy were major breakthroughs. For the first time, the process 
was open to participation from civil society and communities, and for the 
first time the policy was to address the ‘land problem’ in the country. Ac-
cording to the analysis of the final draft by the Transnational Institute 
(2015a), the land problem centres around three key issues: landlessness 
due to conflicts and natural disasters; tenure insecurity; and lack of effec-
tive means to access land and control in decision-making. The land prob-
lem is rooted in a lack of recognition of customary tenure systems, in 
“stacked” layers of outdated laws and regulations (Mark, 2016) created by 
the British colonialists and by subsequent regimes seeking to consolidate 
their power, and in a multiplicity of institutions dealing with land manage-
ment.  
 The gender text in the final, sixth, version of the NLPU was the result 
of negotiations over several drafts, which were significantly shaped by de-
mands from civil society, NGOs and the international community (Faxon, 
2015, 2017; Gender Equality Network, 2014; Transnational Institute, 
2015b), including the promotion of the use of the Voluntary Guidelines on 
the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context 
of National Food Security (VGGT) as a yardstick for social inclusion, human 
rights and gender equality. In earlier versions, for example, while the Eng-
lish text made clear references to gender equality and women’s equal rights 
to land, these were missing in the Burmese version (Faxon, 2017). Among 
its basic principles, the NLUP ensures “equal opportunities for men and 
women over land resources, tenure rights and participatory decision mak-
ing” (Principle 6k, Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 
2015: 4). A whole section, Part IX, lays out the “Equal Rights of Men and 
Women”, and highlights that, in accordance with the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
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and the Myanmar Constitution, the National Land Law shall provide for 
the equal right: to hold and own land individually and jointly (9a); to inherit 
land tenure and management rights (9b); to land allocation and manage-
ment (9c); to participate and represent a community in decisions around 
land disputes; and (9e) in relation to land acquisition compensation, reha-
bilitation and restitution (9f). The right of members of ethnic groups to 
recognize, register and protect their customary land use rights is also ex-
plicitly mentioned (9h). A focus on generational dimensions is included in 
the provision on land acquisition for social and economic development, 
which should take into account “sustainable land use for future genera-
tions” (Part V, 35).   
As mentioned, the process was remarkable in itself, creating expecta-
tions of change that would be inclusive of smallholder farmers, ethnic 
groups and people who had been displaced by years of conflict (Franco, 
Kramer, et al., 2015), and revert the effects of two contentious laws passed 
in 2012, the Farmland Law (FL) and the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin (VFV) 
Land Management Law. The combined effect of these two laws had ag-
gravated tenure insecurity for small farmers and ethnic groups. The FL 
created a formal land market by legalizing the sale and purchase of land 
with land use certificates (LUCs), also known as Form 7, and transformed 
into illegal squatters all those farmers who had been on the land for gen-
erations but did not have LUCs. According to government sources, 80 
percent of farmers have Form 7, while 20 percent remain untitled in re-
mote and conflict areas where land cannot be measured.4  
In turn, the VFV gave the government a free hand to reclassify as va-
cant, fallow or virgin all land that was not titled and being used, which 
could then be conceded to investors.5 This was highly problematic, espe-
cially in areas where shifting cultivation is practiced and land is left fallow 
on a rotational basis. Likewise, VFV created difficulties for community-
managed resources, which became more vulnerable to confiscation 
(Franco, Twomey, et al., 2015: 9). On 11 September 2018, in spite of re-
peated calls from CSOs to delay the process, the Union Parliament (Amy-
othar and Pyithu Hluttaw) promulgated an amendment of the VFV law, 
requiring anyone using VFV land without a permit to apply for one within 
a three months deadline from the enactment of the amendment or risk 
land being confiscated. This amendment also created a new criminal tres-
pass offence, among others.6 A public announcement followed suit on 2 
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November 2018 in newspapers and on the website of the Ministry of Ag-
riculture, Livestock and Irrigation calling for users of VFV to apply for 
permission by March 2109.7  
After an extensive process which included inputs from civil society, 
including women’s groups,8 ethnic youth groups, farmers groups, the in-
ternational donor community, and the United Nations, the NLUP was 
passed in January 2016 in the final months in office of President Thein 
Sein’s government. After a two-year gap, the incumbent government and 
ruling party - the National League for Democracy - decided in early 2018 
to establish a National Land Use Committee (NLUC), tasked with the im-
plementation of the NLUP, including the formulation of an ‘umbrella land 
law’. The NLUC is supposed to play a pivotal role as the apex structure 
for land governance and is headed by the Vice President, with the partici-
pation of all Union ministers related to land, and chief ministers of regions 
and states, and has a total of 26 members. While the NLUC will hold bi-
annual meetings, working committees have been created, including one to 
work on the land law, following a process similar to that of the NLUP 
with consultation and popular participation.9  
These reforms are particularly important for Myanmar’s farmers who 
have long suffered from the effects of poor policies, poor infrastructure, 
and tenure insecurity (Shivakumar and Saw Hlaing, 2015). Myanmar’s 
agrarian economy is dominated by smallholders, 80 percent of whom have 
less than 10 acres of land (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irriga-
tion, 2018). These smallholders, however, control less than 30 percent of 
agricultural land, while almost 20 percent is held by 20 percent of house-
holds, according to data from the 2010 Agricultural Census. A large num-
ber of households have less than five acres (about two hectares). Women 
hold only about 14 percent of the total acreage. According to a survey 
conducted in nine States and Regions by international NGO Namati, 18 
percent of titles are registered to women (Ingalls et al., 2018). However, 
this figure may not give a full picture of the multiple realities of women’s 
access to land under the many different customary systems in use in the 
country.   
Land is also central to the ethnic question and the peace process in 
Myanmar, where ethnic minorities make up about 30 percent of the pop-
ulation, and ethnic states 57 percent of the total land area. Hence, agrarian 
and environmental transformation cannot be decoupled from the ethnic 
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question, nor from issues of territorialisation and ‘production of sover-
eignty’ (Lund, 2011). The exploitation of natural resources in ethnic areas, 
first by the colonial state and subsequently by the military governments, 
has been a fundamental tenet of the politics of control and domination 
across the country, including in Tanintharyi and Karen ethnic areas 
(Bryant, 1994, 1997; Malseed, 2009) where the field work for this chapter 
was carried out.  
Equally important are issues of sovereignty, customary land tenure sys-
tems and the criminalization of shifting cultivation. While customary ten-
ure is not recognized by Union laws, the NLUP recognizes “the protection 
of customary land tenure rights and procedures of ethnic nationalities” 
(Chapter I, objective 6.c). This is further articulated in Part VIII on the 
‘Land Use Rights of Ethnic Nationalities’ which also states that “Registra-
tion of land use rights relating to rotating and shifting cultivation that ex-
ists in farmland or forestland shall be recognized in the new National Land 
Law” (Part VII, para. 68).  
The 2015 (Karen National Union) KNU Land Policy, which affects 
KNU controlled areas, including parts of Tanintharyi, uses much stronger 
language and aims “To recognize, prioritize and promote customary ten-
ure rights and practices and to ensure the sustainable occupation, use and 
enjoyment of communal land and related rights, especially by the poor, 
marginalized and vulnerable peoples and long-standing resident village 
communities, free from encroachment or unauthorized occupation or use 
by others.” (Article 1.2.4). In addition, it recognizes “customary occupa-
tion, use and stewardship practices with regard to land, forests, fisheries, 
water and biodiversity” (Article 1.3.2), and ku (the Karen term for toungya 
or shifting cultivation), the traditional system of upland rotational farming, 
as ecologically sustainable and closely embedded in Karen culture, social 
customs, spiritual practices, and the “kaw” system of land tenure” (Article 
1.4.4).  
In contrast, shifting cultivation is ostracized in several policies, includ-
ing the 1995 Myanmar Forest Policy and most recently the REDD+ draft 
strategy mentioned earlier (see Section 1.2). This aversion is supported by 
laws and regulations that either fail to recognize land under shifting culti-
vation or create the conditions for its criminalization – for example, the 
2012 Farmland Law and the 2012 Virgin, Fallow Vacant Land Law and 
recent amendments, and the 2018 Biodiversity and Conservation of Pro-
tected Areas Law. This aversion is rooted in the historical fear that saw 
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frontier and uncontrolled zones as centres of resistance and aimed to exert 
economic control over them, and to misconceptions of the nature of shift-
ing cultivation, seeing it as backward and harmful (Springate-Baginski, 
2018). In the ethnographic study of The Karen People of Burma, Rev. Marshall 
(1922) refers to ku as a “primitive” method of cultivation. At the same 
time, colonial forest management recognized the value of toungya not only 
as a well-established and eco-friendly agroforesty technique, but also as an 
effective way to exert political and economic control over ethnic territories 
(Bryant, 1994, 1997). 
Within their matrilocal system, Karen communities have been tradi-
tionally patriarchal, with men designated as the head of the household and 
women groomed from childhood into taking on a caregiver role.10 “The 
men still feel their superiority and remain idle, while the women do the 
heavy work for them. Even apart from the care of children, the women 
bear the heavy end of the burden.” (Marshall, 1922: 131) This reflects the 
reality of the rest of the country, where prevalent socio-cultural norms still 
shape women’s space and agency materially and discursively. At the same 
time, Karen groups have no strict gender division of farming activities, 
with women engaging in all aspects of farming, including felling trees, and 
boys and girls expected to help their parents at home and in the field, albeit 
with different tasks. Land is also divided to both sons and daughters, usu-
ally when they marry, with preference given to the youngest, regardless of 
sex. However, certain domestic and care work, as well as activities such as 
water fetching, vegetable collection, and animal husbandry, are strictly 
women’s business. Likewise, social and community activities tend to be 
divided along gender and age lines. Women take the lead in ceremonies 
and community social gatherings, such as weddings and religious ceremo-
nies, while men take leadership roles, such as village leader, pastor, and 
medic (Karen Human Rights Group, 2006). Young people support all 
community activities, often organized through church-based youth 
groups.  
This broad picture was also confirmed by interviews and FGDs during 
my fieldwork. Furthermore, the fluidity mentioned above means that there 
may be differences among groups, which can be mediated by religion, lo-
cality and the specific historic conjuncture in which they are performed. 
For instance, a CSO report highlighted that during the civil war and the 
subsequent massive displacement of people, many women took on lead-
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ership roles within families and communities, and engaged in activities tra-
ditionally ascribed to men, such as trading and teaching, and acting as vil-
lage leaders. These new roles in turn changed women’s identity and stand-
ing within communities (Karen Human Rights Group, 2006). However, 
the number of women leaders is reported to have decreased substantially 
after the preliminary ceasefire (Karen Human Rights Group, 2016).  
 
2.3  Tanintharyi: mainstream visions of development 
Alienation obviates living-space entanglement. The dream of alienation in-
spires landscape modification in which only one stand-alone asset matters; 
everything else becomes weeds and waste…When its singular asset can no 
longer be produced, a place can be abandoned. The timber has been cut; the 
oil has run out; the plantation soil no longer supports crops. The search for 
assets resumes elsewhere. Thus, simplification for alienation produces ruins, 
spaces of abandonment for asset production (Tsing, 2015) 
Tanintharyi, the southernmost part of the country, stretching between the 
Andaman Sea and Thailand and bordering Mon state to the north, extends 
over 43,344.9 km², and, as of 2014, had a population of around 1.4 million, 
with just over 50 percent being female. The region accounts for only 2.7 
percent of the country’s population and is one of the least populated states 
and regions, with a population density of 32 people per square meter 
(Department of Population, Ministry of Immigration and Population, 
2015). Seventy-six percent of the population resides in rural areas. The 
population is relatively young; of the total rural population, 28.4 percent 
is below the age of 14, 60.9 percent is between 15 and 64, and only 4.8 
percent is over 65 years. The share of people aged 15-64 reported as ‘em-
ployed’ in agriculture totals 43.7 percent (52.2 percent male and 27.4 per-
cent female) (Department of Population, Ministry of Immigration and 
Population, 2015). During the civil war, the region witnessed major waves 
of displacement of people from their houses and villages, either within the 
country or to Thailand. According to UNCHR data, as of 2015 a total of 
97,356 verified refugees (both registered and unregistered) were living in 
camps spread along the Thai-Myanmar border (UNCHR, 2018).  
The Tanintharyi frontier zones remained relatively untouched during 
the civil war, except for selected investments by domestic cronies and the 
military, until the ceasefire, when various initiatives were started thanks to 
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the end of armed conflicts, the new favourable legislative and policy envi-
ronment, and the cracks in the governance structure created by the unclear 
demarcation of powers between the UG and the KNU, especially in the 
so-called ‘grey areas’ where both coexist. Several people pointed out that 
“after the ceasefire, many more companies, foreign and local, have come, 
mainly for logging, which could not come here before.”11 As a result, be-
tween 2012 and 2015, 126 cases of land confiscation resulting from infra-
structure projects, natural resource extraction projects, commercial agri-
culture, and confiscation by the military were reported from Karen areas 
in southeast Myanmar (KHRG 2015).  
The expansion of oil palm plantations dates back to a 1999 plan by the 
military junta to turn the region into the ‘oil bowl’ of the country to reduce 
dependence on imported oil. Oil palm plantations were to be developed 
over 500,000 acres (202,343 hectares) of land and to reach 700,000 acres 
(283,280 hectares) by 2030. Since 2010, concessions have also been given 
to joint ventures between foreign companies and Myanmar partners 
(Tarkapaw et al., 2016), including the two which will be analysed here. 
According to Tanintharyi-based civil society organizations, a total of 1.8 
million acres were allocated for oil palm production from 2011 to 2016, 
totalling about 35 percent of all agribusiness concession areas nationally, 
affecting local communities’ access to land and livelihoods. However, it is 
estimated that only five companies currently actively produce oil palm and 
barely 29 percent of the total area granted will be put into actual produc-
tion, with most of the land still being cleared for logging (FFI, 2016; Tarka-
paw et al., 2016). According to a technical report by a conservation INGO, 
inadequate government policies, oversight in land use planning and land 
allocation, and poor management of plantations and processing facilities 
are among the reasons for the failure of the sector to develop (Baskett, 
2016; FFI, 2016). Conversely, several CSO reports and people interviewed 
highlight that the main reason driving these concessions might have been 
logging and timber trading in the first place, as also confirmed by cases in 
this article. In 2016, following escalating protests by affected communities 
and grassroots organizations and with the National League for Democracy 
(NLD)-led government taking office, some initiatives to address villagers’ 
grievances started to materialize, including an order for the controversial 
Myanmar Stark Prestige Plantation (MSPP) company to stop expanding. 
As a Tanintharyi-based investigative journalist stated, “The new govern-
ment is trying to be more transparent with communities.”12  
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The region is also high on the conservation agenda, with 2.5 million 
hectares of deciduous forest lowland, which hosts a number of endan-
gered species including tigers, elephants and tapirs (CAT 2018), inland wa-
ter resources and ecosystems, and a coastline that includes an archipelago 
of over 800 islands. Tanintharyi hosts three of Myanmar’s 39 Protected 
Areas (PAs), two proposed and one existing. Cumulatively, these three 
extend over a land area of 1.7 million acres (Istituto Oikos, 2011), with a 
possibility to be connected in the future through a Tanintharyi Nature 
Corridor that would bring up the total land area to 2.5 million acres (Con-
servation Alliance of Tanawthari, 2018). People I interviewed in villages 
in Lenya, inside one of the PAs, had not heard of any plans regarding the 
establishment of a national park until they learned about it from the CSO 
I was working with. People also said that there were no patrols or visits 
from staff from the Forest Department (FD)13 in the area, which is largely 
under KNU control. In a couple of villages, people mentioned noticing 
the sudden appearance of a Lenya Forest Reserve signboard near Nar-
Karine stream in 2005 but did not really bother to inquire about as nothing 
has happened since.14  
According to a Karen activist, “the government wants to control for-
ests in KNU controlled areas, but the KNU does not agree. This is why 
not much has happened until now, in spite of some areas having been 
designated in the 1990s.”15 The recent acceleration of investments and ex-
pansion of agribusinesses, and the consequent clearing of forests, has 
prompted the FD and international environmental and conservation 
NGOs, further galvanized by the climate change agenda, to mobilize sup-
port and efforts to preserve the country and Tanintharyi’s biodiversity and 
ecosystems from “agricultural expansion, shifting cultivation and conver-
sion of forest to plantations” (Istituto Oikos, 2011: 4). The Conservation 
Alliance of Tanawthari (CAT)16 highlights that PA proposals have been 
carried out without the Free Prior and Informed Consent of the Karen 
indigenous communities whose access and use of lands and resources, and 
livelihoods would be affected. Furthermore, many IDPs and refugees who 
have started to return, find that their lands are in areas demarcated as PAs 
(2018: 28).  
The tension between conservation efforts and agribusiness expansion 
highlights the conflicting mandates of the Ministry of Agriculture, Live-
stock and Irrigation (MOALI) and the Ministry of Natural Resource, En-
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vironment and Conservation (MONREC), and the resulting growing in-
stitutional conflict between them (Woods, 2015a). More broadly it speaks 
to the intersecting interests and conflicting priorities of different institu-
tional actors and sectors, including communities themselves, which are all 
contributing to ‘producing sovereignty’ on the ground, as highlighted by 
Lund (2011). This is also a critical node around which different CSOs and 
community mobilization initiatives and alliances coalesce, separate and re-
group in strategic ways as opportunities and issues materialize, contrib-
uting, in turn, to the creation of alternative visions of development from 
below, or what I refer to as ‘other-visioning’.  
To illustrate this point from the perspective of gender and generation, 
I now turn my attention to two oil palm plantations, Myanmar Stark Pres-
tige Plantation (MSPP) and Myanmar Automotive Company (MAC), and 
to the Lenya National Park project. Each is briefly presented in the next 
section. 
 
2.4  ‘Other’ visions of development 
2.4.1  Oil palm basket and conservation hotspot: two faces of the 
same (dispossession) coin?  
 
The case of MSPP 
In January 2106, together with other members of the project consortium, 
I attended a community meeting in one of the four villages I am studying 
– Village 1 - impacted by the expansion of Myanmar Stark Prestige Plan-
tation Ltd. Co. (MSPP) company.  
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Map 2.1 
Map of the three research sites 
 
Source: Original elaboration by Dawei Development Association 
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We travelled off the main road and onto barely traced paths for about 
40 minutes to reach our destination. The village is located in an open green 
esplanade, with houses and community buildings, including the church, 
standing around it. The open area is where young people play football and 
volleyball in the afternoon, before dinner till sunset. There are many big 
trees and there is a stream running nearby, although people say that its 
waters are not as clean as they used to be. Most houses now have running 
water, thanks to a community-led watershed project, and there is a plan to 
establish community forestry over an area of 3885 acres that has been al-
ready identified, of which I learned when I visited the village again in May 
2018. There is no littering in the village which looks immaculate, well-kept 
and harmoniously blended into the just- tamed-enough nature surround-
ing it.  
 
Picture 2.1 
Village 1 at sunset 
Source: Author, May 2018 
 
The meeting, held in the community hall, was chaired by the commu-
nity pastor and the village leader and aimed to brief us and other villages 
about the impact of MSPP. Many people were there, perhaps most villag-
ers, men and women of all ages. Community environmental research 
 CHAPTER 2 113 
groups were prepared to share their findings based on research villagers 
had been conducting with support from local CSOs into local fish species, 
herbs and vegetables. A young pregnant woman stood up, took the mi-
crophone and started reading the brief that the community had prepared 
for the occasion. It detailed the history of the village – a history of people 
fleeing the war, destruction and rebuilding – and the chronology of 
MSPP’s arrival and expansion. While reading, the woman stopped several 
times, her voice broken and eyes full of tears. The feeling of injustice for 
the aggressive expansion of the company, compounded by the scars left 
by years of civil war, transpired from every single word she uttered, 
strengthened by each and every nod in agreement from the audience.  
Similar feelings of sadness and dismay but also resilience surfaced in 
the words of a woman in her fifties, whom I interviewed when I went back 
to the village in 2018. She had been born in this village. She said that be-
fore the war, villagers could access plenty of resources, including vegeta-
bles and medicines, from the forest. When the war broke out, she had to 
hide in the jungle and move from one place to another several times. This 
why her children could not be educated. In 2000, she finally moved back 
to the village with everybody else, despite the fact that it was still con-
trolled by the military. Now they have to deal with MSPP. The company 
took their gardening land without giving any compensation and its opera-
tions are affecting the environment. The variety and number of wild veg-
etables are decreasing and the water is polluted. The villagers want to pro-
tect their natural resources and are maintaining the water supply but MSPP 
is trying to encroach on this area and is not responding to the villagers’ 
request to meet and discuss the issue. A man who joined in the conversa-
tion added that the villagers have a plan to initiate community forestry. 
They wanted to register it with both the KNU and UG but the KNU re-
plied that it encompassed too much land while the UG did not come to 
the village, stating that they did not have enough staff. I was told that the 
villagers would not simply sit around and wait but were going ahead with 
mapping the resources, organizing a communal prayer meeting and using 
customary law to define the area. However, they were still afraid that the 
company would take the land away if they did not have an ownership cer-
tificate.17   
MSPP is one of the best known cases of land grabbing in Tanintharyi, 
having sparked mobilization by affected villagers and local CSOs, and has 
been well-documented in a 2016 report and film.18 It is a venture between 
114 Other visions of Myanmar’s agrarian and environmental change 
 
Malaysian Prestige Platform, owned by a Malaysian conglomerate, and the 
Myanmar-based Stark Industries, owned by a Myanmar businesswoman 
with connections to domestic elites and the military.19 In 2011, MSPP was 
granted a concession of over 42,200 acres of land in an area where four 
villages have their farming and community land.20 According to the CSO 
report above, the government had ‘incorrectly’ classified these lands as 
‘vacant’ (Tarkapaw et al., 2016: 29). All four directly impacted villages are 
in KNU controlled areas. Altogether, 13 villages have been affected in 
terms of access to forests and livelihoods.21 “The first year they felled all 
the trees, including betel nuts and cashew nuts trees. But nobody helped 
the village. Then they cleared and planted the palms. The company also 
mapped the land and said maybe they will pay compensation later but not 
for community forest.”22 While many companies and local cronies are in-
volved in land grabbing, nobody consults the villagers even if “it is against 
human rights law and IP rights.”23 
 
Picture 2.2  
View of MSPP 
Source: Author, May 2017 
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Since 2011, MSPP has cleared more than 6,000 acres, including betel 
nut and cashew gardens and areas that people had prepared for rice, seri-
ously impacting people’s food and income. In Village 3, for instance, while 
two households had lost land to the company, many more suffered from 
the consequences of MSPP’s aggressive expansion and not only in terms 
of its direct impact on livelihoods. 
Before life was easier. We did not worry. If we wanted rice, we could get 
enough per year. We could also cultivate betel nuts the next years. But now 
the company has grabbed some village land, including betel nut plantations, 
and is expanding. Before we were free to come and go but now it’s not pos-
sible anymore because if we go away, the company might take our land. Some 
10-20 cows have also died because of the pollution in the water and grass.24 
As illustrated by the woman’s words above, people have a history of 
multiple displacement in these areas, having fled their villages which were 
routinely ransacked and destroyed by the military, and relocated or hid in 
the forest many times. This, together with the overlapping governance set-
up and the protection granted under traditional tenure systems, means that 
most people have not registered their lands. As a male Karen grassroots 
leader explained,  
According to tradition, most land was community land, governed by tradi-
tional laws. People marked the land to delimit the boundaries and everybody 
acknowledged that. There were no conflicts but a common understanding.  
But now with company grabs they can no longer say ‘this is my land’ because 
MSPP says ‘if this is your, show me your registration form, Form 7’. But they 
don’t have that. In this area people do not ask permission from the govern-
ment [to use the land]. We are the community and we are doing shifting cul-
tivation because this is our tradition.25 
MSPP used people’s lack of land certificates to its advantage but with-
out giving anything in return. When questioned by the villagers, the com-
pany stated it had paid the government for the land so the government 
should be held accountable not the company. The local administrator in 
Village 1 explained, “We don’t know who authorized the concession be-
cause the companies are never clear […] At the time conflicts were ongo-
ing and there was no transparency or proper consultation. At first the 
KNU tried to oppose the company but now the company says they will 
do community development (roads etc.) and is trying to negotiate with the 
pastor.” According to the villagers in Village 2, the company’s new strategy 
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is to show that they are socially responsible. As an example, “they recently 
built a church and a school to show their good will. When they started the 
constructions, they did not say anything but tried to get land in exchange.” 
Village 2, which is a resettlement village, was heavily affected by MSPP. 
Most of the villagers work for the company, doing the clearing, planting 
and spraying of pesticides. “Anybody can just show up. The villagers do 
not have land anymore so this is the only choice they have. Many have 
migrated to Thailand and Northern Shan.”26According to local CSOs, in 
Village 2 resistance was weaker and not as organized as the ‘strength’ of a 
village can be affected by its history of displacement.  
However, people in this village are now pressed into registering their 
lands “because the government does not care about customary law. So we 
want to push for land registration through Form 7,” emphasized one man, 
adding that customary law was recognized under British rule (53-55 Act) 
but this was lost when the Myanmar government was formed. The com-
munity forest in Village 2 is close to the land used by MSPP and commu-
nity-based organizations started working to protect the forest and push 
the government to respect Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). Vil-
lagers came together to protect the forest as this strategy had worked in 
the past to preserve areas from the company. Following several petitions 
to the government, symbolic ceremonies and initiatives to measure vil-
lages’ land, the government formed an investigation committee in 201527 
and in July 2016 ordered MSPP to stop expanding. 
 
The case of Myanmar Auto Corporation 
The case of Myanmar Auto Corporation (MAC) is in many ways similar 
to that of MSPP. However, this company has struggled to get the oil palm 
business off the ground, or simply might not be as interested in the oil 
business as it is in logging. MAC, a joint venture between Korean Auto 
Industrial Co. (AIC) and Singaporean Resources & Resource Pte. Ltd was 
registered in 2011.28 According to AIC’s website, in 2010 the company was 
authorized by the Myanmar Government to operate a logging and palm 
oil business on 133,600 acres of land. “Having planted palm oil seedlings 
and completed a crude palm oil production plant, we were able to supply 
high quality palm oil. We also started production and supply of timber.”29 
The company managers told the villagers they had obtained permission 
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from the UG but never showed any evidence of this. The KNU also said 
they never gave permission to the company to operate.30  
According to a Karen grassroots leader who has been supporting com-
munities in the area, as of February 2016, the company had cleared more 
than 10,000 acres of forest but planted only 100 acres; at the same time, 
13,000 tons of timber had been shipped to unknown destinations, pre-
sumably in cooperation with Yadanar Moe Pyae Tun Co., Ltd, a domestic 
company active in logging in the area (Advancing Life and Regenerating 
Motherland et al., 2018). When the grassroots partners and I visited the 
area, close to the main company site where both the offices and staff ac-
commodation are located, we saw piles of timber laying around in appar-
ent abandonment, although they were all duly numbered and marked with 
the FD logo. Our local guide explained that Yadanar Moe Pyae had started 
legally logging for MAC in 2015, which is why the timber was numbered. 
However, after the new government announced a moratorium on logging 
in 2016, these logs could no longer be traded (see Photo 3.3). A recent 
NGO report provides further details on the case, updating the planted 
area to 3315 acres, which is still only 3 percent of the total. Based on in-
terviews with company employees, timber extraction workers and local 
communities, the report alleges that the extracted timber has been ex-
ported to international markets. MAC also posted an advertisement on the 
e-commerce website Alibaba to sell the timber produced from oil palm 
plantation areas, thus selling illegal timber as if it were legal timber. Given 
MAC’s favourable location with easy access to the Greater Mekong South-
ern Economic Corridors, the timber trade might actually be one of its 
main operations (Advancing Life and Regenerating Motherland et al., 
2018). 
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Picture 3.3  
Numbered logs near MAC area 
Source: Author, October 2016 
 
The history of Village 4, affected by MAC operations and which I vis-
ited four times between 2015 and 2018, is illustrative of local people’s sto-
ries of displacement and the material and emotional impacts of the war. 
The village is located along the Myeik-Kawthaung Road and inhabited 
mostly by Karen people who were forced to flee their villages during the 
civil war and resettled in the current location in around 2000. Presently 
there are more than 80 households in the village. One woman recalls that 
“in earlier times, the [old] village had more than 300 households. But the 
village was destroyed by the army and we were separated. Some people 
migrated to other countries. Other people have also joined the village – 
they are Burmese, like the owner of the “restaurant” who is now buying 
land.”31   
As was the case with MSPP, a number of legal violations occurred in 
this village, including violation of the VFVL Law and the 2012 Environ-
mental Conservation Law. MAC also failed to obtain indigenous Karen 
communities’ free prior and informed consent (FPIC). According to the 
Karen leader quoted above, it is likely that bribes were involved, as the 
company started clearing even before being formally awarded the land. 
With help from local CSOs, villagers are now more aware of their rights, 
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which helps to make the KNU and the UG more accountable.32 After sev-
eral meetings with the villagers, CSOs and the local authorities, the com-
pany agreed with the township authorities to compensate the villagers for 
the land on which they had established the oil palm nursery, which villag-
ers had initially agreed to rent for three years, but which was never re-
turned to them.33 In fact it was only in 2016 that the villagers heard from 
the company.  
Compensation? Nobody received anything. Sometimes we asked for the 
translator but he didn’t come. At times we go to the company and request 
land and compensation but the company staff doesn't want to speak with us. 
There are two staff members, one Korean and one Burmese. But even the 
Burmese doesn't speak to us. 
We organized the villagers to mobilize against the company. We tried again 
and again to go the MAC office and tell the company this is our land but the 
company was not responsive and asked for the evidence. We don't have the 
evidence but we have the tax receipts. But the company doesn't care.34  
Villagers were not sure how much land the company actually has and 
what it does. “We don’t understand the company plans. The company is 
not doing anything. We don’t understand the project.” 35 Compared to 
when it first arrived, MAC seems to have become much less active. When 
I visited the area in 2016, there were very few visible signs of ongoing 
activities and, according to the Burmese translator, it would take at least 
another two years before oil pressing could start.36 The investor had finan-
cial problems so had to reduce the number of labourers, from 350 in 2015 
to only 50 in 2016.37 As one villager later added: “At first, some people 
engaged in work to get some income, 1-2 days per week. The company 
paid 2,500 Kyats/day to women and 5,000 Kyats/day to men. However, 
at the moment nobody is working for the company that only has only a 
few people who are not from this area.”38 As already noted for MSPP, and 
just as in other well-documented cases of palm oil expansion, companies 
prefer to source labour from afar, making local labour unnecessary (Li, 
2011). Moreover, as seen in the case of Village 2, this type of labour is not 
perceived by locals as attractive and only used as a last resort.  
In the area around MAC operations, villagers have now established a 
community forest on 2400 acres through the UG and KNU. Although it 
serves the purpose of protecting the environment and their forests, it also 
limits their access to land for toungya, as one man elaborated: “We have 
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difficulties because, on the KNU side, the forest is being controlled for 
conservation and we cannot do toungya. So now we go back to former 
toungya land from 17 years ago where there are big trees. We don’t have 
enough land because of conservation and the company. This is problem-
atic, especially for the new generation. In May KNU started and finished 
measuring the land. We don’t know the plans but in theory KNU wants 
to control the area and keep it from other companies.”39 As this illustrates, 
in the scramble for territorialisation by different actors, villagers are also 
using their own strategies, including community forestry and expanding 
the area under toungya into the concession area. 
  
Lenya National Park 
The Lenya National Park (LNP) is an example of green grabbing or what 
Hall and colleagues define as “ambient exclusion”, which is “motivated by 
efforts to attain the ‘common good’ promoted by conservation projects 
and discourse” (Hall et al., 2011: 60). Although the park has not yet mate-
rialized, as seen in section 2.3, its anticipated impacts are already felt on 
the ground and shape the lived experience of villagers in the area. The 
establishment of the LNP will affect 13 villages, nine of which are Karen, 
and 2470 people whose farmland is in the designated park area, in addition 
to all the IDPs and returnees that have started returning since the ceasefire 
and whose numbers are expected to increase (Conservation Alliance of 
Tanawthari, 2018). Most villages in the area were abandoned, destroyed 
and rebuilt numerous times during the 70-year-long civil war between the 
KNU and the UG.  
 Currently the area is under the mixed administration of both authori-
ties. According to a KNU general,40 meaning that “the government and 
KNU work together and the boundaries between the two are not so set,”41 
and both collect taxes. The National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) specifies 
that parties to the NCA have to carry out all programmes and projects in 
coordination with each other, including in the areas of environmental con-
servation (Article 6.2) and “receiving aid from donor agencies both inside 
and outside the country for regional development and capacity-building 
projects” (Article 6.5). According to a Karen activist, an ad interim land 
policy was urgently needed to protect the rights of communities, and this 
is what had been agreed during the NCA negotiation. However, “the gov-
ernment land agenda totally ignores the peace process.”42 The risk here is 
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that the expansion of government controlled areas in the guise of national 
parks might create tensions with the KNU and undermine the peace pro-
cess (Conservation Alliance of Tanawthari, 2018: 27). The tension also 
underlines the ongoing battle to affirm territoriality over what Vandergeest 
and Peluso (1995) define as ‘abstract space’ - space that can be easily meas-
ured and located within larger spaces – in juxtaposition to the way in which 
people materially experience space as “located, relative, and varied” (Ibid: 
389).  
Because of the history of the villages and new people joining them, the 
composition of the population is more heterogeneous than that in the 
MSPP and even MAC areas, often with both Karen and Burmese families 
as well as Thai and Shan in some cases. Nonetheless, livelihoods still rotate 
around shifting cultivation, and betel nuts and fruits (e.g. bananas) for 
cash, which is used for household and kitchen supplies, school fees and 
medicines. However, because most of the betel nut gardens are of more 
recent establishment (and it takes at least seven years for a tree to become 
productive), people complain that they do not earn enough cash.  
The creation of LNP and its extension were proposed respectively in 
2002 and 2004, after an endangered bird species was discovered in the area 
(Istituto Oikos, 2011). To date, the area, which spans over 702,080 acres, 
has not yet been gazetted. However, there has been a recent surge of in-
terest in revamping the project following the involvement of international 
conservation actors including Flora Fauna International (FFI). There are 
also plans to create a “Tanintharyi Nature Corridor” to connect the LNP 
and the Taninthary Nature Reserve (CAT 2018). According to the Envi-
ronmental Justice Atlas website, IUCN has allocated 1-1.5 million Euro to 
the project (EJOLT, n.d.). 
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Picture 2.4 
Lenya Area 
Source: Author, February 2017 
 
When I first went to the area in 2017, people in the three villages I 
visited had just learned about the LNP project. “Nobody has come to ex-
plain the project to us. We don’t even know where the boundaries are. 
KNU does not agree to the national park. We have heard from [name of 
grassroots CSO] about the park”.43 The main concerns that people had 
were not dissimilar to those of villagers in other areas, focusing largely on 
the decreased availability of new land for toungya, especially for young peo-
ple, and the impact of the changing weather patterns. “Farms are 2 hours 
away by foot or 1.5 hours by bike.”44 With the establishment of the LNP, 
people will have to go farther and farther to find new land and worry that 
their gardens might be engulfed by the park. Focus Group Discussion par-
ticipants agreed that for now the availability of land was still okay but they 
were already unable to go to the watershed and national park areas alt-
hough there are no signs of demarcation around the park area. People 
worry that when the park is established, it will impact their rights, future 
generations and livelihoods as they learned from local CSOs has been the 
experience in Thailand.45   
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In the villages I visited, the majority of people did not have Form 7. 
Most land in the area was measured two or three years ago but people 
have heard nothing since. The process is not easy and most people do not 
speak Burmese, which is a major problem. One man in his early 60s said 
he had to go to the district office five times before he could get the certif-
icates – he has 50 acres divided across four certificates (for garden land) 
and 10 more of farmland (not toungya). The certificates are in his children’s 
names. But not all parents can prepare land for their children. If they do 
not have land when they marry, new couples will start with toungya and 
work for other people until they can save cash from betel nuts.46 Among 
the people who did have land certificates, the practice of having these in 
the names of the children seemed common. Repeatedly people said their 
land was divided equally among their sons and daughters, with the only 
exception being the youngest, regardless of sex, who would also get the 
parental house and the ancestral land.  
 
2.4.2  Tradition in the winds of change     
Changes in livelihood and access to resources: solidarity and conflict  
People in all the areas I visited practice upland rotational (or shifting) 
farming – toungya, from toung (hill) and ya (cultivation) – of rice, vegetables 
and spices, mainly for family consumption, in combination with betel nut 
and cashew nut trees which provide the cash income. A Karen leader ex-
plained that betel nuts for cash were introduced in the 90s; in his grand-
parents’ time, there was no market for the nuts and people did not have 
cash crops. Instead, families could borrow what they needed, including 
rice, from other villages, which they would return the following year. 
Nowadays, because of the reduced availability of land due to the expan-
sion of concessions and forest demarcations, people focus more on cash 
crops.47 The intensified engagement with the cash economy has also trig-
gered processes of social differentiation and a breakdown of solidarity due 
to the fact that some families have more betel nut land and thus cash in-
come, which also comes with access to paid labour. Additionally, land-
based conflicts, for instance with returning IDPs or between people who 
fled and those who resettled, contribute to changing social relations. 
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“Rice is for eating and ordinary life. Betel nut is for the future, for our 
sons and daughters”, explained one woman in Village 3.48 A betel nut gar-
den can produce a cash flow of 100.000 Kyat (62 USD) per acre, which 
means over 1 million Kyat per harvest on 10 acres. In Village 3, most 
families reportedly have about 10-15 acres of garden land, a few with  as 
much as 150-200 acres, but the land area “depends on the [number of] 
family [members] and how hard you work.”49 This means that the re/pro-
ductive ability of households is internalized, in line with Chayanov’s fam-
ily-centred concept of peasant economy and labour (Bernstein, 2009; Cha-
yanov et al., 1986).  
When villagers refer to garden land, they are talking about betel nut or 
cashew nut plantations on which many other crops and fruit trees – for 
instance, mango, durian, pineapple - are also planted. This is also the land 
that is passed onto children, together with the ancestral land which is also 
cultivated. Although toungya is still practiced, nowadays the land is con-
verted into beetle nut gardens after one year while before it was on a 
seven-year rotation.50 “On 5 hectares [12.35 acres], we can have 3,000 trees 
which is enough for a family. So if we don’t get enough from toungya, we 
buy the rice at the market in nearby villages or Myek.”51 However, when I 
asked in various discussions whether rice from toungya was for selling, I 
would always be laughed at. The separation between cash crops and food 
crops goes far beyond the material separation of space and is intimately 
social and cultural. Even betel nuts are considered an expression of tradi-
tion because people used to grow them for personal use long before they 
started selling them for cash. This is not to romanticize the traditional Ka-
ren way of life (for a counter argument see, Walker, 2001, 2004), as people 
are aware of and do not shy away from opportunities to generate cash 
income through the sale of betel and cashew nuts. In fact, a man com-
plained that he tried to sell other crops, like bananas, but there is just no 
market for them.52  
Traditionally families slash and burn forest land each year to plant rice. 
The following year, on the same land, they can plant betel nut seedlings, 
which take 5-7 years to reach full productivity. If some people have a rice 
surplus, they can loan it to other families who have less and recoup it with 
the next harvest. Each household does their own farming but there is, or 
used to be, also a system of labour exchange, in which families help each 
other. Normally, the preparatory activities start between December and 
February. First of all, the right land is identified using various rituals and 
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practices to test the soil. Then the land is cleared of small trees and bushes, 
an activity carried out by women and men together and normally taking 
one week. Then groups of people take it in turns to fell the big trees and 
finish clearing everybody’s land. While these activities are done jointly by 
women and men, those tasks that require more physical strength, like cut-
ting down big trees, are men’s responsibility. 15-20 people working to-
gether can normally clear one family’s plot in one day. This means that if 
there are 50 households in one village, in about 20 days every family would 
have its land ready. Once the land is cleared, the burning takes place. 
Within one week to 10 days of clearing the land, households can start 
planting vegetables, sugarcane, chili and sesame, which are planted again 
in June when the new seeds are ready. In the early days, the time between 
March and May was for resting, but now people are busy keeping the betel 
nut gardens clear of weeds. In June and July, rice is planted. Again, this 
can be done working in groups. From then onwards, weeding becomes 
important as the paddy needs to be kept clear. By September-October, 
flowers and fruits are blossoming in the fields, with harvesting of the rice 
finally taking place in December.53  
Some people can use the extra help in their garden as well, depending 
on how much land they have. Young unmarried men in particular engage 
in this type of work, once they are done helping their families. This enables 
them to earn some petty cash for fuel or snacks, or to top up the credit on 
their mobile phones. “This is part of the traditional lifestyle. It is an ex-
change of labour when we need it,” commented a male farmer. “However, 
now our lifestyle has been affected because people want to get paid as 
much as the companies pay.”54  
This social differentiation and the breakdown of solidarity is a common 
outcome of agrarian transitions among indigenous communities, as we will 
also see in Chapter 5. In some cases, this creates conflicts as well, as cap-
tured by a man during a group discussion with villagers affected by MSPP:  
Under the traditional system we helped each other day by day. Now rich men 
[from the community] also act like companies.  
Now there are many more differences. Before, all people had farms but now 
some had the chance to be labour contractors for the companies.  
This is creating conflicts. When they have links with the company, they put 
pressure on the community. They even took land from the community and 
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called the villagers to clear it so that they could then sell it to the companies. 
We could not refuse it because we were afraid. In one example, the rich per-
son is a woman who is married to a KNU general.55  
It is important to highlight that the participants of the focus group dis-
cussion above came from different villages and included both men and 
women and young people. The diversity reflected in the quotes, reflects 
how people move back and forth between the tendency to romanticize 
the past, especially the elderly, and a more analytical view of the changes. 
In Village 2, internal divisions and conflicts, including among KNU and 
the government,56 escalated following some people’s decision in 2017 to 
take the compensation offered by MSPP - about 30,000 to 100,000 Kyats 
per acre. Soon after, the company also offered to buy land and some peo-
ple sold their land, mostly IDP families who returned to the refugee camps 
after selling the land. Although they did not have land certificates, they 
were asked by the company to sign papers for the sale. Those who did not 
take the compensation, 12 households, do not live in the village but have 
their ancestral land there.57   
Land is the main cause of disputes in Village 4, which is a resettlement 
village, as seen above. Although people have lived there for a long time, 
they do not feel as if they fully belong and this adds to the sense of inse-
curity: “Here it is not our land. It is other villagers’ land so sometimes 
there are problems. But we complain and make the case they [the other 
villagers] should appeal to the army since it is the army that forced us 
here,” said one old man reminiscing about his old village. Another man 
added that they have temporary land certificates, Form 10558, and had al-
ready been in the village for eighteen years. He also highlighted that the 
area was once part of their traditional customary land. Thus, increased 
pressure on land and conflicts pressures people to secure access to land 
through formalizing what once was customarily held land, promoting a 
transition towards capitalist property rights within the span of one gener-
ation.  
After the civil war, many Burmese came to take the land in Village 4 
with the compliance of the army, taking advantage of the fact that almost 
all people had forcibly removed. Now the lower part of the road in the 
village is Burmese while the upper side is Karen. “In the old village, we 
had our grandfather and grandmother’s land. On average 50 acres. But 
here we have 50 by 80 feet for our homestead […]We had planned for the 
 CHAPTER 2 127 
new generation to settle in the old village but now the land is included in 
the MAC area.”59  
There is also a spatial and social separation of what people identify as 
‘new’ and ‘old’ village. The ‘old village’ is where their ancestral land is lo-
cated and is inside the MAC concession area. The ‘new village’ is where 
people have settled, sometimes on other people’s land. “The company 
area includes land that we do not have certificates for. We had tax forms 
but these were not useful”, explained one young man.60 Although the 
whole village area was engulfed by MAC, because the company had not 
cleared all the land, the villagers said they planned to “prepare it” for 
toungya,61 thus using shifting cultivation as a form of land occupation.  
 
2.4.3  The gender and generational face of change  
 
Reduced access to forests and forest products is impacting women in 
terms of income, workload, physical security and emotional distress. They 
have to walk further to reach the fields and to collect firewood, herbs, 
vegetables and water. Married women in Village 3 pointed out that because 
toungya land is increasingly far away, not only are they forced to travel 
longer distances but also have to leave the children behind, which creates 
additional practical and emotional challenges. Women are used to taking 
their children along and are not happy leaving them with relatives or el-
derly women.  
 Women in Village 4 were also concerned about what the decreased ac-
cess to land and forest might imply for food and income availability. They 
highlighted, for example, that before there was rattan, which provided 
them with a cash income. Now there is not so much rattan and they also 
no longer have access to as many vegetables.62 Even their diets have 
changed a lot: “Wild vegetables cannot be found anymore. We had a lot 
of fish before but now the logs drain the lake. There are no more wild 
animals to hunt in the forest. Water is also a problem. In the summer we 
have to collect water far away because we cannot drink anymore the water 
[from the stream] because it's become very dirty and polluted and there is 
less.” This finding is confirmed by other research on land grabbing across 
countries, including Cambodia, and continents (Julia and White, 2012a; 
Park and Daley, 2015; White et al., 2014).   
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According to young women, in net terms, “the impact [of no land] is 
the same for women and men because we do the toungya with men and 
livelihood is interdependent.”63 This was echoed by women of all ages in 
group discussions and interviews. Women said they work alongside men 
and in community groups doing the same activities, albeit there was some 
degree of variation across communities mainly due to individual circum-
stances (women with small babies and young children) and individual 
characteristics (mainly strength), with a clear division of roles for a number 
of activities, depending on the location: 
There is reciprocity and exchange of labour. Cutting down the tree, harvest-
ing; almost all is done together at the village level. Women and men do the 
same things, including cutting trees. Hunting is men's job. Collecting vegeta-
bles is women's job and fishing we do together. Collecting medicines depends 
on your knowledge but normally this knowledge is with women.64   
We work together with our husbands sharing all activities in rice farming and 
plantations, except for tree cutting…We usually go to the forest in small 
groups [of women]. Sometimes we also collect water. Only a few men are 
involved in water collection and fishing… Some households have buffaloes, 
cows, chicken, dogs and cats. We both take care of animals and children can 
take care of small animals.65 
Sometimes men are sick, and women have to do everything. But, if women 
have small babies, they cannot do heavy work. The only difference is that 
women cannot ride bikes.66 
These observations are also supported by research conducted among 
Karen communities which found that division of labour was not distin-
guished along gender lines (Leonard and Pe Tha Law, 2015; Karen Human 
Rights Group, 2006), which also explains the apparent contradictions in 
the first and second quote with regards to tree cutting, as there might be a 
degree of variability within the general rule. At the national level, available 
data also indicates that women’s participation in all agricultural activities 
is on a par with men’s, with the exception of land preparation (Table 3.1). 
Hilary Faxon (2017) observes that across different farming systems many 
tasks tend to be shared equally, with the exception of seed-saving, weeding 
and transplanting (seen as women’s tasks) and ploughing and operating 
equipment (seen as men’s). In spite of this, she notes women’s tendency 
to identify themselves as helpers and workers rather than as farmers and 
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“also rooted in social conventions about the proper or polite way of doing 
things, or what workshop participants frequently referred to as ‘culture’ 
(yinkyehhmu)”, in addition to stemming from gendered agricultural prac-
tices (Faxon, 2017: 1207). In my research among FGD participants, 74 
percent (34 out of 53) of women referred to farming/shifting cultivation 
as their main occupation, while as only 8 percent defined themselves as 
housewives. Those who highlighted sharing farming tasks with their hus-
bands did it with a sense of pride and realism.  
Figure 3.1 
Members of farm-holding households working within the past 12 months in 
different farm activities, 2010 
Source: Myanmar Census of Agriculture  
(first used in FAO-UNW, draft report) 
 
Activities such as fetching wood and water, collecting vegetables and 
herbs, cooking, washing and taking care of children and other family mem-
bers were clearly identified as women-only responsibilities. This strict sep-
aration when it comes to domestic work, also has a spatial dimension 
whereby the kitchen or the back of the house are women’s spaces. Even 
women’s clothes are kept strictly separated from the rest in Burmese soci-
ety in general (Than Than New: 2003) and in the communities I visited. 
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For instance, the place where we (women) could hang our clothes to dry 
after washing was not the same as the one that men used. Rev. Harry Mar-
shall wrote in its ethnographic study of Karen in the early 1900s: “the men 
consider themselves dishonoured if brought into close contact with a 
woman’s garment or compelled to appear in any way subordinate to a fe-
male… In this respect they entertain feeling similar to those of Burmese 
men” (Marshall, 1922: 121).  
Among youth group participants, a gendered division of roles was 
more evident. Young men mentioned harvesting, collecting betel nuts and 
tending the garden as part of their daily chores, for which they get pocket 
money that they can use for phones and motorbikes (fuel). In addition, 
they can earn extra to buy snacks and soft drinks by cutting trees and 
bushes for toungya. Conversely, while both boys and girls are expected to 
help their parents both in the household and field (Karen Human Rights 
Group, 2016), young women mentioned that their daily activities mainly 
consisted of cooking and other domestic chores and this came with no 
remuneration, highlighting that women’s work tends to remain in the 
realm of the ‘other’ economy, invisible and unremunerated, thus unvalued. 
The reduced mobility of young women has an impact on their access to 
higher education, as families faced with increasing shortage of resources 
have to prioritize and are more likely to prefer girls to stay at home. Re-
duced mobility also impacts young women’s participation in community 
mobilization, as will be discussed later in the chapter.  
This strict distinction solidifies more as people age and adhere more 
closely to gendered and generationed scripts that determine who should 
do what. Marshall (1922: 131) noted that traditionally women, “the older 
they grow the more conservative they become, and not infrequently the 
opinions of a grandmother will keep a whole family from bettering its 
condition by engaging in some new occupation.” He further remarked that 
the special position of the Karen grandmother as “high priestess” of the 
Bgha – the tutelary god/spirit of the family – feast, while having a religious 
and cultural significance and being rooted in the matriarchal origin of the 
Karen, does not affect the social position of women, “except in so far as 
it prevents younger members of the family, both men and women, from 
breaking with religious and social traditions of their forefathers” (Ibid, 
1922: 133). For example, in mixed group discussions, women, boys and 
girls tended to speak less and sit at the margins of the circle, with women 
typically sitting on the lower step of the wooden floor.  
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Than Than Nwe (2003: 3–4) summarizes this spatial manifestation of 
patriarchal and age hierarchies as follows: “In aspatial relationships the 
juxtaposition of equity and inequity in Burmese society is subsumed. They 
become more pronounced however, when boundaries in real space based 
on gender are drawn.” She argues that while women have enjoyed a rela-
tively high status, society is permeated with male chauvinism, sanctioned 
by the Buddhist notion of women’s spiritual inferiority, which is rein-
forced through a gendered division of space and position. This also applies 
to younger men under the cultural practice of respect of the Buddha, 
monks, parents, teachers, and anyone older than self, which is “expressed 
in space in several ways” with those worthier taking the “highest or tallest 
geographical position” (Ibid: 9).  
The exclusion of women from Buddhist monastic communities, the 
sangha, has also contributed to endorsing their inferiority relative to men, 
reinforced by the historical predominance of men in leadership positions 
as monks, village leaders and administrators (Ikeya, 2012), and teachers. 
These gendered hierarchies were also reified by Christian missionaries 
who set out to educate women according to ideas of what might constitute 
a good housewife in a good Christian family (Ikeya, 2012: 32). Most of the 
communities I visited were predominantly Christian.  
 
Picture 2.5 
Community meeting – women and youth sitting in the back   
Source: Author, May 2018 
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Encounters with the cash economy, as families face problems getting 
enough food and income, bring the lower value placed on women’s work 
to light, as women are typically paid less than men for the same type of 
work. Wages for casual labour varied from 3500-4000 Kyat a day for men 
and 3000-3500 Kyat a day for women, based on physical strength. Similar 
findings are also confirmed by other research (FAO, 2016; Oxfam 2014). 
In general, casual labour on the plantations is not very popular because it 
is heavy and leaves no freedom: but it is a fall-back option and a source of 
ready cash. For instance, in Village 2, in the middle of the MSPP conces-
sion area, livelihoods were severely affected by the company. People had 
no land and they became poorer, forcing many to migrate to Thailand and 
Northern Shan. Those who stayed had no choice but to accept casual work 
on the plantation doing clearing, planting and pesticide spraying. Women 
told me that when they really need money, they go looking for work, alt-
hough the company does not always accept them.67 In Village 3, partici-
pants in the female FGD recalled that some 20-30 people in the village 
worked for the company at first but then stopped because they were not 
paid regularly. Nowadays the company mainly sources labour from outside 
the area, mostly Muslims [because it is a Malaysian company]. Only if extra 
labour is needed will the company announce this and, if the women are 
free, they may consider taking up employment to get extra cash for 10-15 
days.68  
When asked about decision-making, women provided varied re-
sponses. For instance, in one group, women said they make most of the 
decisions themselves, apart from the most important ones, for instance 
buying and selling land, which are made jointly.69 In another group, 
women said that decisions about farming and children are made jointly, as 
are those over the use of money (although it is the women who keep the 
money70). However, in the everyday politics (Kerkvliet, 2002, 2009) that 
animates community life and inter-community exchange, while women, 
including older women, and young people join community meetings on a 
regular basis, decision-making tends to happen following rigorous gender 
and age hierarchies. “We don’t know about the issues, so we don’t talk. 
Husbands do the talking. We think these issues are not related to us.”71 
Participation is open to everybody in the village, including the few families 
from other ethnic groups; in practice, however, women do not have much 
say. It was not uncommon for women to tell me that they are “ignorant” 
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and “uneducated” and this is why they do not feel confident about speak-
ing up. Faxon’s (2017) research points to similar findings and highlights 
women’s estrangement from male decision-making spaces. As men are 
identified as heads of households, leadership positions within villages have 
traditionally been assigned to men, while women are tasked with commu-
nity tasks, including those related to culture, tradition and religion (Karen 
Human Rights Group, 2006).  
For young people the situation is similar. In Village 4, when I asked a 
group of youth between the ages of 15 to 30 years if they had considered 
doing anything about the company, they uttered: “We don't have a strategy 
to do anything. We trust [our] parents’ opinion and follow that. We respect 
our parents. Parents don't talk about it but we do talk with each other”.72 
These responses are in contrast to young people’s experiences discussed 
later in the chapter and might be a reflection of the normative position of 
being ‘a good child’ and trusting the older generation, as Karen children 
are indoctrinated to be (cf. Karen Human Rights Group, 2006). It is also 
important to note that young people’s responses in focus groups are so-
cially and relationally produced and may be subject to acceptability filters. 
Younger married women with children and older women were generally 
more vocal and confident within women’s groups, indicating that gender 
and social age shape people’s relative position and status during their life 
cycle, with older women always having “a measure of maternal authority” 
(Ibid, 2006: 14).  
Households are equally in a state of flux, as roles and relationships are 
renegotiated and change, also in response to the changes that are currently 
taking place, as the following quote by a female teacher in her mid-fifties 
from Village 1 highlights. While sharing her experience of participating in 
community mobilization with villagers in the MAC area, she was asked 
when ‘the project’ – meaning CSOs and other villages - could help them. 
She replied: “Protection has to come from ourselves. I am a school prin-
cipal, a government official. In the past I was afraid to speak up but now 
I know that this is my right and I have to do it for myself and my children 
as well.”73 In her case, the education and status that came with her job, 
usually a man’s one in traditional Karen society, along with the support 
provided by CSOs, played a decisive role in boosting her confidence: for 
other women the reality might be different. Nonetheless, this testimony 
also shows and confirms that women’s participation in the politics of land 
grabs often has an empowering effect (see also Chapter 4). 
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While existing empirical evidence clearly indicates that CSOs and 
NGOs play an important role in this respect, there was no sign that this 
was happening in the areas I visited, in spite of very active social move-
ments. The curriculum for training and awareness-raising sessions that lo-
cal CSOs were holding did not include gender equality or women’s rights 
among the topics discussed, while these have, to an extent, entered the 
repertoire of national and apex groups, as also emerged during the nego-
tiations over the NLUP. It is only recently that the partners I was working 
with more closely have started introducing gender equality more system-
atically in their trainings, probably influenced by their participation in the 
MOSAIC project and their interactions with me. 
 
Inheritance and intergenerational transfer of land  
As seen above, land is most commonly divided equally between sons and 
daughters. The youngest child, regardless of sex, receives the house and 
the ancestral land to make up for the less time s/he has under direct pa-
rental care and to build up his/her own assets. In the Dawei area among 
Tavoyan communities, it was also noted that the youngest child is usually 
the one who stays in the parental home and takes care of ageing parents. 
This observation about inheritance was repeated across cases and inter-
views, suggesting a general pattern, but there were also variations and flu-
idity in the application of the rules, depending on the family’s history of 
displacement and its current situation. For example, if the parents do not 
have land to give, the children receive nothing; and if women inherit in 
their native village but move to other villages after marriage, they can ar-
range for their relatives take care of the land. For instance, in Village 4, 
three out of five women I spoke to had inherited 10 acres of land each 
from their parents in the old village area, while the other two could not 
inherit because their parents had died during the war or because the land 
had gone to their younger siblings. Of those women who had land, all had 
LUCs (Form 7) for garden land, both in the MAC (uncleared) area and in 
the new village, with three out of five having more than one certificate. In 
this latter case, the certificates were in the names of their children who 
were married and had families.74  
Other research in Myanmar confirms the finding about inheritance, 
highlighting the danger of formalization that might benefit men more than 
women (Land Core Group and TROCAIRE, 2018). However, I could not 
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confirm this for people I interviewed: those who had certificates were 
both men and women. Women had certificates in their names for land 
inherited from their parents but there was no case of joint registration by 
married couples. Although joint registration is not prohibited, it is not en-
couraged or suggested either, and people are generally not aware of this 
option. In the case of a husband who has land entitled to him dying, the 
widow has to reapply for a new certificate at the village level. And accord-
ing to officials of the Department of Agricultural Land Management and 
Statistics (DALMS), disputes among family members and siblings if both 
parents die, are very common. The Land Management Committee at the 
village level is tasked with settling these types of disputes but if it cannot, 
it will refer the case to the competent regional body. Only after the matter 
is solved, can a new LUC be issued.75  
The process for getting a Form 7 is quite cumbersome for farmers, as 
seen earlier in this chapter. This creates a barrier that intensifies social dif-
ferentiation among people. According to the DALMS official mentioned 
above, the entire process takes at least five months. First the farmer applies 
at the village level. The land administration body at the village level carries 
out the inspection and measurement on the ground and opens the case, 
which is then submitted to the township level. From there, after inspec-
tion, the file goes to the district level. In the meantime, the township calls 
a no objection period of one month. The district reviews the case and, if 
everything is in order, approves the application and informs the township. 
Finally, the township land management authority notifies the applicant of 
the approval. A registration fee of 500 Kyat must be paid before a Form 
7 can be issued.76  
It should be noted that in villages that are logistically better connected, 
such as Village 4 which is on the main road, it is easier for people to move 
around and go the township office. Conversely, people in the Lenya area 
are much more isolated and most people do not have land certificates, as 
discussed above. The time it takes to go back and forth to the various 
offices and the distance needed to travel can discourage women from ap-
plying. During the gender session of a workshop attended by farmers and 
CSO representatives, one male farmer stated sarcastically that “their wives 
are too lazy to go to town to register land”. If we look beyond that farmer’s 
mockery, his words may be speaking some truth about women’s reality: 
their mobility is hampered at different levels due to a lack of time but also 
due to a lack of access to motorbikes, for instance. Women tend to be 
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scared of driving motorbikes as the roads are often in bad shape, especially 
during the rainy season. In addition, traditionally motorbikes were consid-
ered to be a man’s thing although this is changing with the new generation 
and it is not uncommon to see girls riding bikes within the village. Overall, 
however, in the rush to secure land from different forms of exclusion, 
women are more likely to lose out.   
The lack of certificates, however, did not seem to affect informal land 
transactions, some of which happen as a result of distress or changing 
family conditions. Some people sell land for money because they cannot 
work or bear the costs of their children’s higher education. Schools in the 
area around MAC are only up to grade eight and children have to move 
to Myek or another far away village for high school, where the annual cost 
of boarding school is about 35 million Kyats (22,000 USD). Despite the 
enormous investment, most children come back to the village after com-
pleting their education as they cannot get work in the city or fail to pass 
the grade 10 exam, even after several attempts. Traditionally, boys are 
given preferential access to education because of the more public role that 
men are expected to play. Security concerns (Karen Human Rights Group, 
2006) also play a role since education beyond primary school almost al-
ways requires travelling or moving around. In Village 3 for instance, FGD 
participants highlighted the absence of young men (but not young women) 
in the village because of the lack of schools in the area.77 If sales of land 
do not translate into access to jobs for children, this may create a situation 
in which families sell their land to invest in education but then have no 
land left for their children when these come back to the village due to a 
lack of job opportunities elsewhere. In the past, this was not a problem as 
new land could be easily cleared, but this is no longer the case. The out-
migration of youth may hence signify that they are being pushed out of 
rural areas rather than speak to a desire for ‘upward social mobility’/mo-
dernity. 
 
Dreams and realities: gendered and generationed experiences of 
becoming   
With different initiatives competing for natural resources, access to land 
has become a sombre reproduction concern shared by all people, but es-
pecially young men. One young man’s comment says it all: “The new gen-
erations will have limited land. Land is decreasing, so I worry that it will 
 CHAPTER 2 137 
be more difficult to marry. On the KNU side we created community forest 
but KNU owns the forest near our forest. So toungya will be more difficult. 
Our parents give us land when we marry but this is garden land [that is, 
betel nut or cashew nut].”78 His remark also highlights that, in the case of 
males, reproduction is intimately linked to the ability to produce rice, that 
is food, for the family, and this in turn shapes masculinity. It also points 
to the tension that exists around conservation, even when it is community-
led as in the case of community forestry, if, in practice, it restricts free 
access to resources.79 “Shifting cultivation may become more difficult but 
we are studying and we want to support the livelihood [of our families] 
but we depend on our parents. There is nothing we can do by ourselves 
because the traditional activities depend on our parents,” remarked one 
young man venting his frustration at the situation and perhaps hinting at 
the desire to break with traditional norms that expect children to be sub-
servient and acquiesce to their parent’s decisions.80 In fact, during the same 
group discussion, one young woman shared her disappointment at not 
being able to continue studying: “My education is not finished. I want to 
study in another city but I can’t because shifting cultivation is very hard 
and I have to help.” Another woman echoed her sentiments, highlighting 
that her parents may not be able to continue supporting her education 
because they do not have the resources.81  
In Village 1, while expressing concern about MSPP, young people re-
mained more optimistic. Compared to youth in Village 2, which they vis-
ited, they felt lucky because they still had land and vegetables. In Village 1, 
Karen grassroots groups have been active for a while, promoting commu-
nity-based development initiatives, including the research and mapping of 
natural resources, watershed management, and community forestry. The 
effects of the long-term engagement in activities around community-based 
natural resource management and conservation, and indigenous rights are 
also visible. During a youth group discussion, one girl aged fifteen said, 
“In my village we have clear air, mountains and land. Because of this, we 
don't want to stay in the city. Also, we would get very low [quality] jobs, 
since we don't have an education. We love our village.”82  
Regardless of the differences, the majority of the youth I interviewed 
in the villages, both males and females, overwhelmingly said they would 
prefer to stay in their village and continue traditional farming and gardens, 
albeit this was sometimes associated with their lack of education and al-
ternatives. Going away, mainly for studying, was perceived as a temporary 
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option.83 “There is no migration, we stay and work here. Even if we move 
for education, we come back.” FGD participants in Village 4 noted that 
they still have opportunities in the village, whereas not having “enough 
education” limits access to other options. 84 In Village 2, one young woman 
stated convincingly that even if they received more education, they would 
want to come back and further develop their village.85  
In contrast, in other parts of Tanintharyi, many villages in rural areas 
are empty, with youth more likely to be the ones to migrate.86 In several 
adults groups, participants noted that youth migration might become nec-
essary for poorer families, even if most parents would prefer their children 
stay and help. In Village 2, one of the villages most heavily impacted by 
the expansion of MSPP, adult participants noted that “young people want 
to farm. They don’t go away but they go to nearby villages to work on 
rubber plantations.”87 Until recently, access to land, even for new families, 
was not a problem. Young aspiring farmers did not, therefore, experience 
the key structural challenge that affect young people elsewhere. Some 
youth, both female and male, could benefit right away from land received 
from their parents and/or in-laws, as seen in the previous section. In ad-
dition, as pointed out by several respondents, while waiting to have their 
own betel nut gardens fully productive, young men could work for cash 
for other people in the village. As communities experience anxieties about 
their future, but also actively mobilize to resist unwanted change, 
knowledge and informed participation become important assets.   
The situation of youth in the villages thus seemed to be shaped by a 
combination of forced choice due to a lack of options, compliance with 
gendered social constructs and expectations, and discourses around indig-
enous culture and tradition. For obvious reasons, this mixture did not al-
ways amalgamate smoothly and sometimes created frictions and contra-
dictions that emerged in the form of conflicting statements during the 
discussions and interviews. For instance, the specific ways in which gender 
and age differently shape the lived experiences of women and men 
emerged clearly in the following discussions. In 2017, I was invited by my 
Karen partners and friends to join a youth camp they had organizing in a 
forested area near MAC and Lenya and hold a session on gender. About 
50 youth from four different villages attended, their ages spanning from 
10 to 25. There were also at least three participants who were in their 30s 
or older.88 As I learned later, these camps are valued by participants for 
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being unique opportunities to learn new things, but also as a way to get 
away and enjoy being together.   
On the last night of the camp before bed, sitting in front of our tents, 
I had an improvised discussion with a group of young women aged 13-24. 
They were curious about me and asked me questions about my life and 
were eager to share information about theirs. They said that at 18 most 
girls are already married. They stated that before, girls had married at 20, 
but now they married early because “they have emotions”- which I under-
stood as feelings and especially sexual desires, which they could not ex-
press freely. Marriage gives them more freedom but “when you are 18, it 
is difficult to say what’s right or wrong”, emphasized one of the two mar-
ried women in the group. Picking up on this point later in the discussion, 
the two women said they regretted getting married so early. “Sometimes I 
feel hopeless and have no dreams. We are not free”, said one woman, 
pointing to her multiple responsibilities. She missed going to the forest 
with her father and also wished she could go back to school but, with two 
children, it was impossible and her husband would not allow it. Sometimes 
she could work with her husband when her mother took care of the chil-
dren. Although their own house was in her husband’s village, they also 
stayed with her parents at times. When she got married, her parents gave 
her some land and they also have her husband’s land. The other married 
woman seemed happier with her role in the house and said she took pride 
in making her house look nice, but sometimes she wished she could run 
away from it all. After marriage, she went to live in her husband’s village. 
Her parents did not have any land so they only received land from her in-
laws.  
Both women said they joined the youth camp to improve their 
knowledge about the issues affecting the community so that they could do 
something for their people. They had not been aware of land grabs and 
conservation initiatives, although one woman had heard about the park at 
another training. They did not talk with their husbands about these issues 
and pointed out that quite often it is the women who attend the meetings 
as the men are busy working. The women wanted to know more and learn 
how to use social media to that end. They found it difficult, however, to 
tease out the real news from the fake news, said one of them in frustration.  
 The material and psychological constraints of married life for these 
young women contrast sharply with the reality of the following interview 
with a young man, also in his twenties and married with two children. This 
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young man is very active in his community – Village 1 - and with local 
CSOs. He was formerly responsible for community forestry and helped in 
setting it up. According to him, young people in his village are interested 
in traditional farming and there is no migration of youth. “Most young 
people understand that if we keep the land, it will be beneficial for the 
community. When they go to the cities, they realize the value of land. We 
are very happy about solidarity in the community.”89 In contrast to the 
testimony of young people in Village 4, he thinks that young people have 
the opportunity to contribute to community mobilization, whether against 
land grabs or for other issues that affect the community. There is a youth 
group, formed by the village leader, which holds social and community 
activities but they also engage with CSOs in organizing awareness-raising 
meetings. “We are also more mobile as we have motorbikes and can join 
meetings in other villages too. In the political discussions, we are not in-
volved as much but always support with logistics etc.”  
The quote above highlights once again the existence of age and gender 
hierarchies. Girls generally do not have motorbikes and if they are married 
and have children are constrained by care responsibilities, and youth play 
a supportive role when it comes to political issues. However, it also reveals 
that young people are able establish their social age as young adults 
through participation in rural politics, even beyond their own communi-
ties. Through engagement with Karen grassroots groups and the use of 
prefigurative politics – seen here as a set of egalitarian alternative social 
practices and relations that anticipate a future that cannot yet be fully re-
alized (Breines, 1980) - they are also able to actively co-construct their ideal 
village and farming future. In some instances, this goes as far as circum-
venting traditional norms, including those around gender and genera-
tioned roles. For instance, the youth leader in Village 1 is a very energetic 
single young woman. She explained that the youth in her village plan to 
collaborate with the ‘old people’ on the village development plan and want 
to secure their lands working with grassroots organizations. She also rein-
forced the point that they [youth] have the opportunity to share their views 
in community meetings and she is free to decide what to do in the family 
because she has a job as kindergarten teacher. In her case, just as we saw 
with the teacher from Village 1, social age and gender roles have been 
(re)negotiated and (re)constructed due to her knowledge/education and 
job, her position as a youth leader, her environmental activism, and her 
status as a single woman.  
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Young people’s identity is also closely intertwined with traditional 
farming and way of life, which grassroots ethnic groups have centred strat-
egies of prefigurative politics on. In one group discussion, the youth stated 
clearly their outright dislike for “modern agriculture because it destroys 
forests”.90 When I probed them about government policies and attitudes 
about toungya, in particular, the background chatter was suddenly replaced 
by people wanting to say something and talking over each other to the 
extent that my translator was not able to keep up. There is strong resent-
ment of the government tendency to accuse local communities and toungya 
of deforestation and for being environmentally unsustainable. One young 
woman was particularly vocal about it: “Toungya is our custom and we 
made it clear to the government. The company also did the logging. So it 
is the company which is doing deforestation not us”. 91 In this sense, betel 
nut is also perceived as an extension of traditional farming, in addition to 
being the key source of cash income and an asset that can be transmitted 
to children.92  
 
2.4.4 Grassroots mobilization 
 
Communities have actively mobilized with the help of local CSOs, alt-
hough some only more recently. One woman from one of the villages 
affected by MSPP described her community’s initiatives to oppose the 
company, including petitions and letters, “but no acts of vandalism or 
damage to the company because we are afraid of the company and author-
ities. Our request is to get our land back and be compensated for lost betel 
nut harvest. We have no time to go to the city and no experience in dealing 
with these issues, but hope that the new government will help. We trust 
and hope.”93  
In 2016, I participated in a meeting organized by my grassroots partners 
in Village 4. Four communities from the Lenya area, as well as represent-
atives of communities from the MSPP area also attended. The aim of the 
meeting was to raise awareness of the importance of mobilization and it 
was the first time that Village 4 and Lenya villagers had joined this kind of 
event. A Karen grassroots leader gave a presentation on the importance 
of FPIC, the traditional way of life, and preserving natural resources 
through, among others, toungya. This leader pointed out that toungya does 
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not affect the regrowth of forests, whereas the logging carried out by com-
panies does because they uproot the trees completely by digging deeper 
into the soil. Toungya also helps communities to preserve traditional 
seeds.94 When I visited the village again in 2018, these concepts had be-
come part of the common activist vocabulary and the repertoire of villag-
ers. In addition, all the communities I visited sooner or later organized 
themselves into community-based organizations which had become 
‘places’ for discussing, strategizing and decision-making. The role played 
by ethnic CSOs was and still is influential in shaping grassroots politics 
and organizing.  
For instance, at the youth camp described in the previous section, there 
was also a lot of identity ‘building’ through mini-lectures – for example on 
FPIC, during which issues and legal rights of indigenous peoples (in the 
UN Declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples) were discussed - 
prayers and songs, both of which are a very important part of the process 
of building young people’s identity and knowledge. Communal prayers, 
involving religious leaders and people of different faiths have always been 
part of the repertoire of communities’ mobilization, and go hand in hand 
with awareness-raising, the sharing of lessons across villages, supporting 
mobilization efforts, and holding training and sensitization sessions for 
young people and children.  
We believe that when we pray, this is the power of our community. The first 
time we did this, we gave white ribbons to the participants. After we tied them 
to the trees, the company did not touch the trees. I say this is power. Because 
the children were crying and they stopped when we started tying the ribbons 
to the trees.95  
Songs are another important dimension. At the youth camp, for exam-
ple, three songs were taught and sung every day at different times during 
the day. All in the Karen language, they included a song about the im-
portance of water, a nationalist song and an environmental song. On the 
final day of the camp, the songs were played through a loudspeaker while 
people of literally all ages jumped into the fresh waters of the nearby 
stream to gleefully dance and sing while splashing water at each other. 
Vivid images and feelings associated with this outbreak of joy, affirmation 
of sovereignty and attachment to nature stay with me to this day. David 
Brenner (2018) shows how karaoke becomes a way for Kachin rebel grass-
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roots groups to perform rebellion and, at same time, how rebel subjectiv-
ities are created through reiterated acting which brings “into being certain 
kinds of realities” (Butler, 2010: 147). Independent artists moving within 
the Kachin national framework also “coproduce rebel political culture” 
with songs that also reflect concerns related to social justice and environ-
mental degradation (Brenner, 2018). Dance has also featured quite con-
sistently in many recent women’s and students’ protests and has a tradition 
in liberation movements. “The unexpected, spontaneous and pleasantly 
disruptive nature of collective celebration is one of the great equalisers of 
social and political struggle” (Stephenson, 2017).  
 
Picture 2.6 
Joy explodes at the youth camp 
 
Source: Author, July 2017 
 
The youth camp itself is a strong illustration of the approach shared by 
many Karen groups, which centres on discourse around traditional life-
styles and values, material closeness with nature, and indigenous identity 
building. This, in turn, contributes to the creation of other visions of de-
velopment in contrast with those created by commodification processes. 
So while, as Nancy Peluso (2012: 79) highlighted, “commodification of 
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‘nature’s products, places and processes’ produces new sorts of socio-na-
tures”, communities in Tanintharyi are also producing other socio-natures 
through collective defiance of such processes and prefiguratively creating 
their own vision of development. However, as seen thus far, this process 
of constructing and signifying the relation between communities and na-
ture does not interrogate questions about gender and generational inequal-
ities. It takes at face value existing women’s and men’s roles and recognizes 
youth only to the extent that they represent ‘the future’ of communities 
without providing them with a space for meaningful participation in deci-
sion-making.  
  
2.5 Conclusion 
  
In this chapter I have analysed the gendered and generationed impacts of 
agrarian and environmental changes among Karen communities through 
the lens of two cases of palm oil expansion and one national park initiative. 
The expansion of agribusinesses and conservation initiatives in Southern 
Tanintharyi have clear intersecting and overlapping conjunctural impacts 
on physical landscapes, on people’s different access to land and natural 
resources, and their livelihood strategies and politics. These impacts I have 
presented in brush strokes throughout the case studies. For women, the 
immediate impacts consist of the longer distances they have to walk to 
reach their farms, fetch water and collect food in the forest, and the emo-
tional and practical hindrance of having to leave their children behind. In 
addition, the occasional wage work they take on when their families are in 
need of cash contributes to reiterating the lower value of women’s work. 
In these communities, rice farms and gardens, because both are rooted in 
shifting cultivation, are likely to be situated far from the village. This will 
be increasingly so, provided, that is, that there will still be land to be cleared 
in the future, especially for young starting farmers.  
 For young people, especially those whose parents do not have land to 
pass on, the immediate (in the oil palm areas) and anticipated (in Lenya) 
issue of land scarcity is casting a shadow on the prospects of forming fam-
ilies of their own and the possibility continuing to farm. This, in turn, af-
fects young men’s masculinity and delays their transition to adulthood. In 
addition, financing children’s education might also become problematic as 
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families lose access to a secure flow of cash income through betel nut gar-
dening. This introduces the prospect of young people being dispossessed 
twice: of their farming future and of the opportunities that education 
might give them. This is likely to have gendered implications, as families 
might prioritize boys over girls for education and outmigration.  
 Through engagement in community politics and grassroots mobiliza-
tion, young people, especially men and single women, are able, to an ex-
tent, to break age and gender stereotypes that relegate them to marginal 
roles. In contrast, young women’s early entrance into adulthood through 
marriage creates material and emotional burdens, restricting their mobility, 
their access to information, and their meaningful participation in commu-
nity politics. If grassroots organizations do not specifically raise the issue 
of women and girls’ equal rights and participation, the idea of social justice 
that is being promoted risks being imbricated and reproducing existing 
patterns of injustices and power asymmetries.  
More generally, the chapter has shown that the impacts on communi-
ties are manifold and varied depending on several factors, including the 
type of initiative and the way it has manifested on the ground, the context, 
and the strength of the community in reacting to the changes. The ongoing 
reduction and demarcation of the space in which communities are allowed 
to subsist is a manifestation of multiple processes of territorialisation and 
commodification operated by different actors – UG, KNU, private inves-
tors, conservation INGOs and communities themselves - which are reor-
ganizing and articulating frontier spaces “with political, economic, and so-
cial institutions in constantly emerging new ways” (Rasmussen and Lund, 
2018: 389–390) with clear gendered and generational repercussions.   
In this context, the activism fostered by local grassroots organizations 
can potentially be disruptive of a neoliberal reorganization of nature, peo-
ple and social relations. By making use of repertories that span from re-
course to human rights treaties and international conventions, to promo-
tion of community-led natural resource management, sensitization to the 
care of the environment, a revaluation of a traditional way of life and live-
lihoods, the training of youth, and recourse to the performative power of 
music, Karen organizations and communities are putting forward another 
vision of development. Through enacting in the present the future that 
they would like to see and that grassroots movements are promoting, 
young women and men especially might find ways to promote socially just 
outcomes for all, despite the existing material conditions and normative 
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constructs which tend to reproduce existing inequalities. This engagement 
in ‘prefigurative politics’, that is, the embodiment in the present of “forms 
of social relations, decision-making, culture and human experience that are 
the ultimate goal” (Boggs, 1977: 100) allows them to effectively advance 
their other vision of development. Such a vision may stand a better chance 
of including gender and generational justice, as more young women and 
men break away from traditional gendered and generationed roles through 
their engagement in land grab politics, especially trans-local land politics. 
This stands an even better chance if they are also supported by local CSOs 
and grassroot organizations, in the forms of advocacy and sensitization.  
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3 
‘Our Lands are Our Lives’: gendered 
experiences of resistance to land 
grabbing in Cambodia 
 
Abstract 
With this chapter we shift our attention to Cambodia, known as a hotspot 
for land grabbing in Southeast Asia. Land dispossession due to elite cap-
ture, natural resources exploitation, and agribusiness development has cat-
alyzed international attention following outbreaks of violence, mass pro-
tests, and retaliations. Agrarian economies, as well as social and gender 
relations and thus power dynamics at different levels, are being trans-
formed and reshaped, facilitated by policies that promote capital penetra-
tion in rural areas and individualization of land access. Focusing on cases 
of rural dispossession and political resistance in Ratanakiri and Kampong 
Speu provinces, and drawing on reports, government documents, focus 
group discussions, and interviews, this study analyzes the gendered impli-
cations of land grabbing in contemporary Cambodia and argues that gen-
der shapes and informs women’s responses and politics, as well as the 
spaces in which these are played out. 
 
3.1  Introduction  
 
In Cambodia, the surge in land grabs in recent years has been largely as-
sociated with increasing numbers of Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) 
– a mechanism that allows investors to lease state land for economic de-
velopment1 – and aggressive urban expansion, both of which are facili-
tated by the government agenda of economic growth and development. 
According to non-governmental organization (NGO) estimates, ELCs 
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granted to foreign and domestic companies were close to 2 million hec-
tares in 2013 (Grimsditch and Schoenberger, 2015). Following growing 
resistance by dispossessed communities, a moratorium on ELCs was de-
clared in 2012 right before communal elections The moratorium, how-
ever, has failed to stop or completely roll back existing initiatives. In spite 
of a number of concessions that have been canceled or reduced, according 
to government sources, as of 2016, there are still 111 active contracts cov-
ering more than 1,030,672 hectares of land. Furthermore, definite num-
bers and areas are difficult to determine ((Diepart, 2016).  
A number of studies have examined the gendered outcomes of land 
grabs in the context of Cambodia (Brickell, 2014; Cambodian League for 
the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights, 2014, 2015; Kusakabe, 
2015; Lamb et al., 2017; McGinn, 2015; Park and Maffii, 2017). These 
have focused on different aspects, including the economic trajectories cre-
ated by urban dispossession (McGinn 2015), the gendered geopolitics of 
forced evictions (Brickell 2014), the implications of agrarian transfor-
mations on indigenous women (Park and Maffii 2017), and the roles and 
practices of women in relation to men’s and their complementary struggles 
to protest land grabbing (Lamb et al. 2017). 
While feminist research has extensively documented women’s land ac-
tivism, this has often been ignored by authors writing on political reactions 
from below (Borras and Franco, 2013) and environmental collective ac-
tion (Agarwal 2014), as noted in the introduction. Schneider, for instance, 
examines different forms of peasant resistance to land grabs in Cambodia 
but does not address their gender dynamics and the agency of different 
rural actors, including women. Women along with indigenous peoples and 
children are mentioned only as those suffering most dramatically from the 
impacts of dispossession (Schneider, 2011). James C. Scott’s (1985) im-
portant work on everyday forms of resistance has been criticized for its 
“androcentric focus” and lack of attention to gender. The resulting analy-
sis – critics posit (Hart, 1991) – misses out on “the contextually specific 
ways in which politics construct gender and gender constructs politics” ( 
Scott, 1999, Chapter 2, Section II, para. 6 ) and fails to “ask how gender 
might interact with class (or other forms of social hierarchy) both to struc-
ture that hierarchy in specific ways, and to determine the forms that re-
sistance to it might take” (Agarwal, 1994b: 421). According to Agarwal, 
women’s struggles are about class oppression but also the related forms 
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of gender discrimination; this is why looking only at overt acts of re-
sistance does not tell the full story. In addition, women’s resistance is dif-
ferent from men’s because of the different forms of oppression from 
which they suffer and the weapons they have (Agarwal 1994). Regardless 
of class and social differences, women can find commonality of interests 
when it comes to protecting their natural resources against external fac-
tors, as documented for instance in West Kalimantan in Indonesia, where 
the women taking part in protests against the establishment of an oil palm 
plantation were found to be very diverse in terms of age, marital status, 
education, income, and land size (Morgan 2017).  
Gender roles, identity, and positioning can also circumscribe the space 
in which women and men can exercise their agency in everyday life (Res-
urrección, 2006: 384). In spite of women’s key roles in land occupations 
in Brazil, for instance, formal gender equality within the social movements 
did not translate into an increased number of women beneficiaries of the 
agrarian reform or leaders (Deere, 2003b). According to Agarwal (2015), 
for this to happen women need to shift from “women-in-themselves” to 
“women-for-themselves,” that is, “from individual to a group articulation 
of their interests.” This critically depends “on whether women can over-
come the structural constraints they face, and what outside support they 
have to facilitate this” (Agarwal, 2014b).2 This point is confirmed by an 
ample body of research from Latin America, where across the subconti-
nent, the rise of the national and international feminist and women’s 
movements, together with the emergence of national gender machineries 
and women’s NGOs, the rise of rural unions and liberation theology 
groups created conditions favourable to the organization of rural women 
in the 1980s and 1990s (Deere, 2003; Deere and León, 2001; Stephen, 
2006). It is also noteworthy that, in many instances, women eventually 
decided to spin out of the movement that they had helped to create and 
to establish their own (Valle, 2009: 221).  
Although not to the extent of mobilizing for their own rights, there is 
a transformational power that comes with women’s engagement in mobi-
lization. Daley and Pallas (2014) found that women’s active participation 
and leadership role in mobilization against the Polepally Special Economic 
Zone in Andhra Pradesh, India contributed to their empowerment along 
the way. Women “found their voice in the process, thereby becoming em-
powered to engage politically through adversity” (Daley and Pallas, 2014: 
191). Agarwal (2015) also noted that even the mere participation of 
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women in community forestry groups increased their self-esteem and 
standing in the communities in addition to having positive impacts on 
their efficiency. This process of empowerment – defined by Kabeer (1999) 
as the process of change through which those who have been denied the 
capacity to exercise choice gain this capacity – entails a reshaping of gender 
and power relations, which may have harsh consequences on women. 
Studies from Cambodia highlight that women land activists often suffer 
from impacts such as domestic violence and family breakdown, confirm-
ing the entrenched nature of gender relations, power structures, and re-
sistance, whereby sites of domination also become potential sites of re-
sistance (Collins 2000; Brickell 2014; LICADHO 2014). 
Building on the research above, this chapter explores land grabbing, 
rural dispossession, and political responses from below, focusing on cases 
from Ratanakiri and Kampong Speu.  
 
3.2  Land reform and Economic Land Concessions  
 
With the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the embrace of an open market 
economy, a series of policies paved the way to the adoption of Cambodia’s 
2001 Land Law, which extended private property rights – abolished by the 
Khmer Rouge and reintroduced for residential land with the 1992 Land 
Law – to agricultural land. This was a time, following the affirmation of 
the Washington Consensus, when blanket programs of privatization 
where high on the agendas of donors and governments (Hughes, 2003; 
Springer, 2010). In Cambodia, too, the land reform agenda had a strong 
focus on the formalization of property, promoted through donor-driven 
programs and government campaigns.3 In what it defined a “historic land 
reform program,” by 2013, the government stated it had distributed more 
than three million land titles (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2013: 6), 
covering around 50 percent of all land parcels in the country, and was 
moving resolutely towards the goal of achieving 100 percent coverage by 
2023 (Lim 2014). 
The 2001 Land Law, which defines tenure rights in the country, recog-
nizes private ownership rights for residential and agricultural land and the 
right of indigenous communities to collective ownership of land.4 The law 
also authorizes the granting of land concessions on state private land for 
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social and economic purposes.5 In practice, however, the leasing of state 
private land had been ongoing since 1995, prior to the promulgation of 
the 2001 Land Law and of Sub-Decree No. 146 on ELCs in 2005 (Saing 
et al. 2012). Sub-Decree No. 146 regulates the procedures for the granting 
and management of concessions, including requirements to conduct pub-
lic consultations and environmental and social impact assessments.6 How-
ever, these aspects, along with those related to small farmers and indige-
nous peoples’ security of tenure and access to dispute resolution 
mechanisms, have been problematic to implement and monitor.7 ELCs 
have been awarded in areas where people had legitimate tenure rights, and 
land titles have been largely issued in areas not affected by or earmarked 
for ELCs (Dwyer, 2015). Local political elites, business tycoons, and local 
patrons, as well as foreign actors, have been able to co-opt to their ad-
vantage the opportunities arising in this context (Beban and Work, 2014; 
Springer, 2010, 2011), shaping property and labour regimes and creating 
“new legal and practical instruments for possessing, expropriating, or chal-
lenging previous land controls” (Peluso and Lund, 2011: 668) and accu-
mulating capital, including Order 01 described below.  
Map 3.1 
Economic Land Concessions and research sites 
Source: OpenDevelopment Cambodia 
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Land tenure insecurity and repeated violations of people’s land rights 
have materialized both in rural and urban contexts (Grimsditch and Hen-
derson, 2009; LICADHO, 2012), and resistance has manifested itself 
through the full range of expressions, from “everyday forms of resistance” 
(Scott, 1985, 1986) to organized protests and riots in Phnom Penh, with 
the active participation of women.8 According to NGO estimates, over 
420,000 people have been affected by land grabs and evictions since 2003 
(LICADHO 2012), and 10,625 have been registered in 2014 alone 
(LICADHO 2014). Illustrative urban evictions include the infamous cases 
of Borei Keila and Boeung Kak Lake,9 both of which have been analyzed 
from a gender perspective (Brickell 2014; McGinn 2015). 
Following mounting protests and criticism by civil society organiza-
tions and development partners, in May 2012, the government declared a 
moratorium on ELCs (Beban and Work 2014; Milne 2014; Schoenberger 
2015).10 A few months later and before commune elections, it also issued 
Directive 01BB, also known as Order 01, on the Measures Reinforcing 
and Increasing the Efficiency of the Management of Economic Land Con-
cessions (LICADHO, 2014). Under the order, the Prime Minister 
launched a yearlong land registration and titling campaign supposedly with 
the aim of improving people’s land tenure security and resolving conflicts 
between communities and companies. Between June 2012 and December 
2014, approximately 610,000 individual titles (550,000 according to official 
data from the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning, and Con-
struction) were issued at no cost (Schoenberger, 2015), including in indig-
enous areas that had been already earmarked for communal titling. While 
focusing on areas with less secure tenure and where ELCs had been 
awarded, the programme however avoided areas where conflicts were on-
going,11 crystallizing on the ground the material effects of the so-called 
“leopard sky policy” (Milne 2013). By allocating titles, including to indig-
enous land and state land that was occupied and could thus be demarcated 
away from ELCs (Milne 2013), the order has contributed to creating sim-
plified tenure systems outside of ELCs areas that facilitate the exercise of 
state’s control over space (Scott, 1998) – space that is reshaped in the form 
of “landscapes of control and appropriation” (Scott 2012: 33). 
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3.3  Gender equality and women’s access to land  
 
The government has integrated gender equality discourse and practice in 
policymaking, including in the agricultural sector. Cambodia has commit-
ted to international human rights and gender equality instruments, includ-
ing the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights against Women, both ratified in 1992. Under the 1993 Constitution, 
women and men enjoy equal rights, including rights to property,12 and Ar-
ticle 45 explicitly mandates the elimination of all forms of discrimination 
against women. Under the 1989 Law on Marriage and the Family, spouses 
have equal rights to property acquired during marriage and to individually 
own property possessed prior to marriage or received as a gift or inher-
itance. Joint property may not be disposed of without the consent of both 
spouses.13 The 2011 Civil Code further strengthened the legal framework 
for gender equality in relation to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and im-
movable property.  
In practice, however, engrained in the predicaments of the Chbab Srey, 
the traditional code for women, patriarchy is still deeply rooted in society.14 
The code was introduced in the educational system to represent “tradi-
tional” values and gender roles and used as a form of resistance to French 
influence under Norodom Sihanouk, whose reign (1955–70) is regarded 
as the golden age of the country’s history (Chandler, 2008). The nationalist 
movement in the early 1950s picked up the norms. Contrary to many na-
tionalist movements worldwide that advocated for women’s emancipation 
and liberation, the Cambodian nationalist movement kept women’s em-
powerment within the limits imposed by the Chbab Srey, in spite of using 
ideas of solidarity and equality to attract young women and men (Ibid 
2008: 172). Although eliminated from school curricula in 2007, the code 
continues to exert a strong influence on people’s behaviour (Wong, 2014 
cit. in MOWA, 2014). Women’s failure to abide by the Chbab Srey can re-
sult in social sanctions and exclusion. According to the code, women 
should respect their husbands, be frugal, speak softly, and be morally ir-
reprehensible, particularly from a sexual point of view (Kent 2011). At the 
same time, men are expected to be tough and exert power as well as disci-
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pline, including through violence, if needed (Lilja 2008, 2012). Conse-
quently, discrimination and violence against women are tolerated, if not 
condoned (MOWA, 2014).  
Rapid economic growth is creating new opportunities for women’s 
emancipation especially in urban areas, expedited by migration of young 
women from rural areas and use of social media (MOWA, 2008, 2014; 
USAID, 2010).15 Yet, progress in terms of the overall improvement of 
women’s condition is still slow (MOWA, 2014: 4). According to the Gen-
der Inequality Index (GII), which measures inequality in achievement be-
tween women and men in reproductive health, empowerment, and the la-
bour market, Cambodia ranks 112 out of 188 countries in 2015 (United 
Nations Development Programme n.d.). Women are still underrepre-
sented in politics, where parties constitute a conservative “bloc of patriar-
chal resistance to great gender equality” (Sedara and Ojendal, 2014: 1). As 
Lilja highlights, “the exclusion of women from the political spaces” is 
rooted in the “separation of women and men into two, mostly stereotyped, 
binary categories; a classification providing the basis for the hierarchiza-
tion of the two sexes” (2008: 1). 
Gender inequalities in access to and control over land are also wide-
spread. Women represent 51 percent of the agricultural labour force 
(FAO, n.d.), but they account for only 27 percent of all agricultural hold-
ers, that is, those who make main decisions over land use and management 
(NIS, 2014).16 An enhanced focus on joint titling under the land reform 
has boosted the numbers of women co-owners of land. According to the 
data of the Land Register database, as of September 2013, 63 percent of 
the titles distributed through the systematic land titling programme were 
registered in the name of both spouses and 18 percent in those of wives 
only (Yniesta, 2014). Assessments of the systematic land titling pro-
gramme report that the majority of women respondents (96 percent) ap-
preciate land titles as a safeguard against family crises, such as death of a 
spouse or divorce (Yniesta, 2014). However, according to other research, 
women are also concerned that legal rights may not translate into their 
ability to exercise their rights in case of disputes (Mehrvar et al., 2008). 
This confirms the existing divide between women’s legal ownership of and 
de facto agency over land and cautions against titling campaigns that use 
women’s land rights as distractions from other agendas (Monsalve Suárez 
2006; O’Laughin 2009), such as the promotion of property rights as a 
blanket solution for tenure insecurity. This focus on the “formalization 
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fix” (Dwyer, 2015) is particularly tricky in Cambodia where, as seen above, 
land titling has de facto tended to focus on unproblematic areas, while 
unmapped state land was being formalized through concessions (Milne, 
2013; Dwyer, 2015; Work and Beban, 2016).  
 
3.4  Gendered experiences of dispossession and resistance  
 
The cases analyzed for this study include dispossessions and land grabs 
driven by the establishment of a sugar plantation in Kampong Speu and 
by the compounded effect of the expansion of rubber plantations and the 
titling exercise carried out under Order 01 in Ratanakiri province. 
Kampong Speu, located west of Phnom Penh, is one of the provinces 
targeted by large-scale ELC expansion, particularly of sugar. Between 1995 
and 2009, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery (MAFF) 
granted eleven ELCs in the province covering an area of 109,981 hectares 
(Saing et al. 2012). In 2010, the government conceded 9,000 and 9,050 
hectares of land, respectively, to Phnom Penh Sugar Co. Ltd. and adjacent 
Kampong Speu Sugar Co. Ltd., registered in the name of a well-known 
politician and his wife. According to a NGO-led assessment, more than 
1,000 families were affected by the concession, which engulfed areas 
where people had been living for more than five generations and had pa-
pers proving their legal possession issued in the 1980s and early 1990s 
(Equitable Cambodia and Inclusive Development International 2013). 
The people I interviewed were from two households that had been relo-
cated and partially “compensated” and two households that were still ne-
gotiating the terms of relocation and/or compensation with the company. 
Families lost land and, when compensated, they received land that was 
much smaller, of worse quality, and far away from the village. Most people, 
especially women and children, had to resort to work on the plantation as 
casual and seasonal workers or on other people’s farms to complement 
the family’s need for food and income. In spite of the poor conditions and 
lack of security, they found work on the plantation as the only viable op-
tion. Women perceived their burden as having increased because planta-
tion work had come in addition to farming. Children whose families were 
relocated far away from the village could no longer go to school.  
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Ratanakiri, located in the northeast of the country, has been targeted 
mainly for rubber by ELCs. As of 2012, eighteen out of twenty-two ELCs 
in the province focused on rubber as the main or sole investment crop 
(Human Rights Council, 2012: 112–116). The village I visited, inhabited 
by the Kachat indigenous minority, had been affected by the establishment 
of a rubber plantation run by a Vietnamese company. The villagers said 
they suffered from loss of access to farmland, water, and forests for food, 
hunting, and fishing, as well as for spiritual rites and graveyards. While the 
company tried to negotiate a monetary compensation for their lands with 
the villagers, the villagers rejected the offer, which they felt was inadequate 
to make up for the loss of land and the long-term benefits of farming for 
them and the next generations. According to my local indigenous facilita-
tor, since problems with ELCs started, the community leader was threat-
ened at various times by the local authorities and the villagers’ cattle were 
killed. “Killing cattle means threatening lives. Today they kill the animals; 
tomorrow they may kill the villagers. That’s how the villagers feel toward 
this act.”17 The village had also been targeted by the titling campaign under 
Order 01. According to the community leader, all but ten of the 189 
households in the village had their farming land (not the one for shifting 
cultivation) demarcated by the volunteers recruited for the campaign and 
received land titles; joint titles were issued to husbands and wives. The ten 
families who did not have a title had either refuted the process or their 
land was far away from the village and did not get measured “because it 
was too hard for the students to travel back and forth.”18 Families received 
titles for different amounts of land, 1–2 hectares on average, depending 
on how much land they were cultivating at the time, not including for-
estland or land that was fallow under the rotational system of shifting cul-
tivation. The process was quick: one day to measure the land, one day to 
process the applications, and two weeks to get the provisional copy of the 
land title. Approximately, two or three months later, they all received the 
original certificate of title. 
 
3.5  Resistance and mobilization  
 
Land grabbing is so painful that we are not afraid to die. Our lands are our 
lives. We are not afraid to risk our lives to get the land back.19 
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People’s overall perception of security of tenure was very low both in 
Kampong Speu and Ratanakiri. In Kampong Speu, where most of the 
people interviewed did not have a land certificate, one woman highlighted 
that they had legal grounds to contest the dispossession since they had 
been living continuously on their land for more than five years prior to the 
promulgation of the Land Law in 2001 and were thus entitled to legal 
ownership.20 However, in practice, there was nothing that they could do 
to avoid the aggressive expansion of the company. Not only were they not 
able to stop the grabbing of their farmland, but they also felt insecure 
about the land received as compensation. When asked if she had a title, 
one woman elaborated on her strategy to counter insecurity: 
No, none of the families here has such a document on the old land. Before 
we received the compensation land, the company issued a recognition paper 
with information on the location and size of the land. After we received the 
new land, we had to give that paper back to the company. But I made a color 
photocopy of it and gave that to the company while I kept the original paper 
for myself as evidence, just in case there is any future problem.21 
In Ratanakiri, perception of insecurity went beyond individuals’ and 
households’ access to land for farming and shifting cultivation. Indigenous 
communities had always had access to communal land and forests, which 
not only provide them with various vegetables, animal proteins, medicinal 
herbs, and construction materials, but are central to their spiritual practices 
and identity (Park and Maffii 2017). This has become increasingly difficult 
with the introduction of large-scale rubber plantations and the clearing of 
forestland – a process that has been consolidated and sanctioned during 
the titling exercise. According to the village leader, there were some dis-
putes with the student volunteers who came to measure land. They told 
him that the government would keep 10 percent of the land for the com-
munity, but to that date there had been no follow up. In addition, he elab-
orated that not having access to forests “destroys their identity.”22 
Both in Kampong Speu and Ratanakiri, women had been actively en-
gaging in protests and different forms of resistance, including riots, road-
blocks, trespassing, and damaging company property. Several interviewees 
confirmed what other research has indicated: when confronted with 
threats to their livelihood and their natural resource base, women felt they 
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had to join the fight, as vividly recounted in the quote at the beginning of 
this section by a young woman in Ratanakiri. 
Women’s engagement was strategic. When asked about their reasons 
for joining the protests, women interviewed in Kampong Speu, Ratanakiri, 
and Phnom Penh repeatedly affirmed that it was a strategy to keep the 
level of confrontation with the police or military down and avoid a situa-
tion where the men would get beaten or jailed. This suggests a strategic 
use of women’s positions. In the early days of the Soviet regime, during 
women-led protests against forced collectivization, peasant women used 
common perceptions about their behaviour as backward and hysterical to 
their advantage. Women’s protests were tolerated more than similar pro-
tests by men, and women were treated less harshly when criminal charges 
were pressed (Viola 1986). Documenting a case of eviction in Kratie prov-
ince, Lamb et al. also note that:  
[W]hen responding to eviction, families wanted to avoid any possible violent 
retaliation. The men fled or ‘were asked to flee for their safety by their wives’ 
while the women felt that they could stay and observe what their evictors did, 
without eliciting violent reaction. (2017: 9)  
In the eviction from Boeung Kak Lake, women further explained their 
activism as an “extension and elevation of their traditional responsibilities 
as wives and mothers to ensure family harmony and stability” (Brickell 
2014: 2). In other words, women not only used their position and identity 
strategically but were also influenced in their decisions by their roles as 
mothers and wives. As a Borei Keila activist explained, recalling an episode 
where the authorities arrested eight men: “Being women and wives, we 
were worried about our husbands’ security. The women started to stand 
up instead, as we believed that the local authority would not be as cruel as 
they were to the men.”23 This, however, proved not to be true, as women 
were beaten and arrested during those urban protests together with men. 
There were signs that engagement in protests had resulted in increased 
levels of confidence. Two of the women I interviewed identified them-
selves as land activists. One of them, a woman in her early 50s, emphasized 
that she is a land activist and works with different NGOs. In 2010, the 
company and the village chief called a meeting about the company’s in-
vestment plans in the area; they did not mention that their lands would be 
affected. The villagers did not agree to the investment as they had heard 
about the company’s land grabs in Koh Kong Province. However, one 
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day later the company tractors, fifteen to twenty of them, accompanied by 
the local military started to clear their farmland without any notification. 
The villagers tried to stop the tractor drivers and asked the local authorities 
– the district head and village chief – to stop the company activities. At 
the end of the same day, one of the company’s tractors was burnt down 
during the negotiations over the compensation of 100 USD/hectare. They 
were told that if the families did not accept the offer, they would receive 
nothing. Her family used to own approximately 20 hectares of land but 
was compensated with only 3.2 hectares of land, while they received noth-
ing for the remaining 17 hectares. Before giving them the new land, the 
company issued the “recognition paper” mentioned above. The woman 
asked to have her name undisclosed because she was involved, along with 
other people, in protests to stop the company activities, including road 
blocking around the plantation, and was in the news. As a result, she was 
accused of destroying the company’s property, although she claimed her 
innocence, and was being monitored by the authorities. 
Covert forms of organized resistance were also detected during the in-
terview, as she explained: 
In addition to me, there are two to three women representatives from my 
village. We have to secretly call meetings that usually take place at night, so 
that the commune leader or village chief does not know about them. I do not 
use the phone to invite people because I do not have enough money for the 
phone calls. Plus the direct invite for the meeting is more effective because I 
can give detailed explanations and concrete information to each family.24  
This activist vividly described her role and tasks and the pride she takes 
in getting people’s attention and support, including from men, in spite of 
the hardship of having to walk long distances and juggling multiple re-
sponsibilities. This signals a breakthrough in traditional gender roles and 
hierarchies that expect women to be subservient and quiet. 
Talking to men is not a problem because all family members are involved and 
interested in getting the land back. Sometimes the husbands have to work 
outside and are not there, but ask their wives to receive the information from 
me. But when they have to advocate in court, both husbands and wives join. 
People listen to me because they trust me. Also I am confident and brave 
enough to talk with high ranking officers, Oknha,25 as well as the district chief. 
Thanks to the training I received, I have gained more knowledge on human 
rights, the land concession law, and policy. Before going out for any activity, 
however, I have to consult with the NGOs. 
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This quote points to the role of NGOs as key enablers but also poten-
tially bottlenecks for women’s advancement if attention is not paid to their 
meaningful participation in the different initiatives that target communi-
ties. In both locations, communities referred to at least three to four dif-
ferent local NGOs that were active in the area conducting trainings, advo-
cacy sessions, and providing legal support for the filing of complaints. In 
addition, in Kampong Speu, several international NGOs have had cam-
paigns and programs to support the communities affected by the expan-
sion of sugar plantations, partly in response to the clamor created by these 
very companies supplying sugar to the European market under the Euro-
pean Union’s Everything but Arms preferential trade pact.26 Although I 
could not get exact numbers, many people mentioned having participated 
in different NGOs’ trainings. However, no trainings specifically targeted 
at women or focusing on women’s rights were mentioned. Still, as seen, 
several of the women interviewed said they appreciated the opportunity 
to learn about land issues and government policies, as well as the confi-
dence that has come with it. 
Although this point cannot be elaborated at length in this study, other 
research has noted that NGOs and, particularly, international NGOs, with 
a superficial understanding of how gender roles and relations sit in the 
context of broader dynamics of power and capitalist relations, can work 
against an emancipatory agenda for women, reinforcing existing inequali-
ties and further relegating women into the reproductive realm (Frewer 
2017; Park and Maffii 2017).  
Women are also acknowledged as having superior negotiating skills, 
and their work in conflict situations is highly valued. “When we need to 
solve a problem, always it is the women who negotiate. The men only 
know how to argue, but the women, we can find a solution.”27 Women 
interviewed in Kampong Speu and Phnom Penh stated that by way of 
participating in mobilization and resistance they “learned a lot” and could 
engage in the politics of land grabbing as activists, community leaders, and 
“official protesters,” as the police labels women land activists in Phnom 
Penh.28 In addition, thanks to easier mobility and access to and use of in-
formation, the women in Phnom Penh had organized themselves in a 
group with a governing mechanism and clear roles and tasks. One of them 
explained:29 
At first, there were 117 women, representing 117 families. Now there are 156 
women in our group. What we all believe in is strong solidarity within the 
 CHAPTER 3 165 
group. The common fight against the company has made the women in my 
community become stronger and more confident in engaging with advocacy 
and fight for justice. Besides this, our work also includes filing legal com-
plaints to court, ministries, embassies, and NGOs … The group has seven 
representatives, whose roles are also to be the main decision makers. I am one 
of them and have to prepare the plans with the other representatives. After 
reaching agreement among us, we call the rest of the group for the final meet-
ing and inform them about the plan. I have to prepare a clear plan, prepare 
the documents, and invite the members to join the meeting to inform them 
about the route of their protesting parade, which street they should walk, etc. 
There were also signs that solidarity across social and rural/urban di-
vides was materializing, though not specifically along gender lines, as this 
woman said her group was reaching out to communities in rural areas to 
support them. 
Some women in Ratanakiri reported they had stopped participating 
mainly due to the disappointment caused by lack of response from the 
government.30 
When the company arrived in 2011, everyone (pregnant women, children, and 
teenagers) participated in the meetings and protests. Women and pregnant 
women were standing on the frontlines during the protests. But now we feel 
discouraged because there are no actions from the government.  
The village above, inhabited by the Kachat indigenous group, has been 
seriously affected by the expansion of a rubber plantation, which has en-
croached over their territory and restricted free access to forests not only 
for daily food, but also for spiritual rites and burial land. The villagers had 
thus started mobilizing through protests and acts of resistance, such as 
burning the company’s trees and trucks. As a result, they were called for a 
meeting by the village head who signed an agreement with the company 
stating that in case of destruction of company property, the villagers may 
be taken to court and have to pay compensation. This is because the village 
head, who is a political appointee, is part of the government party and 
favours the company, according to the community leader. “If the villagers 
destroy the rubber tree, the villagers have to pay compensation of 200 
USD to 300 USD per rubber tree. We fear that the land issue has become 
life threatening for our village,” explained one young woman. In this vil-
lage, the effects of the implementation of Order 01 together with the ex-
pansion of the company surfaced in the form of increasing numbers of 
disputes and sales of land.  
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It brings bad relations, among people, and villages. When the company came, 
some families did not have good relations with one another. Some siblings 
did not want to share the land with those whose land was lost to the land 
concession. There are also cross-village arguments on the land due to the un-
clear borders, specifically on whose lands were lost to the concession.31 
While more in-depth investigations into intrahousehold dynamics 
would be needed to better understand women’s resistance in terms of the 
social construction of gender roles, the interviews did point to tensions as 
well as enablers of women’s sustained engagement, including peer pres-
sure:  
When I started working on the land issue, my husband hesitated to support 
me. However, after my arrest, thousands of villagers showed their support, so 
my husband changed his mind. I discuss my decisions with my husband.32 
Field observations also point to the material difficulties that women 
activists face in sustaining their engagement on the ground, even when 
they are strongly motivated and interested. As one researcher highlighted 
to me, talking about women involved in community forest patrolling, it is 
hard for women to do research.33 The days are long and grueling and they 
still have to prepare all the food for the research teams and their families, 
making it difficult for them to record the data collected. 
In the Philippines, among activists with the communist guerrilla move-
ment (Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army; CPP-
NPA), both men and women complained about their activist spouses as 
the engagement with the movement became more time consuming (Rut-
ten, 2000). Further investigations would require looking at the encounter 
between dominant ideas about women’s roles and their engagement in the 
politics of dispossession, which comes with less time for domestic obliga-
tions and increased voice and assertiveness of women, thus calling for a 
renegotiation of roles. As Brickell (2014) has documented in relation to 
the Boeung Kak Lake case, there were signs of “marital strain or break-
down” but also cases of men taking on a share of household responsibili-
ties and being generally more flexible.  
Finally, in the cases analyzed for this study, in spite of a process of 
“empowerment along the way” having been triggered, there were no visi-
ble signs of a shift to “women-for-themselves.” As other research also 
highlights, women’s participation in protests failed to translate into in-
creased voice and decision-making power (Lamb et al. 2017). Women’s 
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rights were not part of the agenda of the many NGOs that were working 
with these communities or, for that matter, even of those women who 
defined themselves as activists. The women were more concerned about 
the future of their communities and the possibility for future generations 
to continue farming, as women in Ratanakiri highlighted, “If our lands are 
continuously lost, then there is not hope for the future generation. There 
are possibilities that the future generation may go from being farmers to 
migrating for labor to other areas.”34 This sentiment was echoed by the 
urban activist who said, “All I can see is to do something for the future of 
my kids. I want to support other Cambodians protest who suffer from the 
same issues.”35  
 
3.6  Conclusion 
 
This Chapter explored women’s participation in land activism in two cases 
of rural dispossession and land grabbing. Urban land activists were also 
interviewed to look at a full spectrum of experiences of women’s mobili-
zation and agency.  
Women reported having engaged in overt and covert forms of re-
sistance, initially as a strategy to curtail police and military reactions. In the 
process, this led to some of them taking on leadership roles within their 
communities and increased self-confidence and esteem, seemingly trigger-
ing an initial process of “empowerment along the way.” However, women 
activists’ lives are not easy, having to renegotiate their roles within house-
holds and communities. In contrast to other research, extreme cases of 
confrontation among spouses were not reported, though tensions sur-
faced as women had to win their husbands’ consent and support. In this 
respect, the pressure exerted by public recognition and appreciation of 
women’s roles by others in the community helped to open the space for 
negotiation.  
The cases analyzed in this study seem to indicate that the enabling fac-
tors that Agarwal (2015) refers to may have not fully materialized, in par-
ticular, as none of the NGOs active in the areas visited have embraced the 
agenda and discourse of women’s rights as part of their mobilization cam-
paigns. Lastly and importantly, the cases also point to the fact that 
women’s agency – even when stretching the boundaries of existing gender 
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roles, for instance as women take on land activism as their primary occu-
pation – is still largely confined within the boundaries of a patriarchal sys-
tem of gender roles and relations which constructs them primarily as 
wives, mothers, and stewards of family unity and safety.  
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Notes
1 Regulated under the 2005 Sub-Decree No. 146 on Economic Land Concessions, 
ELCs can be granted on state private land for either social or economic purposes, 
including tree plantations and agribusinesses (Human Rights Council, 2012). 
2 While resonating with the Marxist formulation of “class in itself” and “class for 
itself,” Agarwal’s (2015) concept differs in a fundamental way, since women do not 
suffer from false consciousness as evidenced by the different ways in which they 
resist gender inequalities. 
3 One of the main programs was the multi-donor Land Management and Admin-
istration Project (LMAP) initiated in 2002 as the first phase of the Land Manage-
ment, Administration, and Distribution Program (LAMDP). LMAP was sus-
pended in following a request filed by residents of Boeung Kak Lake, who were 
excluded from the land adjudication process and faced forced eviction. The World 
Bank Inspection Panel found that a number of World Bank safeguard policies had 
been breached, leading to the arbitrary exclusion of lands from the titling process 
of the residents, especially the poor and vulnerable [We deleted the single closing 
quotation mark here. Ok? YES OKAY Is there supposed to be an opening quota-
tion mark? NO] (Bugalski, 2012: 20). 
4 Article 1 of the Land Law of Cambodia, NS/RKM/0801/14, August 30, 2001.  
5 Land concessions for economic purposes include tree plantations and agro-in-
dustrial production of food crops. Investors who are granted land in the form of 
ELCs have exclusive rights to manage and harvest the land in exchange for invest-
ments, fees, and land rental. ELC areas are limited by law to a maximum area of 
10,000 hectares per person for up to 99 years. The granting of land concessions on 
multiple areas in favor of legal entities controlled by the same person is prohibited 
(Human Rights Council, 2012). 
6 Article 4 of Sub-Decree No. 148 specifies that ELCs may be granted if: 1) envi-
ronmental and social impact assessments have been completed with respect to the 
land use and development plan (article 4.3) and 2) there have been public consul-
tations with local authorities and residents (article 4.5). 
7 Article 23 of the Land Law recognizes indigenous communities’ right to continue 
to manage and use the land according to their customs; Article 26 ratifies their right 
to collective ownership of land. Sub-Decree No. 83 on the Procedures of Regis-
tration of Land of Indigenous Communities, issued in 2009, sets out the procedure 
for indigenous land titling and registration. In order to be eligible for the collective 
land title, communities have to register as legal entities with the Ministry of Interior 
(Cambodia Center for Human Rights, 2013). Indigenous community land com-
prises: 1) residential land; 2) cultivated land; 3) reserve land for shifting cultivation; 
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4) spiritual forestland; and 5) burial ground forestland. Residential land and culti-
vated land may only be state private land, while the other three categories may 
include state public land. 
8 Boeung Kak Lake is a well-known case where women activists have been highly 
visible, including Yorm Bopha, arrested during a protest on accusations of planning 
an assault on two men and released on bail after over a year in prison (Chakrya and 
Worrell, 2013; International, 2013). 
9 In Phnom Pehn, in January 2012, 300 families were forcibly evicted from Borei 
Keila to make room for a residential development project by Phanimex company 
(ADHOC CAMBODIA, n.d.; The Borei Keila Nightmare, n.d.; The Cambodia Daily, 
n.d.).  
10 Since the moratorium, the government canceled or reduced the area of seventy-
one ELCs, covering a total land area of 656,380 hectares as of January 21, 2015 
(Oldenburg and Neef 2014; Grimsditch and Schoenberger 2015). 
11 In response to an increasing number of complaints filed on the grounds of mis-
information, the government set up procedures for members of indigenous com-
munities to revert back to communal tenure (Sovanna 2014). 
12 Article 44 of the Constitution protects the legal right to property and mandates 
that expropriation be enforced only on the grounds of public interest and if prior, 
appropriate, and fair compensation is granted. 
13 Articles 32–34, 37 of the Law on Marriage (1989).  
14 The code is a rhyming poem instructing women on how to behave. While re-
ferred to as an ancient tradition, the code is a relatively recent creation and goes 
back to King Ang Duong, who ruled from 1848 to 1860. It was revamped in the 
early twentieth century as an example of literature from the golden age of Cambo-
dian history. (Evans, 2006) 
15 Cambodia’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth was 6 percent in 
2010, and it has been over 7 percent since 2011. Poverty headcount ratio at national 
poverty line (percentage of population) has decreased from 45 percent in 2007 to 
20.5 percent in 2011 (World Bank, n.d.).  
16 The Agricultural Census defines agricultural holder as “the person that makes 
the major decision regarding resource use; exercises management control over the 
agricultural holding operation; has technical and economic responsibility for the 
holding; and may undertake all responsibilities directly or delegate day-to-day re-
sponsibilities to a hired manager” (NIS, 2014: 2).  
17 Interview on March 17, 2014 with the indigenous woman who was the local 
interpreter for my interviews. She was also working with a rights-based NGO.  
18 Personal comment by the community leader, village in Andong Meas district, 
Ratanakiri, March 17, 2014. 
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19 Focus group discussion held in village in Andong Meas district, Ratanakiri, 
March 18, 2014. Also cited in Park and Maffi (2017). 
20 Article 30 of the 2001 Land Law states that: “Any person who, for no less than 
five years prior to the promulgation of this law, enjoyed peaceful, uncontested pos-
session of immovable property that can lawfully be privately possessed, has the 
right to request a definitive title of ownership.”  
21 Interview held in Orm Leang Commune, Phlorng District, Kampong Speu, April 
2, 2014. 
22 Interview with village leader held in Andong Meas District, Ratanakiri Province, 
March 17, 2014. 
23 Interview held in Phnom Penh, March 27, 2014. 
24 Interview held in Orm Leang Commune, Phlorng District, Kampong Speu, April 
2, 2014. 
25 Oknha is an honorific title bestowed upon business people who make substantial 
financial contributions to national development projects. 
26 These international NGOs include Oxfam International, ActionAid, and FIAN 
International. See, for instance, Equitable Cambodia and Inclusive Development 
International (2013).  
27 This observation was made by the research teams in Kampong Chhnang and 
Preah Vihear under the Mosaic project during a focus group discussion, Preah Vi-
hear, July 4–6, 2015. 
28 Interview held in Phnom Penh, March 27, 2014.  
29 Interview held in Phnom Penh, March 27, 2014. 
30 Interviews held in Andog Meas District, Ratanakiri Province, March 17–18, 
2014. 
31 Interview with village leader held in Andong Meas District, Ratanakiri Province, 
March 17, 2014. 
32 Interview held in Orm Leang Commune, Phlorng District, Kampong Speu, April 
2, 2014. 
33 Personal communication with Courtney Work, Kampong Chhnang, 2015.  
34 Interview held in Andog Meas District, Ratanakiri Province, March 18, 2014. 
Also cited in Park and Maffi (2017). 
35 Interview held in Phnom Penh, March 27, 2014. 
 
  
 
 
4 
‘We are not afraid to die’: gender 
dynamics of agrarian change in 
Ratanakiri province, Cambodia 
 
Abstract 
While the previous chapter focused on women’s participation in rural re-
sistance, this one examines the gendered and generations implications of 
agrarian and environmental transformations in indigenous areas of north-
ern Cambodia, where the expansion of economic land concessions (ELCs) 
is only one piece of the puzzle. Dramatic changes have subverted the so-
cially, culturally and resource-rich systems of indigenous communities liv-
ing in Ratanakiri province. These changes include the incursion of market-
based economy and commodification of land, the alienation of land and 
natural resources by way of ELCs and the inflow of large number of mi-
grants from other regions and countries. Their cumulative impact has af-
fected indigenous communities’ agrarian practices, their livelihoods and 
their system of beliefs and way of life, with important repercussions on 
social differentiation and gender relations. This chapter analyses how 
emerging capitalist relations are shaping shifting gender relations and cre-
ating hierarchies of power that risk marginalizing indigenous women and 
girls and eroding spaces of recognition, autonomy and agency they once 
had. 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As seen, the impacts of land grabs are felt differently by social groups dif-
ferentiated along lines of class, gender, generation, ethnicity and national-
ity (Hall et al., 2015). These intersecting social differences determine roles, 
opportunities and rights that different women and men have and hence 
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the way in which the restructuring of rural economies and changes in so-
cial relations of production and reproduction affects them (Behrman et 
al., 2012; Daley et al., 2013; Daley and Pallas, 2014; Daley and Park, 2012; 
Doss, Summerfield, et al., 2014b; Julia and White, 2012b). Similarly, re-
search conducted among indigenous peoples in Malaysia, India, Thailand, 
China and Indonesia (Kelkar and Nathan, 2001; Li, 2000, 2010) has shown 
that changes in land tenure systems and commodification of the commons 
impact deeply on women’s status, role, workload and agency. However, 
little research attention has focused on the gender dimensions of capitalist 
expansion and land grabs in indigenous communities in Cambodia. 
 This chapter argues that the penetration of capital in indigenous com-
munities in Ratanakiri, coupled with state initiatives to simplify existing 
tenure systems (Scott, 1998, 2012), not only disadvantage women and girls, 
but also erode spaces of recognition, autonomy and agency they once 
had. Women’s status and roles in the indigenous communities visited have 
specificities that can determine equally specific gendered outcomes and 
are thus worth investigating to get a more nuanced understanding of the 
ongoing agrarian transformations. In fact, while the findings are spatially 
confined, they do suggest that the gendered implications of the ongoing 
changes on indigenous societies need to be analysed in the context of 
broader resource politics (Li, 2000) and ‘regimes of dispossession’ (Levien, 
2013) where capital needs the land and resources but not the people on it 
(Li, 2011).   
 While access to and ownership of land is a central aspect of the theo-
retical debate surrounding gender inequalities in rural societies (Agarwal, 
1997; Agarwal, 1994a; Razavi, 2007a) as well as of the literature on land 
grabs, in our case it has lesser pertinence as will be explained later. There-
fore the analysis focuses strongly on division of labour, voice and partici-
pation as well as cultural norms and behaviours shaping gender relations.   
 Although this Chapter does not engage with the academic debate on 
indigeneity, it argues in the context of ongoing agrarian transformations, 
a discursive gendered reconfiguration of indigeneity may be taking place, 
with women being reconstructed as embodying all the negative connota-
tions commonly associated with it. The findings indicate that women are 
losing not only the material and symbolic places of recognition they had 
but also their identity as farmers and agriculturalists, while being re-framed 
essentially as care providers according to mainstream gender norms. The 
reconfiguration of roles is largely discursive but has tangible effects. 
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Women continue to be active in the productive realm, but their work is 
reclassified as housework and devalued and their public role is obstructed 
by the new gender constructions. This process is fully integrated within 
and shaped by the ongoing agrarian changes and is the primary focus of 
this article.  
 The first section of the article provides information on Ratanakiri in-
digenous groups, their agrarian system and practices and gender roles 
therein, and the legal and policy framework shaping their access to land 
and resources. It then focuses on the changes that have occurred in recent 
years, including those engendered by the recent land rush and followed by 
the expansion of ELCs, and accelerated by land reforms and programs 
that have promoted the individualization of tenure. The second part looks 
at the implications of these changes on gender roles and relations giving 
voice to some of the women we met to illustrate the impact of and reaction 
to the changes from their perspective. The third and final part of the article 
draws some preliminary conclusions and highlights areas where more re-
search might be needed. 
 
4.2 Background to the land rush and agrarian change in 
Ratanakiri 
4.2.1 The indigenous groups in Ratakaniri  
Ratanakiri, Cambodia’s furthest northeastern province bordering Vietnam 
and Lao PDR, is home to the majority of the country’s indigenous groups, 
together with the provinces of Mondulkiri, Kratie, and Strung Treng, and 
is the most ethnically diverse among those provinces (Vize and Hornung, 
2013).1 Far from being cut off and isolated from the lowland society, these 
groups have maintained exchanges and relations with the Khmer majority, 
even if often asymmetric ones and have been heavely affected by the war 
and the Khmer Rouge regime, suffering extrajudicial killing, mass displace-
ment, banning of religious beliefs and rites, forced labour and dismissal of 
traditional agricultural practices (Kiernan, 2008). After the fall of the 
Khmer Rouge, the lack of viable communications axes granted indigenous 
people a decade of relative isolation and peace from modern state-making 
projects (Scott, 2009). 
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The indigenous agrarian system, gender roles and relations2 
The people living in Ratanakiri have practiced swidden agriculture, also 
known as shifting cultivation, ‘as far as their memory can go back in time’  
(Bourdier, 2014: 9). Shifting cultivation is an adapted form of forest land 
use, which translates into optimal returns in terms of labour and yields 
(Dove, 1983) and is embedded in a system of beliefs and cosmology from 
which dwellers derive their social and cultural norms and which leads their 
interactions with the environment (Bourdier, 1995). It has been one of the 
most misunderstood forms of land use among policy makers and devel-
opment practitioners, charged with negative prejudices which have con-
tributed to labelling those practising it as backward destroyers of natural 
resources and forests (Erni, 2015: 8).3 
 The system practiced by Ratanakiri indigenous communities is labour- 
but not resource-constrained. It relies on cooperation and labour ex-
change and is characterized by a significant complementarity of women’s 
and men’s roles and low hierarchical gender and social constructions 
(Baird, 2000; Bourdier, 2009; Ironside, 1999; Matras-Troubetzkoy, 1983).  
 Cultivable land, consisting in secondary forest which undergoes cycles 
of cultivation and fallow, is available to families or groups of families who 
are free to farm as much land as they are able to according to the availa-
bility of labour in their households (Backstrom et al., 2007; Ironside and 
Backstrom, 2007). Farmers acquire a non-permanent use right over 
cleared land, generally for 2-3 to 5 years (Ibid, 2007). If permanent trees 
are planted on the farm, possession rights are generally longer; otherwise, 
the land returns to communal land status as soon as left fallow. In all eth-
nic groups, nobody is allowed to sell land or give away communal land. 
 Shifting farms are planted with upland rainfed rice varieties and vege-
tables and fields are left fallow after a number of years, which varies ac-
cording to ecology and soil quality (Matras-Troubetzoy, 1983). Food as 
well as materials for everyday life and exchanges with the lowland are gath-
ered from the forests. Non-timber forest products are particularly im-
portant during the dry season, which lasts six or seven months. Hunting 
and fishing provide access to the main sources of proteins (Matras-Trou-
betzkoy, 1983; Baird, 2000), while domestic animals - chickens, pigs and 
buffaloes - are kept for ritual ceremonies and as an important resource 
that can be sold if needed (Matras-Troubetzkoy, 1983). Cooperation and 
labour exchanges, regulated by a complex system of customary norms, al-
low farmers to tackle the most demanding tasks such as clearing, burning 
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and sowing new land plots. This ensures that even households with limited 
labour can complete their cultivation cycle (Matras-Troubetzkoy, 1983). 
The system results in a low degree of social differentiation and a social 
entity, the community, which is self-governing and where every family has 
access to the key resources needed for their livelihood.   
 Some indigenous groups also grow paddy rice, a practice introduced by 
Lao settlers in Veunsay district 300 years ago (Bourdier, 2009) and en-
forced as a key instrument of incorporation by different regimes as well as 
more recently by some development programmes (Ironside and Baird, 
2003).  
  
Gender dimensions of indigenous agriculture 
Within the agrarian system described above the division of labour between 
women and men generally shows a high degree of complementarity. 
Women’s tasks tend to be considered less intense, not dangerous and are 
carried out during daytime while caring for or carrying infants and children 
(see also, Van der Berg, 1998). The selection of new plots, cutting trees 
and fencing the farms are generally masculine tasks, as are hunting and 
gathering materials for house or tools construction in the deep forest. 
Women are responsible for organizing the cultivation of different crops, 
tending them once the sowing is done, harvesting the vegetables and gath-
ering forest products not far from farms or villages (Matras-Troubetzkoy, 
1983) - all work that women tend to perform in groups. Women are also 
forest product gatherers, but their range of action tends to be confined to 
secondary forest not too far from the village, while men’s includes the 
dense forest for hunting or gathering heavy materials. Such divisions are 
not strict, however, and women and men cooperate in many tasks, with 
sowing or rice harvesting involving all the available household labour and 
activities such as fishing expeditions engaging large groups of women, 
men and children.  
We are very happy when we go into the deep forest: women with the kapha, 
men with the long knife, the dogs, the children […..] I also like to go collecting 
vegetables in the small forest because is a quiet place, is cold and beautiful, 
and cuts down stress. We go together with friends, we gather the products 
and when we have collected enough we relax and chat, then we go back to 
the village and cook, sometime also eat together.4 
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 Women have great autonomy as farm organizers and plant selectors. 
As an informant said, ‘rice seeds are a job for women’ and decisions about 
planting land with different rice varieties are based on knowledge that rests 
with women and is transmitted from one generation to the other: ‘the old 
women tell the young what to do.’5 Women are also in charge of water and 
firewood provisioning, food preparation and transformation of produce 
for consumption or storage, including rice wine which is an essential com-
ponent of ceremonial life. Care of children, the elderly and infirm are also 
predominantly women’s tasks, even though until recently, it was not unu-
sual to see indigenous men carrying babies while women were busy pre-
paring the family meal (Maffii, 2009).  
 Women may take part in petty trading out of the village, selling surplus 
vegetables in provincial or district towns markets if not too far, and main-
tain control over the cash income, which is usually spent on food supple-
ments or clothes and school materials for children. They retain ownership 
and control over household assets and goods, which are transmitted 
through the female line, with the youngest daughter generally inheriting 
the parents’ house (Ironside and Backstrom, 2007). Some ethnic groups 
(Jarai and Tampouan) are organized into matrilineal clans and are essen-
tially matrilocal; others (Kreung) are bilateral and practice a system where 
the newlywed alternate stays with both families for a number of years be-
fore settling in their own house, usually located near the wife’s family ham-
let.  
 The community social space is not segregated by sex and men and 
women of all ages share the same spaces. Solidarity and equality among 
kinship groups within the village are at the core of social interactions and 
village structure, which is circular with all houses facing each other and the 
meeting house at the centre (Matras-Guin, 1992). Differently from women 
in lowland Cambodia, where patriarchal values infuse moral codes that 
determine relations between sexes and women’s behaviour and roles 
(2008), indigenous women’s and girls’ behaviour and reproductive life are 
not subject to particular restrictions (Maffii, 2009). Girls and boys are en-
couraged to socialize before marriage (Matras-Troubetzkoy, 1983)6 even 
if precautions must be taken to avoid pregnancies before marriage. Mar-
riages are not arranged, and cannot occur without girls’ consent. Divorces 
can be initiated by both spouses and compensation is generally required 
by customary law and is equal for men and women (Ironside and Back-
strom, 2007). In matrilinear groups, women retain custody of children and 
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ownership of the house. Instead, spousal abandonment, taking a second 
wife or other forms of marital disengagement entail heavy sanctions, as do 
rape and sexual assault, which, however, are very uncommon. 
 With regards to women’s participation in community governing bodies, 
our field work indicates that each community organizes these differently. 
Male elders tend to be more involved in issues concerning community 
governance, such as boundaries, new farms’ location or disputes with 
neighbours, while female elders exert more of a religious role as shamans, 
medium or traditional midwives (Maffii, 2010). However, women are not 
excluded from decision-making and are consulted on issues concerning 
the communities: ‘How they [men] decide without consulting us? We are 
the one implementing their decision, if we don’t agree nothing is done.’7 
As for other aspects, wide variability exists among communities in the way 
women are included in or excluded from decision-making processes.  
 Overall, the role and status of women as well as gender relations seem 
to follow patterns and criteria that are different from those predominant 
in lowland Cambodian communities. Women’s triple role as farmers, gath-
erers and care providers makes their workload heavy and days busy. At the 
same time, however, women are largely autonomous and retain decision-
making power over these activities and their outcomes as well as control 
over important assets. In addition, they are not excluded from decision-
making and maintain important cultural roles. A gender hierarchy or 
norms that sanction women’s inferiority do not seem to emerge from the 
spiritual, symbolic and religious realm (White, 1996). Social relations 
within households and communities are characterized more by equality 
and common interest than hierarchy and power (Bourdier, 2009). This is 
in strong contrast with the patriarchal dominance and the vertical power 
structure of Cambodia’s central state, where gender norms and values 
shape gender relations and define women and men’s spaces, social inter-
actions and roles (Öjendal and Sedara, 2006).   
 Summarizing, we may conclude that indigenous communities are not 
idyllic places but perhaps a locus of lesser or less structured oppression 
and discrimination compared to lowland societies. For the same reason, 
they also represent a fragile context where material and symbolic changes 
that affect traditional practices and beliefs and accelerate social differenti-
ation can have a significant impact on women’s status, and hence have the 
potential to reshape gender relations substantially. This we explore in the 
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second part of the article, after briefly considering questions of legal recog-
nition of indigenous groups and the broad contours of the land rush af-
fecting them.  
 
The legal recognition of Cambodian indigenous groups  
With the Land Law of 2001 and the Forestry Law of 2002, Cambodia was 
the first country in mainland Southeast Asia to ‘provide those defined as 
‘Indigenous’ with extraordinary land rights’ (Baird, 2013: 269). The Land 
Law recognizes communities’ right to manage and use the land according 
to their customs (Article 23) and ratifies their right to collective ownership 
(Article 26). The communal land title encompasses ‘not only lands actually 
cultivated but also includes [land] reserved necessary for the shifting of 
cultivation which is required by the agricultural methods they currently 
practice and which are recognized by the administrative authorities’ (Arti-
cle 25, Land Law). However, communities cannot dispose of the land held 
communally to any person or group (Article 26, Land Law). The law fur-
ther states that no authority outside the community may acquire rights to 
immovable properties belonging to indigenous communities (Article 29, 
Land Law). De facto, the law forbids sales or appropriation of indigenous 
communities’ land, although these have continued to go on unabated 
(NGO Forum Cambodia, 2007).  
 The long delay in the promulgation of the bylaws which operational-
ized the provisions of the Land Law, and the complex bureaucratic pro-
cedures established by those bylaws (Cambodia Center for Human Rights, 
2016; Milne, 2013) also contributed to delaying access to communal land 
titling for indigenous communities, making them vulnerable to land dis-
possession and enclosures. As a result, at the end of 2015, only 11 com-
munities had been able to obtain the communal title (see Map 4.1), out of 
166 that had applied (Cambodia Center for Human Rights, 2016). Addi-
tionally, interim protective measures for applicant communities were ap-
proved in 2011 but not enforced (Vize and Hornung, 2013).  
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Map 4.1  
Registered Indigenous Communal Land in Ratanakiri 
Source: OpenDevelopment Cambodia 
 
4.2.2  Land rush, land reform and agrarian transformations in 
Ratanakiri 
As noted in the introduction, capitalist expansion in Ratanakiri is not only 
associated with the more recent mushrooming of ELCs but goes back to 
the mid-nineties when the transition to an open market economy and the 
improvement in infrastructure opened the land frontier in the province, 
making it more accessible to agricultural investments, rubber in particular 
(Vize and Hornung, 2013). Land markets and speculation flourished, 
bringing in companies, land investors, middlemen and cash crops planters 
(Maffii, 2009), as well as labourers from other provinces (NIS, 2008).8  
 Forced by increasing land scarcity and destruction of natural resources, 
many communities started shifting partially or entirely from swidden agri-
culture to permanent commercial crops (Maffii, 2015). A process of trans-
formation of traditional systems of farming and labour exchange among 
families was put in motion accelerating the monetarization of the village 
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economy as well as its social stratification. These changes have also im-
pacted people’s interactions with the environment and the social, cultural 
and ritual aspects of their life (Bourdier, 2014). Uncertainty about land 
tenure security, the constant threat of land grabbing and the pressure ex-
erted by land brokers also pushed many families into selling their land -- a 
phenomenon that has been more significant and visible in the areas near 
the provincial towns and along the main roads (Fox et al., 2009). 
 The province has also become one of the preferred sites for ELCs for 
rubber. As of 2012, the number of ELCs in the province had grown to 22, 
with rubber as the main or sole investment crop in 18 of these (Human 
Rights Council, 2012: 112–116). The concessions have been awarded in 
areas where people had legitimate tenure rights or where the process for 
acquiring the communal land title had started or was nearly completed 
(Dwyer, 2015), putting strains on swidden agriculture by reducing the land 
available for rotation and access to forests. The landscape has also changed 
radically with commercial crops and monoculture plantations run by large 
agribusinesses replacing vast tracts of forests. This has affected communi-
ties in different ways and increased women’s workload as gatherers, as we 
will see later.  
 In response to rising criticism from civil society and the international 
community, in May 2012 the government declared a moratorium on ELCs 
and a review of existing concessions, and in July 2012 issued Order 01 on 
the Measures Reinforcing and Increasing the Efficiency of the Manage-
ment of Economic Land Concessions (LICADHO, 2014). The Order, de-
fined as ‘Cambodia’s most recent and most ambitious land titling project’ 
(Work and Beban, 2016: 38), aimed at recognizing and titling state land 
occupied by families in insecure forest and ELC areas (Ibid, 2016: 53), 
while ensuring respect of land belonging to ‘indigenous minorities and cit-
izens’ way of life’ (Directive 01BB in Rabe, 2013). Under the order a 
speedtrack titling campaing was launched which, though in line with pre-
vious efforts of land registration, was sharply different in speed and scope, 
and mandated titles to be issued free of charge (Work and Beban, 
2016:53).  
 In practice, however, in the indigenous areas the programme avoided 
places where conflicts were ongoing and where ELCs had been granted 
on previously occupied land. Therefore, people whose land was in ELC 
cultivated areas could not regain access to their lands through the cam-
paign (Ibid, 2016). Through Instruction 020, all of the ongoing communal 
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land titling processes were suspended, and the titling of communities’ for-
est areas used for NTFP collection or sacred sites was denied, contraven-
ing pre-existing laws (Rabe, 2013). Furthermore, by making individual and 
communal titles mutually exclusive, not only did the Order deprive com-
munities of their legal right to communal titling, accelerating de facto com-
modification of land, but it also legally reproduced as ‘unoccupied’ all state 
land which was in use at the time of the titling (Milne, 2013: 327). People 
were pushed into accepting individual titles without proper information 
and much time for consultation or consideration.  
 In the next section, changes in gender roles and divisions of labour 
over time and particularly are analysed at two critical junctures: the open-
ing up of the land frontier and initial introduction of cash crops, which 
created extra work for women while lightening men’s traditional tasks of 
forest-clearing and hunting; and the expansion of ELCs, commodification 
of land and the establishment of commercial farming, which triggered 
men’s increased involvement in farming.  
 
4.3 Gender implications of agrarian transformations  
4.3.1 Changes in gender roles, division of labour and women’s 
status  
All work is done by women, and men go around. We have much more work 
than before, and no help from men! What men do? They drink! Modernity 
has changed men’s work, they do not have to produce tools, or repair the 
house like before, they have less work to do, they do not go into the forest 
very much; they do not hunt, cut wood or bamboo like before.9 
Before we had solidarity, while now everything is based on money, people 
care only about close relatives. Before people came back from the forest and 
used to eat the prey all together, now they just cut a little piece and run to sell 
the rest in town.10  
The quotations above encapsulate women’s understandings of the 
changes in gender divisions of work, and the social impacts of commodi-
fication, which puts women’s work, especially unpaid (non-commodified) 
work, at the basis of processes of capital accumulation (Razavi, 2009, 
2011). 
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 While sales of some produce such as vegetables occurred even before, 
the cultivation of cash crops, such as cashew nuts, cassava, soy beans, pea-
nuts on permanent land parcels and exclusively for sale, has been a more 
recent development. The transition to cash crops first started with the in-
troduction of cashew nuts, which combine the benefit of cash income with 
protection from land grabs, as trees indicate that land left fallow between 
cycles of shifting cultivation is not terra nullius but belongs to a community 
or a household. However, cashew nut trees have created additional work 
for women:  
It is very hard work with two farms because we have to take care of both. We 
come back so late that sometime it is already dark. Farms are farther now, 
because there is no land available near the village. In cashew nut farms it is 
possible to plant other vegetables when trees are young, but we must control 
weeds and grass, and is very hard. When the trees grow and we start to collect 
the nuts, we need to clean the grass before the harvest, get rid of leaves and 
branches in the dry season to avoid fires, and of course harvest the nuts. Be-
fore some work was men’s work, but now women do everything.11 
 The nature of work has also changed. Many activities must be per-
formed under strict time constriction and are devoid of social value due 
to lack of interactions. For instance, women complained about the dismis-
sal of traditional activities such as weaving, which is made impossible by 
lack of time. 
Before it was more fun. We had time to rest during the dry season, and time 
to spin cotton and weave. And sometime women went to the forest with the 
men for many days, to choose the new fields. We like the old [home-woven] 
clothes more, but we cannot afford them anymore, we do not have time for 
this work. 12   
 In a similar but reversed way, men’s traditional tasks have decreased 
significantly. Men’s expertise in forestry is less needed in a system that 
relies more on permanent crops and where there is little land available for 
shifting cultivation. Hunting is limited by conservation policies or im-
paired by forest destruction and the tools traditionally crafted by men have 
been replaced by ready-made industrial ones. Bamboo houses have been 
supplanted by more durable wood ones, reducing work and time required 
for maintenance.  
184 We are not afraid to die: gender dynamics of agrarian change  
 
 This material and symbolic estrangement from traditional life has been 
aggravated by increased contacts with migrant settlers and by the structur-
ing of a new economic, social, political and cultural environment embed-
ded with strong patriarchal values (CARE, 2013). For some indigenous 
men, though not the majority, this has created opportunities for integra-
tion in mainstream society through employment in the armed forces and 
police and positions with civil society organizations and local governance 
structures. Their attendance at sex-segregated leisure spaces such as beer 
parlours and brothels underwrites this process of integration. Meanwhile, 
women find themselves confined in their villages, limited in the exchanges 
as well as opportunities to learn the Khmer language by their time scarcity. 
Furthermore, when women attend urban markets, they face marginaliza-
tion and abuse of power by non-indigenous vendors. Cases of sexual as-
sault have been frequent, especially in communities near plantations em-
ploying prevalently male workers, limiting women’s mobility.  
 From 2012 onwards, with increasing numbers of ELCs, the arrival of 
non-indigenous plantation workers (Diepart, 2016) and Khmer settlers 
seeking access to land for the production of cash crops (Maffii, 2015), 
another wave of changes has invested indigenous communities and af-
fected agrarian systems of production and reproduction. New permanent 
cash crops, such as cassava, which are labour-intensive and require invest-
ments have replaced in part upland farming (see also, Ironside, 2015). 
Commercial crops provide a renewable source of cash and are seen as an 
important way to catch up with societal and economic changes, as re-
flected in the changing attitude towards money and material assets.  
Before it was easy to cheat us, we didn’t know the value of land; but now we 
have learned, we have more knowledge and more understanding, and we 
know better how to handle money. We are a little bit richer now, we can grow 
cash crops, we have machines to hull rice and prepare the fields, we still grow 
rice, but we plant also cassava, cashew, and soya beans. Before it was only 
rice. We use money to repair or build houses, to buy machines for farming or 
motorbikes.13   
 Contrary to what happened when cashew nuts trees were introduced, 
men have begun to participate more in agricultural work. This may be the 
result of lack of other jobs, except for wage work on plantations, which is 
generally despised, and the income generated through cash crops which 
makes agricultural work more attractive than other temporary jobs. Fur-
thermore, the new cash crops require machines, which facilitate work and 
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provide prestige through their ownership. Men’s mobility and fluency in 
Khmer also gives them a comparative advantage over women in market-
ing.   
 The expansion of ELCs has also put the indigenous agrarian system 
under stress in many different ways, much beyond the loss of farmland. 
For instance, community members in one village in Andong Meas la-
mented the lack of land for food ‘exploration’, - wild vegetables and fruits, 
hunting and fishing – declining access to water supplies, and the loss of 
spiritual forests for sacred rituals and graveyards. This is why the commu-
nity rejected attempts made by the nearby company to negotiate a mone-
tary compensation. In addition, they felt it would be impossible to capture 
the long-term benefits of farming for their generation and the next ones.14 
Women in particular were adamant in opposing any sort of dialogue with 
the company and complained about the lack of support from the state: ‘It 
is not fair. The provincial governor said that cutting down trees is illegal, 
but the government even allows the companies to legally clear the whole 
forest, while it is illegal for us to cut down a few trees and access the forest 
for food for our daily lives […] The companies also created a border be-
tween our farms and the plantation. Because we are illiterate, we feel infe-
rior to the companies.’ 15 
 With increasing land scarcity, farms are often farther away, forcing 
women to walk hours before reaching their fields. Shifting cultivation cy-
cles have also changed. Fallow intervals are reduced and farms tend to 
become permanent, with important consequences in terms of women’s 
labour and time spent in weeding. Firewood and wild vegetables are more 
difficult to find and fish availability has decreased significantly, reducing 
access to a key source of proteins.  
No more forest is left near the village.. […] We cannot find the vegetables 
that we used to collect before in the months when the fields are not produc-
tive […] We do not have wood for building and repairing the houses. We do 
not have wood to make fire. We have to walk kilometres before collecting 
enough wood for cooking; it is very tiresome. We do not find medicinal plants 
[…] We do not have wild animals to hunt anymore, and there are fewer fishes 
in the river. So life is becoming more difficult. And the company just cut the 
trees down and went away.16   
As a result of these changes, many families have turned from food self-
sufficiency to purchase, exacerbating the need for cash income. Thus 
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many women have started working as causal agricultural labourers for 
other indigenous people or new Khmer settlers. The resulting “distress 
character of women’s labour market engagement” (Razavi, 2011: 56) 
translates into low wages and poor labour conditions, which coupled with 
the burden of reproductive work, does not have any net positive welfare 
effects on women (Elson, 1998, 1999).  
 
4.3.2 Commodification and social differentiation 
With cash crops solidarity is different; we still care about funerals, or other 
ceremonies, but in case of farming there is less solidarity. For example, if 
somebody comes to work with a machine we can pay, or exchange labour, 
but in that case two persons must work back for him. The poor are poor 
because they are following the old crop system or they have little land for new 
crops. 17 
Here some people have most of the land, they are not outsiders, they are rich, 
have big houses, they become rich with cashew nuts, and can recruit people 
to work for them. And now they grow cassava and beans, and also rent their 
land to Khmer people. What makes me angry is that people talk about soli-
darity and equality in the community, but the rich do not share. I can only 
cultivate a small piece, not good quality, a lot of grass and a lot of work, and 
it is not enough, not even to buy food. Poor families sell labour, there is noth-
ing else to do. The life of richer women is better now, they have machines, 
motorbikes, and lend money, but for us it is still difficult. We said to rich 
people that they should share because we cannot go as fast as them.18  
The quotes above reflect different women’s lived experiences of social 
differentiation at different ends of the spectrum. Some women (and their 
households) have benefited from integration in the cash economy while 
others have fallen deeper into poverty and have to work as casual labour-
ers.  
 Social differentiation can be better understood in the context of the 
indigenous traditional agrarian system described earlier, where land use 
was mainly restricted by the availability of manpower. The monetarization 
of the village economy and the introduction of cash crops have facilitated 
access to the labour market allowing some people to increase farm size 
beyond the labour available in the household, thus accelerating land accu-
mulation. The system of labour exchange, where still in place, now tends 
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to focus only on restricted family groups and no longer ensures equitable 
and widespread access to resources, social cohesion and solidarity among 
all community members. Those families that were in a prior condition of 
weakness, especially the ones headed by widows, are more likely to fall 
into poverty without access to such solidarity mechanisms. Research from 
Ghana also shows that following large-scale land dispossession, social dif-
ferentiation is gendered. Not only women are marginalized from land 
transactions and the benefits from those, but they are also the subjected 
to domestic forms of land dispossession by male relatives (Nyantakyi-
Frimpong and Bezner Kerr, 2017). 
 Another crucial mechanism for social and economic differentiation is 
access to and integration within networks of power and influence such as 
the local state administration, civil service, or the NGOs. This particular 
mechanism operates on differentiation more clearly at the individual ra-
ther than household level and produces effects that are the result of com-
pounded social differences of gender and ethnicity. Men have better access 
than women to wage employment and decision-making positions includ-
ing in land markets. Instead, women are disadvantaged by widespread dis-
crimination, limited knowledge of Khmer, and the recruitment criteria 
adopted by NGOs which tend to favour the few educated women or those 
who have enough free time to participate in meetings and trainings.  
 Differentiation also follows other lines, namely access to land under-
stood as the ‘ability to benefit’ from land (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). The 
communities that have managed to secure their land and resources, engag-
ing sooner in the communal land titling process, are now in a better posi-
tion, having land available for cashew nuts, upland rice and other cash 
crops and even surplus land to lease out. While socio-economic differ-
ences are also evident within these communities, the number of families 
considered poor, or lacking land and relying only on paid labour for their 
livelihood is minimal. For example, in L’eun Chon, the community repre-
sentative indicated only 3 or 4 out of over 60 households as poor or land-
less.19 Conversely, in villages where land sales and the implementation of 
Order 01 have impaired communal land titling, the compounded effects 
of individualization of tenure and expansion of monocrop plantations are 
much more evident. In Andong Meas and Lumphat districts, where the 
villages are surrounded by ELCs, people’s farm land has shrunk and so 
has their access to forests and pasture. Some families have sold their lands 
after having received individual titles under Order 01 (see also, Milne, 
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2013; Park, 2015). In Andong Meas, the community leader referred to a 
few cases of distress sales after the titling campaign and company en-
croachment. Additionally, while spouses received joint titles, this did not 
translate into women having a say in decision-making as women reported 
not having been consulted in the case of land sales. A young woman in-
terviewed in Andong Meas expressed her immediate and future concerns: 
‘If our lands are continuously lost, then there is no hope for the future 
generations.’20 Such concerns were echoed repeatedly by different women. 
There is no more land for the new generations, no more fish, no wild animals, 
no fruits and vegetables from the forest, we cannot collect food and wood.21 
 Entire communities have become net food purchasers and turned to 
microcredit to finance agricultural investments, with resulting high levels 
of indebtedness.22 In such communities the number of families whose live-
lihood has been disrupted is significantly higher, and the gap between the 
few rich families and the poor ones wider, with the richest individuals usu-
ally active in the land market as land brokers or as moneylenders.   
 It is also important to highlight that where communities have acted 
collectively to obtain communal land titles, internal cohesion has been 
strengthened, contributing not only to partially smooth out internal class 
differentiation, but also to the community’s capacity to attract and manage 
external aid. Projects such as water provision or community schools and 
kindergartens, which have a direct impact on women’s life, are more com-
mon in such communities. Meanwhile, communities that have been disin-
tegrated by land sales, or heavily impacted by land grabbing, are often un-
able to attract external aid and are seen by NGOs as difficult to deal with. 
The repercussions on women’s life are evident. For instance, Krola, in 
O’chum district, has 27 wells, and a pipe system that conveys water from 
a reservoir. In Plum village, Oyadao district, women have to collect water 
from a nearby lake and in the dry season walk hours to find water.23  
 Overall, however, the improvements remain fragile even for the better 
off villages and households. Access to resources, primarily land, remains 
insecure posing challenges especially for the youth who are increasingly 
detached from their identity as foresters and agriculturalists but have no 
alternatives, with the exception of a few, mainly males, who have access 
to education and employment outside the village. As seen, the integration 
in the market economy, access to cash and the increased ‘khmerisation’ of 
the province have accelerated a shift away from indigenous values and 
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norms. This is more visible among young men and is a source of worries 
and complaints among elders.  
New generations do not know what a forest is; they have lost knowledge of 
it, do not know how to produce tools, how to build a house, how to make a 
farm. They do not follow our traditions, do not respect the elders anymore, 
and want to live the modern life like Khmer.24   
 Anti-social behaviours, engagement in illegal logging for traffickers or 
even drug smuggling are also more common.25 Furthermore, the normal-
ization of alcohol consumption, once linked to communitarian rituals in-
volving men and women but now made popular by the availability of in-
dustrial beverages, has contributed to widespread alcoholism and anti-
social behaviour and violence especially among young males or against 
women. For young women, instead, the impact of a new cultural hegem-
ony has played out mostly through the adoption of gender norms and be-
haviours typical of Khmer society but without real opportunities for inte-
gration.  
Before it was different; boys used to come and visit us in the village. But now 
we have changed; we are afraid about reputation. If boys come to visit, bad 
reputation and gossip will follow. It is good to value reputation so no one can 
say bad things about us. We are happy with this.26 
 The findings suggest that a gender fissure might emerge as a result of 
the estrangement of youth from farming activities and the loss of capabil-
ities, skills and status. As farming is increasingly threatened by land grabs, 
processes of social differentiation and integration into capitalist relations 
may have compounded gender and generational dimensions not only in 
terms of the immediate impact on access to critical resources and liveli-
hoods but also with the potential to engender a generational reproduction 
crisis (Cousins et al., 2018; Rao, 2018). While both young men and girls 
are impacted by the changes in terms of loss of traditional roles and gender 
divisions, young men are more likely to speak Khmer and to be better 
connected with the outside world through access to mobile phones and 
motorbikes and stand a better chance to integrate in mainstream economy 
and society than girls. Young women face the cumulative obstacles of time 
scarcity, workload and responsibilities as farmers and carers, and the bar-
riers created by patriarchal norms and discrimination. This dimension de-
serves further research: generational dynamics, coupled with the observed 
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ongoing process of social stratification, help us to understand the engen-
dering of the social reproduction of inequalities (Ansell, 2014).  
 Though this Chapter has argued that access to land is not the main 
driver of shifting gender relations in Ratanakiri, it has nonetheless been a 
strong determinant of political reactions from below, with a distinct gen-
der dimension. This is the focus of the final section.  
 
4.4 Opposition, mobilization and resistance 
 
With land speculation in Cambodia reaching its peak in 2007-2008 (Baird, 
2014), the price of land skyrocketed all over the country as well as in 
Ratanakiri. The dormant provincial town of Banlung turned into a typical 
frontier centre, attracting all kinds of adventurers and predatory business-
men trying to lure indigenous people into selling their land. An army of 
brokers ran through the villages targeting men based on assumptions 
about who had decision-making power. Land transactions occurred in a 
very masculine environment, with deals made at night in beer and karaoke 
parlours.  
We have a lot of conflicts now; some men feel that their wife is old and want 
to find young prostitutes, and spend all money with them. When they finish 
all money they come back, angrier then before and they want to sell land to 
get more money. How we can sell our land? How we will live without land? 
Now we have lots of divorces. Some wives decided to get away but some still 
live with their husbands who destroy all properties and become violent. 27 
 Women largely stood up against land sales, even when this triggered 
harsh conflicts within families and communities, as seen above. The in-
flow of non-indigenous settlers, which has created conflicts around man-
agement of common resources, disregard for customary laws as well as 
growth of cases of sexual harassment and violence, also contributed to 
fostering women’s opposition to land sales, as emerged from group dis-
cussions and interviews with women and local authorities. Traditional au-
thorities, the elders’ councils, have also been active in discouraging land 
give-aways in exchange for money or ephemeral goods - the impact being 
directly associated with the destruction of communities’ identity and unity. 
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These elders find themselves weakened by land grabbing and more gener-
ally commoditization of land, which risk making traditional practices, 
knowledge and rituals obsolete. 
 Women have also participated in open confrontations and protests to 
stop companies or individual tycoons from expropriation and encroach-
ment (Asian Indigenous Women’s Network, 2010), actively engaging in 
political activities that include planning and strategizing beyond the single 
initiative, as illustrated by the following quote.   
First we fought with the company, we burned the company compound, then 
the authorities denounced three of our people, but ADHOC [Human Rights 
NGO] helped us to solve the issue. At the border with Malik village two 
guards came threatening us with guns. After that we had other confrontations 
with the company, we took out the keys of their trucks to stop them. The 
company promised to distribute some rice to us but finally they gave it only 
once, then never again. We sent a complaint letter, we spoke with Radio Free 
Asia. We think that at this point the PM is informed too. Now we have net-
worked with other villages to cooperate with each other, 17 villages now join 
for advocacy. We know that the World Bank has funded the investment made 
by the rubber companies and we will advocate to them to try to stop this plan. 
We are united; we share money to fund the committee, for people’s travels to 
join meetings etc. Women and men, also young boys and girls, we feel really 
angry and afraid for our future.28  
 Among communities there is a strong belief that if women are involved, 
advocacy and negotiations may have better chances to achieve their aims 
and keep levels of confrontation under control in overt conflicts. In fact, 
communities and women themselves consider women’s participation in 
mobilization as a natural fact when their own survival is at stake. This has 
been documented in numerous cases of urban and rural dispossession and 
protests across Cambodia (Brickell, 2014; Lamb et al., 2017; McGinn, 
2015). 
 Women’s participation in opposition and resistance to land grabbing 
has been remarkable, particularly in situations where communities have 
had little external support. It is frequent to hear women, more than men, 
declaring to be ready to face even the most extreme consequences while 
protecting land. Conversely, illegal deals and episodes of corruption and 
co-optation that occurred in some communities have occurred with the 
involvement of male members of the community colluding with local au-
thorities and business representatives.   
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We will not move from here. We will not accept compensation or else, we are 
ready to die here; our only objective is to make them leave.29 
Land grabbing is so painful that we are not afraid to die. Our lands are our 
lives. We are not afraid to risk our lives to get the land back. 30 
 In spite of the key role played, women’s participation has thus far failed 
to put indigenous women’s rights and concerns squarely on the agenda of 
social movements. This confirms research findings that indicate that 
women’s lead role in protests does not automatically translate into oppor-
tunities for women’s empowerment (Lamb et al., 2017) and that external 
support might be needed for this to happen (see for instance Agarwal 
2014, (see for instance, Agarwal, 2015; Deere, 2003; Deere and León, 
2001; Stephen, 2006). Finally, while advocacy strategies by CSO are im-
portant strategies to demand for private investors’ accountability, few 
CSO transnational campaigns have targeted middle-income countries in-
vestors (Thuon, 2018). 
 
4.5  Conclusion 
 
The analysis of gender relations in indigenous societies undergoing agrar-
ian, social and cultural changes is a complex task, which has to take into 
account specificities of indigenous culture and way of life, including gen-
der roles and relations. This Chapter has highlighted some of these aspects 
from a feminist agrarian political economy perspective looking at how cap-
italist relations and new tenure and labour arrangements are shaping gen-
der relations and creating new factual and discursive hierarchies of power.  
 The evidence suggests that the commodification of the economy in the 
form of cash crops and expansion of ELCs has gendered impacts on the 
indigenous agrarian system of production and reproduction shaping dif-
ferent outcomes for different women and men. In this respect, social in-
stitutions of gender, ethnicity and age operate as a critical social regulator 
of processes of integration, exclusion and opposition to capitalist expan-
sion (Razavi, 2011). It was also found that the reality to be more nuanced 
than anticipated as to the type of changes that different waves of com-
modification have brought about.  
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 A relatively long-term perspective has allowed this Chapter to detect 
that changes in gender roles and relations -- shaped by the introduction of 
new agricultural practices and crops, erosion of traditional access to land, 
differential access to opportunities and exposure to the ‘external’ world -- 
have had different outcomes at different points in time for different 
women and men. When cash crops were first introduced, women took on 
the extra burden of production (for cashew nuts). Later however, with 
farming becoming increasingly capital intensive with crops such as cas-
sava, women have been marginalized from their traditional roles of agri-
culturalists. Differential access to cash crops, labour and communal titling 
has also ignited processes of social differentiation between individuals, 
households and communities. The impacts have been clearly gendered and 
‘generationed’ as women’s identity, status and autonomy as agriculturalists 
are eroded and women and girls are pushed into marginal spaces and roles 
that offer fewer opportunities for integration into mainstream society.  
 Newly introduced capitalist relations coupled with increasing scarcity 
of land have reshaped gender roles and relations towards less egalitarian 
models where the traditional complementarity has been replaced by com-
partmentalization of gender roles and exacerbation of social differences. 
In the context of broader resource politics and widespread negative per-
ceptions of indigeneity (Padwe, 2013), this translates into a reconfiguration 
of power dynamics that not only alienates indigenous communities from 
their lands and resources and hampers their social reproduction but sig-
nificantly marginalizes women and girls based on a system of values that 
relies on income, possession of goods and ‘modernity’. 
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Notes
1 In the country there are 23 indigenous groups, comprising about 1.34 per cent of 
the national population (Indigenous People NGO Network, 2010).  
2 In this section and the following one we use ‘ethnographic present’ to describe 
activities, practices and relationships that, at least in some communities, have now 
been replaced and/or dismantled. 
3 This prejudice is still alive and constitutes the main justification for intergovern-
mental plans aimed at ‘modernising’ the areas inhabited by indigenous peoples in 
a triangle comprising South Laos, Northern Cambodia and Central Vietnam (Iron-
side 2015).   
4 Kreung woman testimony, O’chum , 2014 
5 Elder Kreung woman, O’chum district, 2006.   
6 This is a common trait of indigenous ethnic groups in Cambodia and in the whole 
region (Andaya 2006) 
7 Workshop with Jarai and Tampouan women, Leu Khon village, Borkeo district, 
2010.  
8 The population went from less than 100,000 people in 1998 to 150,466 in 2008, 
though the overall population density is still relatively low at 14 people per sq. km 
(NIS, 2008). 
9 Jarai women’s group, Gong Thom village, Oyadaw District, 2008 
10 Tampouan women’s group, Chan village, O’chum district, 2006 
11 Jarai women’s group, Ten Thom village, Oyadaw District, 2006. 
12 Kreung women’s group, Cha Oun village, O’Chum district, 2008. 
13 Jarai women’s group, Padal village, Oyadaw district, 2014. 
14 Mixed group discussion, Andong Meas village, 17 March 2014. 
15 Women’s group discussion, Andong Meas district, 18 March 2014. 
16 Kreung women’s group, Ka Cheun village, Veunsay district, 2008 (First 
cited in full in Maffii, 2010a). 
17 Tampouan women’s group, Laeun Kren village, O’chum district, 2014. 
18 Kreung women’s group, O’chum district, 2014. 
19 Interview with community representative, 2016. 
20 Kachak woman, 17 years old, Andong Meas district 2014 (first cited in Park 
2015). 
21 Tampouan women’s group, Malik village, Andong Meas district, 2014. 
22 Lumphat district, villages visited in 2015. 
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23 Interviews with women’s groups 2016. 
24 Tampouan and Jarai women’s workshop, Ke Chong village, Borkeo district,  
2010. 
25 Elders’ meeting in a Jarai village in Sesan district, 2016 
26 Kreung women’s group, Kren village, O’chum district, 2014. 
27 Tampouan women’s group, Banlung district, 2006. 
28 Women at a Kachak community meeting, Andong Meas district, 2014. 
29 Tampouan women’s group, Lumphat district, where the community is affected 
by a mining c.oncession, 2016. 
30 Kachat women’s group, Andong Meas district, affected by rubber plantations, 
2014. 
 
 
  
 
 
5 
Just standards: international 
regulatory instruments and social 
justice in complex resource conflicts 
 
 
Abstract 
This Chapter takes the perspective to a different scale and argues that in 
order to tackle complex and interconnected issues, a recalibration of rural 
strategies and use of international regulatory instruments might be needed. 
Climate change mitigation and land grabbing are distinct but not isolated 
phenomena. There is evidence that their intersection and interaction con-
tribute to rapid agrarian and environmental transformations with dire so-
cial and ecological spill-over, including the onset and aggravation of con-
flicts. Several existing human rights instruments are applicable to such 
spill-over situations and are preferable to other kinds of regulation, as they 
tend to be seen as more legitimate by those adversely affected. With in-
sights from Cambodia and Myanmar, this paper argues for a recalibration 
of analysis and action on climate change mitigation and land grabs that 
moves beyond regulation in each isolated case and towards integrated so-
lutions that put social justice and gender justice at the fore.  
 
5.1  Introduction  
 
The environmental, social and gender impacts of climate change mitiga-
tion strategies (biofuels, REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Degradation) and hydropower projects portrayed as renewable 
energy) and of land grabbing continue to capture the attention of scholars, 
practitioners, government and civil society actors. Relevant research often 
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investigates these processes separately and confined within discrete tem-
poral and spatial boundaries (such as a particular landholding) where dis-
possession or competing land claims occur. Yet, evidence from the ground 
increasingly points to the need for a wider analytic lens, such as landscape 
or region. It is the intersection and interaction of these phenomena that 
can produce social and ecological spill-over effects, chain reactions and 
ignite new or aggravate old sets of competing claims and conflicts over 
resources within a wider area. 
When climate mitigation initiatives and land deals overlap, compete or 
run in parallel, they do so not just spatially or temporally, but also institu-
tionally, in terms of policies, land claims, community social dynamics and 
mechanisms for settling disputes. Future conflict and cooperation out-
comes, particularly gendered ones, will depend on intersecting struggles of 
power and meaning in the construction of narratives and contestations 
around the grabbing of one resource or another (land, forest, water, fish-
eries or aquatic resources, or some combination of these). Understanding 
specific conflicts in a particular moment in time requires analysing the 
wider spatial, social-ecological and historical-institutional conditions and 
circumstances in which they arise. Only then can we contemplate appro-
priate interventions for influencing their trajectories in the direction of 
greater social justice. 
For those interested in promoting social justice-based solutions in these 
situations, some kind of regulatory mechanism may be relevant and useful 
under certain conditions. An array of national and international mecha-
nisms, processes and bodies are available to respond to issues arising from 
the related ongoing agrarian transformations. Broadly referred to here as 
international regulatory instruments,1 such mechanisms are increasingly 
considered as potential solutions to many of today’s natural resource-re-
lated problems. However, from a social justice and political legitimacy per-
spective, a clear distinction must be made between international instru-
ments adopted by states, such as the human rights treaties, and those 
instruments that are established by corporations for the ostensible pur-
pose of corporate social responsibility. The former are grounded in inter-
national human rights law and within the state system, while the latter are 
essentially attuned to corporate interests (see Coumans, 2017). 
After 2008, following the (re)new(ed) global attention to land grabbing, 
a number of initiatives emerged – ranging from intergovernmental guide-
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lines (Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investments jointly devel-
oped by UNCTAD, IFAD, FAO and World Bank2) to corporate-led self-
regulation (for example, Bonsucro3) – ostensibly to influence how invest-
ments are carried out in relation to social and environmental concerns.4 
While potentially useful, there is a tendency to apply regulatory instru-
ments according to the project parameters of an investment or initiative 
in isolation and within a single landholding, as if this is how such processes 
unfold in reality. While in some instances, a 1:1 correspondence ratio may 
be relevant, this is not the case in others. Often, these phenomena inter-
sect and interact to produce complicated situations with social and eco-
logical effects that spill over the initial project parameters. Even if an in-
tervening actor – be it a company or the state – is willing to apply or use 
human rights in regulating an intervention, in practice their sense of obli-
gation might still stop at the physical or time boundaries of their project, 
which would effectively indicate a different logic at work than human 
rights. 
With insights from Cambodia and Myanmar, this paper problematizes 
the complex reality currently unfolding in Southeast Asia, and calls for 
recalibration of analysis of international regulatory instruments and action, 
including moving beyond a 1:1 application of regulation to a single case in 
isolation. Assuming that international regulatory instruments can help 
avoid conflict or direct conflict dynamics towards more socially just out-
comes, it is argued that their effectiveness depends not only on the under-
lying legitimacy of the instrument deployed but on other factors such as 
interpretation, context and strategy. 
 
5.2  Background 
 
Cambodia and Myanmar present similar yet different contexts, opportu-
nities and challenges for the deployment of international regulatory instru-
ments with regard to the intersection of climate change mitigation initia-
tives and land grabbing (and the conflicts these might ignite). Both 
countries have allowed, and sometimes proactively promoted, the exploi-
tation and extraction of value from land and forest resources by elite, mil-
itary and private companies. Agribusiness development has taken the form 
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of large-scale flex crop and tree monocultures and has often entailed dis-
placement or eviction of local communities. Climate change mitigation ac-
tivities are also ongoing in both countries, albeit more evidently labelled 
as such in Cambodia, where the discourse and rhetoric is being used to 
justify large-scale forestry plantations, for instance (Work and Thuon, 
2017). Cambodia is also a REDD+ ready country, meaning that concrete 
projects exist on the ground, though the collection of carbon credits is yet 
to start. In Myanmar, REDD+ plans exist but there are no projects at the 
time of writing, although hydropower projects are increasingly (re)framed 
as climate change mitigation (Lamb and Dao, 2017). 
 Both countries have embraced ambitious socio-economic and political 
reform agendas, although much earlier in Cambodia (1992) than in Myan-
mar (2011). This time lapse means that, for instance, Myanmar has not 
accessed and ratified most human rights instruments (see Table 1), 
whereas Cambodia ratified most of them from 1983 onwards, including 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination against Women. The institutional set-up and frame-
work, as well as institutional capacity, is much more established in Cam-
bodia than it is in Myanmar. For instance, in Cambodia, the 2001 Land 
Law (NS/RKM/0801/14) sets the framework for tenure rights in the 
country, including in terms of indigenous people’s access to communal 
land titles. There is currently no equivalent comprehensive piece of legis-
lation in Myanmar, but existing legislation does not recognize customary 
land rights or communal lands and instead sees these areas as “vacant, 
fallow and virgin” land and earmarks them for large-scale (foreign) invest-
ment.5 
 Reality on the ground in both countries is marked by multiple, discrete 
land-based interventions and initiatives, either in more or less the same 
place (but different historical periods), at more or less the same time (but 
in different spaces), or both in the same place and at the same time. As in 
many societies in which land and water grabbing is occurring, the two 
countries exhibit an overall failure to address land-based conflict (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2005; Deininger, 2011). 
 Meanwhile, the regulatory landscapes in which these interventions 
overlap and interact are characterized here as “plural-legal”, with numer-
ous regulatory fields competing for standing on the ground and the state 
law being just one of these. To illustrate, in Cambodia’s Prey Lang Forest, 
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a once-massive contiguous forest area, conservation and exploitation is 
occurring in a contested field of power occupied by private companies, 
conservation organizations, government ministries and the communities 
that have inhabited and used the territory for generations. Each actor in 
the landscape is attempting to assert its own understanding of who has 
which rights, to which land, for how long and for what purpose; each at-
tempts to perform this allocation of natural resources in society. Likewise, 
in Myanmar’s Northern Shan State sub-region, in addition to the state mil-
itary and numerous ethnic armed groups, other actors are recasting the 
landscape and existing patterns of social relations through mining conces-
sions, illegal logging, tree plantations billed as “conservation”, agribusiness 
linking flex crop production to processing plants near the border, hydro-
power dam projects and China’s opium substitution programme being 
used by entrepreneurs as a stepping stone to amass large landholdings. In 
both of these rapidly changing landscapes, state law is just one actor, 
among many, and very often is not the most authoritative actor on the 
ground, while localized customary law systems continue to operate simul-
taneously. Plural-legal settings can vary from one place and time to an-
other, and thus play a variable role in structuring limits and opportunities 
for competing rights claims and in shaping resource-related conflicts 
(Franco, 2011). 
 
Table 6.1 
Status of ratification of Human Rights Instruments in Cambodia and Myan-
mar 
Human Rights Instrument Cambodia Myanmar 
CERD - International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination: 1969 
Signature: 1966, Ratifica-
tion/Accession:1983
  
Signature: NA, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: NA  
CCPR - International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights: 1976 
Signature: 1980, Ratifica-
tion/Accession:1992
  
Signature: NA, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: NA  
Optional Protocol of the CCPR: 
1976 
Signature: 2004, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: NA 
Signature: NA, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: NA  
CESCR - International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: 1976 
Signature: 1980, Ratifica-
tion/Accession:1992
  
Signature: 2015, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: NA  
Optional Protocol to the CESCR: 
2013 
Signature: NA, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: NA  
Signature: NA, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: NA  
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CEDAW - Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women: 1981 
Signature: 1980, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: 1992 
Signature: NA, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: 1997 
Optional protocol to CEDAW: 
2000 
Signature: 2001, Ratifica-
tion/Accession:2010
  
Signature: NA, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: NA  
CAT - Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punish-
ment: 1947  
Signature: NA, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: 1992 
Signature: NA, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: NA  
 
CAT-OP - Optional Protocol of the 
CAT 
Signature: 2005, Ratifica-
tion/Accession:2007
  
Signature: NA, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: NA  
CMW - International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families  
Signature: 2004, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: NA  
Signature: NA, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: NA  
 
CRC - Convention on the Rights of 
the Child  
Signature: NA, Ratifica-
tion/Accession:1992
  
Signature: NA, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: 1991
  
CRC-OP-AC - Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict: 2002 
Signature: 2000, Ratifica-
tion/Accession:2004
  
 
 
CRC-OP-SC - Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the sale of children 
child prostitution and child por-
nography: 2002 
Signature: 2000, Ratifica-
tion/Accession:2002
  
 
Signature: NA, Ratifica-
tion/Accession: 2012
  
 
CRPD - Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities: 2008 
Signature: 2000, Ratifica-
tion/Accession:2002
  
 
Source: OHCHR, Status of ratification interactive dashboard 
 
However, institutions and processes that could contribute to prevent-
ing or transforming complex resource conflicts may be weak or absent in 
the very places and at the scale at which they are probably most needed. 
In the case of complex resource conflicts (involving intersection and in-
terplay of multiple initiatives and grabs), for example, the issue of scale is 
important. Village level customary practices are often very relevant and 
appropriate for handling social conflict within a village and between par-
ties of relatively equal status. But the same institutions may not be geared 
towards addressing conflicts that spill over village boundaries to involve 
multiple villages at a time. They may not be capable of handling conflicts 
in which one party is relatively more powerful than another. Institutional 
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strength is partly about capacity and partly about autonomy vis-à-vis pow-
erful actors/interests in society (Fox, 1994). “Institutional capture” and 
the veto power of landlords help to explain why, historically, in predomi-
nantly agrarian societies marked by inequality, democratizing the distribu-
tion of land (through titling programmes, redistributive reform or land 
restitution) is extremely difficult. Similarly, the notion that “water flows to 
power” resonates because it draws a link between decision-making control 
and political power and water allocation outcomes (Roth et al., 2005: 2) 
 
5.3  Recalibration of analysis and action 
 
In both Cambodia and Myanmar, one cluster of increasingly prominent 
land-based interventions and initiatives involves generic land grabbing on 
the one hand and climate change mitigation on the other. When it hits the 
ground, either sort of activity may engage existing structural and institu-
tional fault-lines, potentially reigniting old conflicts or tensions or trigger-
ing new ones. But the more complicated and potentially explosive situa-
tion is when land grabbing and land-based climate change mitigation start 
to overlap, interact with and reshape one another (Hunsberger et al., 
2017). In the Prey Lang Forest, villagers are being squeezed between ex-
panding government-awarded economic land concessions on the one 
hand and initiatives labelled as climate change mitigation activities, such 
as forest conservation, on the other (see Work and Thuon, 2017). Mem-
bers of the grassroots Prey Lang Community Network (PLCN), seeking 
to protect the forest and defend their place in it against illegal logging and 
deforestation by companies, have suffered violent attacks by armed assail-
ants.6 In the Tanintharyi Region in Myanmar, government forest preser-
vation for carbon sequestration initiatives and international environmental 
non-governmental organization (NGO)-driven marine, forest and wildlife 
conservation projects are accommodating large-scale land takings that are 
consuming forest and forest communities: an expansive Navy confiscation 
area eating up villagers’ long-standing cashew orchards and community 
forests, numerous mining concessions contaminating traditional local wa-
ter sources, a sprawling Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and a major high-
way slashing through kilometres of old-growth forest to connect Thailand 
to the Andaman Sea, and expanding oil palm and rubber concessions (and 
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the lucrative large-scale logging that precedes them). Villagers are espe-
cially vulnerable when concessions and conservation need the land but not 
the people on it, as Li (2011) puts it. 
 In addition to recasting the way land is used, in both Cambodia and 
Myanmar, this convergence of economic land concessions and forest con-
servation-as-climate change mitigation build on portrayals of villagers’ 
customary ways of life and production as destructive and/or inefficient 
(Franco, Kramer, et al., 2015), therefore (re)producing narratives that can 
make the new arrangements seem more acceptable as part of the process 
of taking control of the land away from the villagers (Work and Thuon 
2017). In Myanmar, portrayals of shifting cultivators as forest destroyers 
originate in nineteenth-century colonial rule, when, “as Colonial forest de-
partments entered into competition with swiddeners for control of land, 
they began to characterize swidden cultivators as primitive, unproductive, 
even ‘pre-agricultural’ in contrast to forester’s so-called ‘modern’, ‘scien-
tific’ management” (Springate-Baginski, 2018). Fast-forwarding to today, 
according to one close observer, 
[m]any of the [resulting] policies, and the hostile assumptions and attitudes 
on which they are based, persist to this day. Even though they are rarely based 
on more than subjective preference, they have been selectively employed to 
unfairly de-legitimate cultivators’ rights in ways that would be inacceptable 
for lowland cultivators. (Scheidel and Work, 2016) 
As one study notes, while the debate on the persistence or demise of swid-
den cultivation has never ceased among governments and academics: 
From the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992 
to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the policies of inter-governmental organiza-
tion have immensely promoted research on the relationships among swidden 
agriculture and forest degradation and global warming […] Negative percep-
tions from governments towards swiddening in general in SEA have acceler-
ated the demise of this traditional swidden system. (Li et al., 2014: 1656, 1658) 
In such settings, national and international development workers, activists 
or company officials in charge of corporate social responsibility may seek 
to promote one or another international regulatory instrument as a poten-
tial solution, often in the name of conflict mitigation or conflict resolution. 
But, too often, deployment of such measures, when it occurs, fails to take 
into account the interaction of multiple resource grabs, hence the need for 
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recalibration of analysis and action. Similarly, evaluating rule-of-law and 
justice reform initiatives in the early 2000s, Carothers (2003) found them 
suffering from a profound knowledge deficit, with much to be learned and 
unlearned, at a time when such initiatives were still high on official devel-
opment aid agendas. He observed that the nature and consequences of 
proposed rule-of-law changes often eluded legal reformers, and that the 
field of rule-of-law promotion was slow to scale up empirical knowledge 
gained in practice into lessons learned. He drew attention to the “embed-
ded obstacles to the accumulation of knowledge [that] exist below the sur-
face” such as: (1) the complexity and diversity of societies and of how law 
functions and operates and (2) the weak impulses of aid organizations and 
lawyers to undertake systematic “rule of law in society” knowledge accu-
mulation (Carothers, 2003: 14–15). The resulting knowledge deficit ended 
up reinforcing existing tendencies towards top-down, technical reforms 
(Decker et al., 2005). 
 From a regulatory perspective, and with insight from Carothers, per-
haps it warrants asking the following: Is what is perceived as one problem 
in fact a cluster of problems? Are the tools of analysis and action being 
brought to bear – including relevant international regulatory instruments 
– more suited to dealing with a single (type of) initiative/ intervention at 
a time, and to what extent can they deal with a cluster of problems? Cli-
mate change mitigation initiatives and land grabbing incidents each have 
the potential to revive old conflicts and spark new conflicts. When they 
arise at the same time or spill over into the same landscape, their intersec-
tion and interplay may turn seemingly discrete conflicts into a “conflict 
cocktail”. How to address these complex situations with different possible 
aggravated conflict scenarios is not obvious. 
 Regulatory initiatives do not necessarily or automatically detect these 
interactions or necessarily or automatically adjust to the interplay even if 
detected. Would-be regulators of conflict, whether they are from the gov-
ernment, the private sector or the civil society sphere, may simply find it 
easier to focus on just one problem, rather than a cluster of problems. A 
given regulatory intervention may be programmed to focus on just one 
type of situation, and the implementers of that programme simply unable 
to adjust even if a cluster of problems is detected. To what extent does 
focusing on just one problem, for whatever reason, have the potential to 
aggravate rather than regulate conflict? Meanwhile, not all regulatory in-
terventions are the same either. The realm of regulatory interventions and 
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of (inter)national governance instruments is also highly differentiated. For 
example, today, there are very sharp differences in how the US Govern-
ment and many indigenous peoples movements in the world understand 
and use the principle of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC), and 
when these different understandings are deployed in the form of a partic-
ular regulatory initiative, it is more as an assertion of which particular un-
derstanding should prevail over and against another than as an expression 
of a universally agreed understanding. Given that a lack of consensus sur-
rounding the meaning and purpose of different international regulatory 
instruments is indeed part of the regulatory landscape today, which under-
standing of which “standard” ought to apply in a given situation? And 
equally important, what are the implications and consequences of using 
one understanding and standard over another? 
 With these questions in mind, this article aims to lay some analytical 
foundations for exploring the idea that recalibration of analysis and action 
described earlier must also problematize the use of international regulatory 
instruments. The point is not to criticize using them in general, or any one 
instrument in particular, but rather to put forward some preliminary the-
oretical reflections on the following question: where discrete processes of 
land concessions and land-based climate change mitigation/adaptation 
and conservation overlap, interact with and reshape one another, under 
what conditions can which international regulatory instruments contribute 
to transforming conflict in the direction of greater social justice? 
 
5.4  Regulating and transforming conflict 
 
A plural-legal approach (Benda-Beckmann, 2001) combined with Bour-
dieu’s (Terdiman, 1987) concept of “fields of action” allows rural land-
scapes to be viewed as regulated but dynamic spaces, marked by the co-
existence of several fields of social regulation, in which state law is just one 
among several competing for standing.7 This anthropological view of law 
emphasizes the social, political, economic and intellectual context of en-
forceable norms, and the role of state and non-state actors in making them 
authoritative in society. Such an approach allows “Inquiries […] into the 
way norms are generated, how mandatoriness is created, and how regular-
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ities are maintained” (Moore, 2005: 1). For instance, until recently in West-
ern societies, a variety of social regulation, including religious law, local 
customary law and personal law, historically coexisted and competed with 
state law. The interplay of various regulatory systems determined which 
regulatory field held greater sway relative to the others, and the outcomes 
could vary over time and from one locale to another. By the end of the 
last century, neither “increasing centralisation of authority” nor “increas-
ing importance of international and transnational legal obligations and in-
stitutions” has erased non-state law fields or undermined the “complex 
array of jurisdictions” they entail (Cotterrell, 1992: 28) 
 Legal pluralism characterizes many countries in Southeast Asia today, 
and it is not unusual to find Shari’a systems existing alongside (diverse) 
customary systems, and both of these existing alongside national constitu-
tions and statutory systems; what Bourdieu (1987) calls the “juridical field” 
comprising the ensemble of national official institutions, agents, legal in-
struments and norms particular to a given national territory. This juridical 
field is constitutive of the state, but not coterminous with it, since it is 
reproduced by the actions not only of state agencies and judges, but also 
lawyers, law firms, professional associations, non-governmental law re-
form organizations and civil society rights advocacy groups (Houtzafer 
and Franco, 2003)The juridical field may be central to state law making, 
but it is not necessarily or automatically central to “making law matter” in 
society (Crook, 2001). Instead, it is just one of several fields of action in 
which people may actually end up going to regulate conflict and get redress 
and protection. Another is customary law, in which face-to-face dispute 
processing by ordinary people at the village level may involve direct nego-
tiation, informal mediation, retaliation and other customary practices to 
address their grievances.8 Customary law practices have raised concerns 
over how so-called “traditional authority” and customary law allows injus-
tice to creep in, to the detriment of women and the landless rural poor 
(Agarwal, 1994a). It is relevant to note that villagers may sometimes re-
solve a conflict simply by “lumping it” in order to restore social harmony 
(Galanter, 1981). Insights from Africa suggest that because both state-ju-
ridical systems and customary systems can produce unjust outcomes, the 
question for research is how different people or groups of people negoti-
ate such plural-legal contexts in their efforts to claim rights and get justice 
(Ikdahl et al., 2005). 
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 Using a legal pluralism lens does not assume that the co-existence of 
different regulatory systems is necessarily smooth or unproblematic or 
even always visible to every actor or observer. There may be competition 
and/or complementation between what Colchester and Chao (Colchester 
and Chao, 2011) call “diverse paths to justice”, and more localized regula-
tory paths may or may not mesh well with regulatory pressures and instru-
ments originating from “outside”. Such an approach, however, makes pos-
sible better detection of diverse and possibly competing understandings 
of justice that different parties to a conflict may bring to bear. “Making 
law matter in society” can then be seen as a process that extends to and is 
partly contingent upon the perceptions and choices, and actions and in-
teractions, of individuals or groups who may be seeking justice or looking 
to resolve a dispute or to address a grievance. In theory, aggrieved indi-
viduals and groups on the ground contribute to determining where and 
when conflicts emerge out in the open, which regulatory order(s) are acti-
vated in response and whether and how these conflicts get resolved or 
transformed. But exactly how and how much they contribute is an empir-
ical question that invites further investigation. 
 Resolving or transforming conflict increasingly invokes applica-
tion/use of international regulatory instruments by different actors, but is 
not necessarily or automatically determined by these alone. Increased in-
terest in using international regulatory instruments to address conflict in 
places where climate change mitigation initiatives and land grabbing is oc-
curring has been driven in part by a perceived “weakness” of state/juridi-
cal institutions in handling the resulting conflicts. This is part of the de-
clared logic, for instance, behind increased corporate interest in using 
international governance mechanisms to regulate natural resource alloca-
tion and use in relation to the so-called “global land rush” in recent years. 
But the understandings of the associated conflicts and the instruments 
chosen to regulate them can vary considerably, as can the legal reform 
measures prescribed to address perceived underlying institutional weak-
nesses. For instance, “the [World] Bank’s legal reform focus is on the abil-
ity of legal systems to facilitate market transactions by defining property 
rights, guaranteeing the enforcement of contracts and maintaining law and 
order” (Harris, 2007: 1). By contrast, some critics of the World Bank have 
argued that women’s individual land rights have been used as a Trojan 
horse for neoliberal agricultural and land masking commodification and 
privatization of land rights under human rights language while obscuring 
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the need to strengthen women’s distinct right to land in different tenure 
systems (Monsalve Suárez, 2006; O’Laughlin, 2009). For some, “[i]nde-
pendent judiciaries and functioning court systems are clearly important 
tools for human rights protection” (Harris 2007: 1), while for others, it is 
more about protecting property rights. 
 State justice institutions may be (1) vulnerable to elite capture and (2) 
inaccessible either “because they are incompatible with local norms and 
customs and they are physically or economically inaccessible, or because 
people lack the knowledge or capacity to navigate the system” (Decker et 
al., 2005: 7,156). “[I]nstitutional safeguards, transparency, and the exist-
ence of a civil constituency” may thus be seen as relevant measures needed 
to boost judicial independence and accountability (Decker al., 2005: 7, 
157). All this may seem logical and appropriate at first, yet the way forward 
still remains obscured. For example, how exactly does increased transpar-
ency boost public accountability? As Fox (2007: 350–351) has noted, 
transparency does not necessarily or automatically produce accountability; 
and only certain types of transparency might do so, and then only under 
certain conditions. Too often, global prescriptions rely on analytical 
frameworks that ignore the wider regulatory field, institutionalized ine-
qualities and the agency of different actors that inhabit the ground where 
they are introduced, while also ignoring complex process-to-outcome 
pathways, which can then impede access to justice and leave what some 
aggrieved parties perceive as the real conflicts to fester unresolved. 
Analytically, bringing international regulatory instruments to bear in sit-
uations marked by natural resource conflict or clusters of conflicts is per-
haps best understood as a contingent, dynamic – and potentially conten-
tious – political process that unfolds in the “shadow of the law” (Cooter 
et al., 1982), in which “law” in a general sense comprise the entirety of 
what Galanter (Galanter, 1981: 6) refers to as the “background of norms 
and procedures against which negotiations and regulations in both private 
and government settings take place”. How this process unfolds can vary 
across time and place, since no law or regulatory instrument is self-inter-
preting or self-implementing. Instead, laws and regulatory measures are 
interpreted and implemented in specific historical-institutional contexts by 
real “flesh-and-blood” people whose perceptions, interests, political cal-
culations and power resources are variably shaped by personal experiences 
and by “structures inherited from the past” (Franco, 2011, 2014; 
Houtzafer and Franco, 2003). The perceptions, interests, meanings and 
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purposes that get activated by or end up tapping into these processes can 
also influence whether and how any given international regulatory instru-
ment is taken up and where it might lead. 
 
5.5  Problematizing the use of international regulatory 
instruments 
 
An array of national and international mechanisms, processes and bodies 
have emerged and are being used in response to issues arising in an era of 
“global land grabbing” and related fallout in terms of agrarian transfor-
mation. Numerous international initiatives, from intergovernmental 
guidelines to corporate-led self-regulation, aspire to influence how invest-
ments are carried out in relation to social and environmental concerns. 
Such mechanisms are increasingly taken for granted as potential solutions 
or part of a solution to many of today’s natural resource-related problems. 
International governance is often approached as a matter of applying cer-
tain fit-for-purpose procedural instruments or technical tools in order to 
obtain more or less anticipated results, or implicitly makes one-size-fits-all 
assumptions about where they are relevant or appropriate. It is increas-
ingly taken for granted that different international regulatory instruments 
are on equal footing in terms of their origins and legitimacy. These as-
sumptions are problematic. Any situation that is deemed illegitimate by 
those who are affected is likely to be worsened if the regulatory response 
is likewise deemed illegitimate. In the following sections, we reflect on 
these issues and put forward four propositions for a more calibrated ap-
proach to international governance that promotes social justice outcomes. 
 
Proposition 1: interpretation 
“Making law” is a core process in society that includes, but also goes be-
yond, what happens in national legislatures and courts to involve struggles 
between different actors (state and non-state) to make their preferred in-
terpretations of regulatory norms and rules authoritative in society 
(Houtzager and Franco, 2003). Competing interpretations of what counts 
as good governance, deployed or performed by different actors in the 
field, are also factors in shaping how natural resources are being allocated, 
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used and managed. Relatedly, different forms and degrees of legitimacy 
may shape the interpretation and enforceability of different instruments, 
for instance human rights treaties versus corporate-led instruments. It is 
thus important to problematize the very concept of “good governance” in 
the context of the international political economy in which the different 
initiatives arise (Margulis et al., 2014). 
 Interpretation and use of the international human rights principle of 
FPIC9 is illustrative (Franco, 2014). The use of FPIC or its functional 
equivalents (“community engagement”) is on the rise in land and natural 
resource governance initiatives globally,10 following calls for greater trans-
parency and full disclosure in big land deals. Yet very different actors with 
very different purposes in mind and in different settings translate the prin-
ciple into practice very differently. For some, FPIC is a basic democratic 
principle that includes the right to veto. For others, FPIC enables out-
comes in which both communities and companies benefit, even if such 
sharing of resources and benefits of use is not automatically or necessarily 
promoting social justice (International Institute for Environment and De-
velopment, 2012). For still others, FPIC is a tool for averting social con-
flict, while providing social license for deals to proceed (minus the social 
conflict and its disruptions and costs to developers). 
 The example raises several issues. First, who is initiating which instru-
ment for what purpose? Second, how can one know when a given stand-
ard (whether FPIC or some other) has been truly met? Achieving consent, 
for example, is not necessarily the same as people having had a real choice 
to begin with, and in many land grabbing hotspots in Myanmar, for in-
stance, too often the choice offered to villagers when their consent is 
sought is between quitting their land with compensation or without. Third, 
to what extent can consent be treated as a one-time, isolated and fixed 
outcome when in actuality communities are differentiated, projects are 
fluid and impacts are experienced within a larger, living landscape? Some 
villagers may resist at the start and later switch to acceptance, while others 
may end up withdrawing initial acceptance. Or, some villages that were 
not affected initially may get drawn in due to spill-over or chain-reaction 
effects, such as when villagers displaced by a hydropower dam project 
move, or are moved, onto land in adjacent villages. Fourth, who is making 
law on natural resources, and from which gender perspective specifically, 
whether in terms of formulating regulatory responses in corporate offices 
or state corridors, or in terms of interpreting them in the field?11 What are 
 CHAPTER 5 211 
the varied ways in which gender is considered and manifested in regulatory 
mechanisms around natural resources? What are the risks of exclusion of 
women from the associated processes, and, conversely, which kinds of 
processes might favour women’s inclusion? Relatedly, in what ways is the 
perceived legitimacy of a given regulatory instrument gendered, thereby 
shaping its use or reception in the field? 
 Finally, if there are opportunities, there are also limits to interpretation, 
and so analysis must consider that, by design, some instruments may be 
less open to interpretation (including social justice interpretations) than 
others. 
 
Proposition 2: (pro-social justice) design 
Here, different specific international regulatory instruments can be situ-
ated along a continuum; for example, as hovering somewhere between a 
more “pro-business” pole and a more “pro-social justice” pole, using cri-
teria to locate them initially and to track changes in their character over 
time (vision and process of development, who participates, are the human 
rights based, do they promote social justice, gender equality), as illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
While some international regulatory instruments may be more pro-so-
cial justice by design, design alone may not impede or promote social jus-
tice in practice. Also relevant is the inclusiveness of the process by which 
a given instrument is developed, as well as its relation to human rights. 
Even when a regulatory response ostensibly is, by provenance and design, 
pro-social justice, this does not necessarily or automatically make it so in 
practice. The relatively new tenure guidelines of the United Nations’ Com-
mittee on World Food Security (which we refer to here as the CFS Tenure 
Guidelines or simply TGs), for instance, were drafted through what is 
widely considered a highly participatory process: consultations with more 
than 1,000 people from governments, civil society organizations (CSOs), 
private sector, academia and international organizations, from nearly 150 
countries. The TGs12 are explicitly human rights based and include among 
 
212 Just standards: international regulatory instruments and social justice 
 
Figure 5.1 
The continuum of international regulatory instruments 
 
Source: Authors 
 
the principles for implementation non-discrimination, equity and justice, 
gender equality and accountability, among others. Although they are a soft 
law instrument (in contrast to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), for instance, which is legally binding 
once accessed by the states),13 since their adoption in 2012 one can find 
the TGs being deployed by a wide range of actors, in a variety of ways, 
including for purposes that could be said to undermine some actors’ vi-
sions of social justice. 
 Accessibility is another basis on which to assess the extent to which a 
given regulatory instrument is pro-social justice. For instance, the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials certification scheme does have a 
zero-tolerance policy for involuntary resettlement and grievance mecha-
nisms to address conflict. Yet the process for presenting a grievance is 
complex and not easily accessible, particularly for individuals, and presents 
limitations in terms of time (past 12 months), number of appeals (only one 
allowed) and type of grievances (those falling outside the pre-determined 
typology are considered inadmissible). In another example, the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards on Environ-
mental and Social Sustainability state that land acquisition and involuntary 
resettlement (both physical and economic displacement) are to be avoided 
or minimized, with compensation being provided if displacement cannot 
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be avoided. But the definition of FPIC is watered down to a good faith 
negotiation between the client and the Affected Communities of Indige-
nous Peoples, which does not necessarily require unanimity and may be 
achieved even when individuals or groups within the community explicitly 
disagree. 
 To support pro-social justice analysis and action, it makes sense to priv-
ilege international regulatory instruments that come out of more inclusive 
processes, as well as those that are explicit in their human rights founda-
tions, while being attentive to their plural interpretations, discourses and 
uses. But where multiple land grabbing and land-based climate change mit-
igation initiatives overlap, interact with and reshape one another, as in My-
anmar and Cambodia, attention must be given to competing interpreta-
tions across multiple, intersecting initiatives and how these may 
undermine or reinforce each other. 
 
Proposition 3: context 
International regulatory instruments may take on varied meanings and op-
erational characteristics depending on the historical-institutional context, 
including the locally specific assemblage of rules and procedures (informal 
and formal) that have been socially constructed and reconstructed over 
time.  
 For instance, in Cambodia, the Hun Sen government has dismissed the 
TGs completely on the grounds that the country already has a well-estab-
lished legal and policy framework around land and natural resource man-
agement and administration, and arguing that it is only the implementation 
which poses problems. The government’s stance, in turn, has meant that 
Cambodian civil society organizations have also largely chosen to not refer 
to the TGs in their advocacy and political work on cases of land grabs, at 
least for now. By contrast, some civil society organizations in Myanmar 
have begun experimenting with using the TGs in their organizing and ad-
vocacy work. The case of TG uptake in Myanmar shows how changes in 
a given context, however small and seemingly insignificant, can present 
new opportunities to influence law making. There, until recently, few ob-
servers could have imagined an official public consultation on a new na-
tional land use policy, or that it could be anything more than a demonstra-
tion consultation, held under highly controlled conditions and aimed at 
merely signalling rather than acting in good faith to international donors, 
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governments and investors.14 Yet in October 2014, the Thein Sein Gov-
ernment initiated such a procedure and programmed it to start and finish 
in two months. Whatever the intentions behind it, the official process un-
expectedly lasted far longer and went far deeper than originally planned, 
as previously excluded social actors, especially from “below”, mobilized 
to politically engage and register their concerns and proposals, and as 
moderate political currents on the “inside” worked to accommodate these 
new voices. Exploiting the government’s opening up to international 
standards (after decades of isolation), some civil society organizations and 
grassroots groups used the TGs to frame their criticisms and recommen-
dations, which perhaps contributed to reshaping the policy in significant 
ways and pushing it in a relatively more acceptable direction. 
 Taken together, the examples from Cambodia and Myanmar show how 
the existing historical-institutional context – including changes in this con-
text – can influence the political perceptions and calculations of key actors 
– including government authorities and civil society groups – on whether 
and how to take up which regulatory ideas, framings and tools that may 
originate from the international arena. 
 
Proposition 4: political strategy 
In situations in which powerful actors are converging to reallocate land 
and related natural resources away from rural working people, interna-
tional regulatory instruments are likely to be perceived as legitimate by 
those (potentially) adversely affected if these are grounded explicitly in hu-
man rights principles and provisions because of the latter’s core concern 
for remedying social injustice. Such instruments are likely to be most rel-
evant if used in a way that opens up political space for affected people and 
peoples to organize and mobilize to put pressure on state authorities, in 
particular, to act in their favour. With this in mind, international human 
rights instruments can be envisioned as having at least four tactical and 
strategic uses. 
 First, they can be used to inform and frame social movements’ and 
other actors’ understandings of the natural resource-related problems that 
affect their lives and livelihoods, as well as the possible solutions to these 
problems (Claeys and Delgado Pugley, 2017).15 The way in which some 
CSOs and grassroots social actors used the TGs to highlight the problem 
 CHAPTER 5 215 
of land grabbing while validating their own responses to it during the pub-
lic consultation on a draft national land use policy in Myanmar is a good 
example. Second, they can be used to make (more) visible gender dimen-
sions of these conflicts, and to put forward more gender-equitable social 
justice platforms. Again, recent experience in Myanmar provides an exam-
ple: there, soft law and hard law human rights instruments (Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
[CEDAW], the Right to Food, and the TGs) were deployed by CSOs to 
expose serious weaknesses in the government’s handling of women’s land 
rights in the draft national land use policy, and to put forward alternative 
policy proposals, many of which were eventually accepted. Third, multiple 
international regulatory instruments can be used to identify a range of (po-
tential) institutional leverage points to be targeted by advocacy and collec-
tive action campaigns at different scales. Fourth, specific instruments can 
be used to develop “vertically integrated” strategies (Fox, 2001), in which 
state authority is targeted at different levels simultaneously in order to 
minimize aversion of responsibility through displacement (or “passing the 
buck”). 
 
5.6  Conclusion 
 
In Cambodia and Myanmar, both climate change mitigation initiatives and 
land grabbing interventions are recasting the way land is used, while en-
flaming old or sparking new conflicts. National and international develop-
ment workers, activists or company officials in charge of corporate social 
responsibility may be tempted to launch their own interventions in these 
simmering complex situations, by promoting one or another regulatory 
response as a solution. To what extent such interventions are addressing 
– and capable of addressing – not one problem, but the cluster of prob-
lems (the overlap, intersection and interplay of activities that are each in 
their own way recasting land rights and land use) remains an open ques-
tion. 
In light of the above propositions, and in the context of complex land-
scapes, in which climate change mitigation initiatives and land deals over-
lap and intersect such as Cambodia and Myanmar, it makes sense to priv-
ilege the CFS Tenure Guidelines, for both analysis and action. This does 
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not mean discarding other international regulatory instruments as inap-
propriate or irrelevant, but that there are compelling reasons to emphasize 
this particular international standard in an analysis and action on this spe-
cific project. The reasons are as follows. 
First, the TGs alone were formulated to address and answer the under-
lying “land question” which is at the heart of complex resource conflicts; 
namely, who should have what rights to which natural resources (land, 
fisheries and forests), for how long and for what purposes, and who gets 
to decide? 
 Second, the TGs are unique among the array of regulatory instruments 
most commonly being applied in today’s resource conflicts globally in ex-
plicitly anchoring themselves in international human rights law. Not only 
do they make reference to various other specific international human 
rights instruments, but basic human rights principles have been directly 
integrated in specific provisions as well as globally throughout the docu-
ment. 
Third, the TGs are unprecedented in the degree to which they are im-
bued with political legitimacy. These guidelines, in contrast to other in-
struments currently in use, are the official product of a lengthy and inclu-
sive intergovernmental negotiation and agreement, which uniquely 
involved the direct participation in the debates (but not in the final deci-
sion) of civil society actors, specifically NGOs, human rights organizations 
and social movement representatives, and was built upon a relatively ex-
tensive and intensive and inclusive formal consultation process. 
Fourth, the TGs have immediate social relevance in complex resource 
conflict settings: their particular character (described above) means not 
only that states have an obligation to implement these guidelines but also 
that civil society organizations and grassroots social actors need not wait 
for this to happen and can instead immediately make use of the principles 
and provisions contained in these guidelines to (re)frame their analyses 
and actions, including assessing their own situations, monitoring and eval-
uating government and company initiatives, and developing awareness-
raising, organizing and mobilizing strategies. 
Finally, as a result of their particular orientation and character, the TGs 
have a wide-ranging applicability that is intrinsic to their purpose. Rather 
than being built to be used in relation of interventions and initiatives that 
cut across policy arenas and issue areas. The TGs’ built-in, wide-ranging 
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applicability is especially relevant for situations such as the focus of our 
paper, in which climate change mitigation initiatives and land grabbing 
impulses overlap, intersect and interact. 
 
Publication information: 
This Chapter is based on the article: Jennifer Franco, Clara Mi Young Park 
& Roman Herre (2017): Just standards: international regulatory instru-
ments and social justice in complex resource conflicts, Canadian Journal 
of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d'études du développement, 
38:3, 341-359, DOI: 10.1080/02255189.2017.1298520  
 
 
 
 
  
218 Just standards: international regulatory instruments and social justice 
 
Notes 
1 This refers to international regulatory instruments, processes and monitoring 
mechanisms tools and entities collectively as international regulatory instruments. 
However, these instruments vary considerably in terms of legitimacy, ownership, 
accountability and enforceability. For instance, “corporate-led” instruments are de-
veloped by private sector actors, sometimes together with civil society actors, as 
self-regulatory tools and can be sector-wide or company-specific. 
2 Available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/G-20/PRAI.aspx.  
3 Bonsucro is a multi-stakeholder membership-based organisation which promotes 
“responsible” sugar production, including through certification of standards. Its 
members include big corporations alongside farmers, end users and civil society. 
4 Margulis et al. (2013: 5) highlight “the rapid elevation of land grabbing onto the 
global governance agenda and a flurry of global rule-making projects at various 
scales involving a multiplicity of actors to regulate land-grabbing”. 
5 See TNI (2016). 
6 See http://iphrdefenders.net/cambodia-prey-lang-community-network-plcn-
press-releaseattempted-murdered-plcn-activist/  
7 Bourdieu (1987) differentiates between diverse fields of social regulation to illu-
minate different individual actors and groups of actors embedded in field-specific 
institutions and forms of stratification. Their unique combination of bases of 
power, institutions and forms of stratification give fields a particular logic and co-
herence of their own, and therefore a degree of autonomy from each other. 
8 Such practices are a basic feature of many societies, whether they originate in pre-
colonial cultures or with European Christian missionaries seeking to spread a “har-
mony legal model” (Nader, 1993, 2001: 21). As Benda-Beckmann (2001: 52) ar-
gues, “Even if one’s main orientation is to accept the inevitable primacy of the state 
and state law as the means for change, one nevertheless has to take into account 
the overall constellation of normative and institutional orders in which the state 
apparatus, its institutions and regulations, are only one part”. In recognition of cus-
tomary law, many official legal and judicial reform initiatives include “non-state 
justice” components as a way to expand access to justice without further burdening 
regular courts. 
9 FPIC refers to the right to self-determination and to freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development. It is clearly articulated in the United Nations Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: “Indigenous peoples shall not be 
forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place with-
out the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and 
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after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option 
of return” (Article 10). 
10 FPIC is appearing in initiatives: 
ranging from the safeguard policies of the multilateral financial institutions; 
practices of extractive industries; water and energy development; natural re-
sources management; access to genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge and benefit sharing arrangements; scientific and medical research; 
and indigenous cultural heritage. (As noted by Antoanella-Julia Motoc and the 
Tebtebba Foundation in a legal commentary submitted to the Commission on 
Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Prosecution of Human 
Rights, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, at the twenty-third session, 
18–22 July 2005) 
11 While it is safe to assume that most international regulatory instruments will ad-
dress gender, it is important to remember that gender equality is a contested notion, 
including in Asia (Roces, 2010), which can lead to different constructions of mean-
ings and politics. The evidence indicates that, overall, women are disproportion-
ately affected vis-a-vis men by land dispossession  (Doss, Summerfield, et al., 2014: 
3) due to existing hierarchical structures and patriarchal norms. Conflicts, shocks 
and competition over scarce resources can exacerbate existing gender and social 
disparities and further marginalise those who are most vulnerable. 
12 In the context of this Chapter, the use of the acronym TG as opposed to VGGT, 
used by the CFS and FAO, is a political and strategic choice that is based on the 
will to focus on the content rather than the voluntary nature of the guidelines.  
13 There are 10 core international human rights instruments. For each there is a 
committee of experts to monitor implementation of the treaty provisions by its 
state’s parties. 
14 The term “demonstration” is used here conceptually, as in (Herman and Brod-
head, 1984). 
15 On the “framing” function of social movements, see McAdam, McArthy, and 
Zald (1996). 
  
 
 
6 Gender, generations and agrarian change: conclusions and implications  
 
 
6.1  Gender and generations in Cambodia and Myanmar  
 
This thesis investigated how gender and generational roles and relations 
shape and are shaped by land grab politics. To explore this, the study an-
alysed cases of land grabbing, dispossession and mobilization in Cambodia 
and Myanmar. The two countries, while very similar, offered some varia-
bility and contrasts in terms of histories, legal and policy framework and 
the integration of gender concerns therein, women’s activism, and social 
movements and indigenous/ethnic groups. In Cambodia, the study 
looked at the impacts of Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) for sugar 
and rubber in two provinces, Kampong Speu and Ratanakiri. In 
Ratanakiri, the analysis centred on ELC expansion in indigenous territo-
ries in the context of the histories of frontier opening and the simplifica-
tion of tenure systems for state building purposes (Scott, 1998, 2012). In 
Myanmar, the focus was on the impact of intersecting initiatives, oil palm 
plantations and forest conservation on ethnic Karen communities in the 
Tanintharyi region against a background of war, displacement and over-
lapping governance. 
 Throughout its empirical chapters, the study addressed different facets 
of the key question and sub-questions, as highlighted in more detail in the 
next section. Overall, the thesis partly confirmed the findings of other 
studies on gender and land grabs (see for instance, Behrman et al., 2012; 
Julia and White, 2012; special issue of Feminist Economics, Vol. 20: 1, 2014; 
special issue of The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 44: 6, 2017), that is, that 
women are likely to be disproportionately more impacted than men in 
terms of access to and use and control over natural resources, new em-
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ployment opportunities, and decision-making, not only because of the ex-
isting inequalities and power asymmetries that shape control over land, 
but also because of intrahousehold roles and relations, women’s status 
within their communities and their access to education, knowledge and 
information. The study showed that intersectionality is of critical im-
portance for analytical purposes. Women (and men) cannot be taken as 
homogenous, but need to be seen as having subjectivities and positionali-
ties that are shaped by intersecting social differences and axes of power. It 
is also important to consider how these play out in different contexts and 
at different times. Herstory matters, and it matters if she is a Khmer or an 
indigenous woman, if she is married or widowed, old or young, landless 
and poor, because her experience of dispossession, materially and emo-
tionally, will be unique and different from that of other women.  
 The study also confirmed that it is essential to pay attention to the in-
tergenerational impacts of land grabs and how these specifically and dif-
ferently affect young women and men. Without this understanding, de-
bates about the future of farming and the social reproduction of farming 
communities risks being meaningless. Land grabs shut off livelihood op-
portunities for today’s farmers and the next generation by depriving them 
of land and resources that are crucial for shelter and livelihoods, but also 
for their identity, culture, and traditional practices.  
 The study has shown how different people’s histories and experiences 
of land grabs and the changes that these entail – whether actual or antici-
pated (for instance the national park case in Chapter 2) - inform their un-
derstanding, feelings of injustice, and political responses, both individual 
and collective. These are also key to the formation of alternative visions 
of development (Chapter 2). In this respect, grassroots social movements 
and civil society were found to play a key role in supporting community 
mobilization with common tools, information and trainings and in con-
necting them with national and transnational level movements and poli-
tics. However, if social movements are not attentive to gender and power 
dynamics, and do not specifically advocate for women’s rights, women’s 
participation may have only limited beneficial impacts and women’s rights 
will not be adequately addressed in broader strategies and national policy 
discussions (Chapters 3 and 4). Therefore, women activists need extra sup-
port in connecting to each other in different locations (for instance, across 
communities and in rural and urban settings), and vertically with transna-
tional women’s groups (Chapter 3). The use of international governance 
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instruments, especially if resulting from participatory processes and 
grounded on human rights and social justice, can provide a yardstick of 
international standards, including from a gender perspective, which can 
inform advocacy and participation in policy making (Chapter 5).   
   
Key questions, findings and gaps 
This section refers back to the research questions, highlighting the key 
findings of the study and some remaining gaps. 
 The prioritization of fast economic growth, since the mid-1990s in 
Cambodia and in Myanmar from 2013 onwards, has accelerated the ex-
pansion of capital into rural and forested areas. In recent decades, with the 
multiplication of initiatives to exploit land and natural resources facilitated 
by legislation that allows large land concessions and policies to attract for-
eign capital, both countries have become ‘hotspots for land grabbing’. Dif-
ferent forms of ‘green grabbing’ – that is grabbing for environmental ends 
- including conservation initiatives, revamped by international pledges to 
combat climate change, have further encroached onto land and resources 
used by small-scale farmers, fishers and forest dwellers. As capital’s expan-
sive strategies become increasingly sophisticated, the study re-affirmed the 
importance of a landscape perspective in action-oriented research that 
aims to promote socially just outcomes. It also showed the need for anal-
yses and counter strategies that move across scales and transcend sectors 
and divisions, while engaging constructively in “collaborative thought, po-
litical action, and practical change on the ground, in place(s), with rapidly 
changing social movements and a diversity of people in everyday ecolo-
gies.” (Rocheleau and Nirmal, 2015: 808)  
 The complex role of the state was evident in both countries. On the 
one hand, the state was often found to be facilitating, directly or indirectly, 
land grabs and the exploitation of resources by, among other ways, enact-
ing legislation that prioritizes the interests of private investors, rendering 
farmers’ tenure rights insecure, limiting the areas that they can access and 
use (for instance through individual titling), or demarcating areas that they 
cannot access (through the establishment of protected areas for conserva-
tion). As I have shown in this thesis, these initiatives tend to affect adult 
women (e.g. by titling land in the name of the male household head) and 
young women and men (e.g. by reducing the amount of land available for 
new generations) more than adult men.  
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 On the other hand, the state legislative role is crucial to creating oppor-
tunities for more equitable land governance and tenure, as seen in the pro-
cess of the drafting of the National Land Use Policy in Myanmar. National 
policies, if properly designed and implemented, can advance the interests 
of small farmers and gender equality. Furthermore, the state can also be 
called on and made accountable to Human Rights law, international agree-
ments such as the SDGs and the international regulatory instruments to 
which it is a signatory, especially legally binding instruments such as the 
CEDAW. This gives social movements and civil society ways to exert 
pressure on the state and to engage in fruitful negotiations with it when 
the opportunity arises.  
 In both countries, dispossession, land grabs and encroachment on land 
and forests previously accessed freely by communities have had gender 
and generational implications in relation to people’s access to resources, 
livelihoods and food security. In terms of gender, it has led to an increased 
work burden for women due to the reorganization of labour, to their mar-
ginalization due to the lack of education and employment opportunities, 
and to their minimal participation in decision-making. Social differentia-
tion and conflicts between households and different groups of people (for 
instance returning IDPs and villagers) have also been noted. In line with 
earlier research findings (discussed in Chapter 1), this study showed that 
reduced access to natural resources burdens women because they have to 
work longer hours, sometimes in remote areas, and walk longer distances 
to reach the fields and access forests and water (Chapters 2 and 4). As a 
result, women are also more vulnerable to attacks and violence, and suffer 
from the emotional impacts of having to leave their children behind. 
Chapter 4 indicates how the monetization of the economy in Ratanakiri 
gave women additional tasks in cashew nut production, while stripping 
them of their status and traditional knowledge as agriculturalists when men 
took over the cash crop. The encounter with the dominant culture and its 
patriarchal values is also producing new forms of marginalization for in-
digenous women and girls, affecting especially those who have limited or 
no knowledge of Khmer (Chapter 4). While this did not seem to have 
happened in Tanintharyi, several Karen women interviewed said they felt 
inadequate because of their lack of education and their ignorance of issues 
that affect their communities. Limited or no knowledge of Burmese also 
constraints people in their interaction with investors and authorities dur-
ing negotiations and land registration. Women are more affected than 
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men, as travelling outside the village to reach the district office is time 
consuming and difficult if no means of transportation are available to 
them. This was also reflected in differences between young women and 
young men’s prospects of participating in land and community politics and 
joining training and meetings in their own and other villages. Young mar-
ried women in Tanintharyi, for instance, complained that they did not 
know about the issues affecting the community as these were not dis-
cussed at home and women could not always join the meetings, especially 
those held in other villages, because of their domestic responsibilities and 
limited mobility. Those who were not married were still expected to help 
with around the house. Conversely, young men had access to motorbikes 
and thus were more mobile, in addition to being free of domestic work 
even when they were married (Chapter 2).  
 In all the cases analysed for this thesis, labour on the plantations, if 
available to local communities, was not considered a desirable option as it 
was precarious, time-constraining and ill-paid. However, it was often a fall-
back option when families lost land and thus access to food. While access 
to this type of work was not gendered, the study found that roles and wage 
rates were highly gendered. In addition to being short-term and of low 
quality, paid employment sanctions the lesser value placed on women’s 
work as women are systematically paid less than men and hardly ever ac-
cessed the few more stable positions. In the case of youth, casual wage 
work - whether on plantations or on other people’s farms - seemed to be 
an option that was more easily accessible to young men. In indigenous 
communities in Ratanakiri and Tanintharyi, young men were also more 
mobile than young women, having more freedom and easier access to mo-
torbikes. This has implications in terms not only of income but also of 
access to information, networking and exposure to the outside world. In 
the case of Ratanakiri, however, this also created dangers as it enabled boys 
to more easily engage in illicit activities and detach themselves from the 
community’s traditional values and practices of solidarity, thus causing 
worry and disapproval in older people. Older men in particular identified 
this trend as a threat to the reproduction of communities.     
 In the context of traditional agrarian systems, where land use and 
productivity were mainly restricted by the availability and size of the labour 
force, differential access to labour, and consequently the ability to clear 
and cultivate land for cash crops, is driving processes of social differenti-
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ation. The lack of access to family labour and the exchange of labour af-
fects the amount of land that each household can clear and cultivate, and 
allows only those who can afford paid labourers to accumulate more land 
and be productive. In Ratanakiri, the introduction of cashew nuts and cash 
income has facilitated the hiring of external labour, allowing some people 
to increase their farm size beyond the labour available in the household, 
thus accelerating land accumulation. In Tanintharyi, social differentiation 
is shaped by the amount of garden land that the family has, and its access 
to new land that can be cleared and maintained for betel nut cultivation. 
This in turn affects the intergenerational transfer of land and the social 
reproduction of communities. As seen in Chapter 2, due to the history of 
repeated displacement during the civil war, not all families have enough 
productive land that they can pass onto their children when they marry. 
This delays marriage for some and makes livelihoods hard for young cou-
ples who do not have betel nut land, which is the main source of income. 
It also affects young people’s education since the lack of a cash income 
makes higher education in a distant location unaffordable for many fami-
lies due to the high tuition fees and boarding expenses. Compounded by 
the decreasing access to land that can be cleared for the shifting cultivation 
of rice and subsequently converted to cash cropping, reproduction con-
cerns linger in communities and affect young people in particular. Inter-
estingly, in Tanintharyi, while being a concern shared by both women and 
men, the lack of land seemed to worry young men in particular as it was 
closely linked to their idea of masculinity as breadwinners. In both coun-
tries, albeit more pronounced in Cambodia, there were also signs of cracks 
in traditional forms of reciprocity and labour exchange due to social dif-
ferentiation - with a few families having more land and income than others 
- and land conflicts.  
 Land grabs and pressure over natural resources have sparked different 
forms of political reactions from below, ranging from impromptu open 
and violent protests to organized protests, advocacy, and the advancement 
of ‘other’ visions of development and resource management. Political re-
actions from below have occurred in all the cases analysed in this thesis, 
regardless of the type of investment or initiative and the outcomes. En-
gagement with civil society organizations and grassroots social move-
ments, and the cohesiveness of the communities, strongly influence the 
repertoire of responses and strategies. For instance, in Cambodia, those 
indigenous communities which went through the cumbersome process of 
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registering their communal land under the Land Law were found to be 
more organized and resilient to changes and external influences. In con-
trast, in those communities where the penetration of capital was advanced 
and individual land titling disrupted the traditional communal tenure sys-
tem, it was more common to hear about the ongoing withdrawal from 
traditional forms of solidarity (Chapter 4).  
 In Myanmar, the role played by grassroots social movements, particu-
larly ethnic movements, is manifested via the promotion and adoption by 
communities of a shared approach, which includes inter-community, in-
terfaith prayers; youth education programmes; the establishment of com-
munity building organizations; the research and mapping of local species 
(animal and plant); advocacy for the recognition of communities’ rights to 
land and management of resources and indigenous peoples’ rights; and the 
advancement of alternative visions from below. One beneficial effect of 
their engagement with these movements is that communities have been 
able to contribute to regional and national level politics while getting ac-
cess to information that keeps them better abreast of the rapid changes in 
the policy and governance environment. This engagement has also better 
equipped communities to confront the complexities of a double govern-
ance system that includes the Union Government (UG) and the Karen 
National Union (KNU), including the various levels of each (cen-
tral/state/province), and the different actors and interests varyingly asso-
ciated with each. These actors, in turn, may challenge each other – for 
instance to affirm sovereignty or blame each other (in the case of contro-
versial investments that the UG or the KNU may have both agreed to but 
do not want to take responsibility for) - or temporarily collaborate. How-
ever, differential access to information and participation in decision-mak-
ing fora means that women and girls, and youth in general, often have less 
opportunities to voice their concerns and have them reflected in the deci-
sions that are made, as seen in Chapter 2.  
 In all cases, the various forms of mobilization have involved women 
and men of all ages, with women notably standing at the forefront of overt 
and violent protests to prevent their husbands and sons from being beaten 
up or arrested. Women’s participation in community politics is preceded 
and followed by a continuous process of negotiation and does not auto-
matically translate into women and girls’ increased agency. When women 
have been able to affirm and perform their role as land activists, as seen 
in the examples from Cambodia (Chapter 3), this has had an empowering 
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effect, improving their knowledge and social standing within communi-
ties. However, the cases suggest that more specific interventions might be 
needed to scale up women’s activism. Civil society and grassroots organi-
zations do not systematically integrate women’s rights in their local agen-
das, and generational justice has been kept within the boundaries of a 
broader discourse on ‘future generations’. In the mist of escalating in-
stances and forms of land grabbing, gender equality - including specific 
reference to women’s land rights - seems to easily fall off social move-
ments’ priority lists. In spite of the dominant discourse on the high status 
of women in Cambodia and Myanmar and Southeast Asia in general, the 
evidence suggests that when it comes to sitting at the decision-making ta-
ble, women and young women and men, especially from rural and ethnic 
communities and groups, are not at the table on equal terms with men. As 
other research on women’s activism has shown (see Chapter 3), only with 
specific attention to addressing the power dynamics in which social and 
grassroots movements are also imbued can there be an open and honest 
discussion of why this is not happening. Efforts in this direction can be 
supported by a recalibration of analysis and action by social justice move-
ments, and the adoption and use of international instruments that have 
political legitimacy from below and gender equality as a key element of 
social justice (Chapter 5).  
 Young people’s participation in community politics was common in 
Tanintharyi due to a focus by ethnic grassroots movements on youth. Alt-
hough young people tend to stick to prevailing social norms that assign 
marginal roles and spaces to women and youth, this study showed that 
such roles can also be challenged under specific circumstances - for in-
stance, when women are literate - and as young men and women gain more 
knowledge and familiarity with the issues. The discussions with young 
people revealed that they take pride in engaging in community politics, 
and this in turn fosters their sense of belonging and boosts their confi-
dence, enabling them to renegotiate their roles and be recognized as young 
adults even when they are not yet married. However, young women are 
generally more constrained than men by their limited mobility, as motor-
bikes are mainly ridden by men and boys and are perceived as dangerous 
and difficult to drive on rugged terrains. Young women are also con-
strained by familial responsibilities when they are married and have young 
children. This confirms the feminist political ecological observation that 
bodily, spatial and social practices and nature are mutually constituted.  
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 The ethnic indigenous question is complex and connected with efforts 
to open and establish sovereignty over frontier territories; in Myanmar, it 
is also intimately intertwined with the peace process. Although not the 
central focus of this thesis, the cases from Cambodia and Myanmar have 
illuminated some facets of the issue from the perspective of intersection-
ality. In Ratanakiri, in the encounter with capitalist relations and main-
stream patriarchal culture, the intersection of gender with ethnic differ-
ence, age and class (from a poor household) has heightened women’s 
marginalization as fewer opportunities for education, income generation 
and recognition are available to women. Because of the process of com-
modification that has increasingly estranged women from their traditional 
role of agriculturalists, indigenous women have lost social status and con-
trol over resources in communities where commodification is reaching 
maturity. While indigenous identity is being deployed to reclaim territories, 
nature and culture, the ‘indigenous rights package’ used is assumed to be 
equally beneficial to all. In practice, as seen above, land grabbing and com-
modification have triggered processes of social differentiation and a fixa-
tion of existing and new power hierarchies that affect women and girls 
more than men and boys. At the same time, there seem to be possibilities 
for youth, and especially young women, to use the state of urgency and 
fluidity created by land grabs to renegotiate their roles vis-à-vis their par-
ents and adults in the community. The scattered manner in which this is 
happening signals the critical role that can be played by grassroots move-
ments, including facilitating their exposure to experiences from other sites 
and countries, and to transnational activist advocacy and agendas, in sup-
porting young people’s engagement in land grab politics. This confirms 
the importance of looking at mobilization not only in the context of the 
wider landscape but also at its implications across multiple scales. 
 This research has thus confirmed the findings of the few earlier studies 
on the gendered and generationed implications of land grabs, while con-
tributing additional evidence that can provide a nuanced and informed 
understanding of what happens on the ground. In contrast to the other 
studies, however, this thesis has attempted to bring gender and generation 
together in analysing cases of land grabbing using key theories and con-
cepts from feminist political economy and using feminist political ecology 
as the overarching umbrella. While the cases considered here are different 
and shaped by the specific context, histories, forms and nature of the land 
grab, and the socio-natures in which they materialize, the findings largely 
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point in the same direction as previous research conducted in other set-
tings, countries and regions, indicating that the power dynamics and forms 
of oppression at play are a key factor that shape and transmit the outcomes 
and experiences of land grabs, including the way in which these are fought 
over generations by different people.  
 The evidence that grassroots social movements and civil society do not 
systematically integrate gender and generational justice, and women’s 
rights in their claims and advocacy agendas means that existing power 
asymmetries and gender and age stereotypes and discrimination are im-
plicitly, or in some cases explicitly, reproduced in the narratives of the vi-
sions of development that are being put forward as alternatives, thus steer-
ing away from opportunities to advance social justice. While gender 
equality appears in state policies and programmes, as a result of interna-
tional commitments and donor pressure, it is not always fully internalized. 
Chapter 5 argued that the effectiveness of international regulatory instru-
ments in rural struggles depends critically not only on the underlying legit-
imacy of the instrument deployed, but also on factors such as interpreta-
tion, pro-social justice design, context and strategy, of which gender 
equality ought to be a minimum common denominator. Hence, this study 
has confirmed the crucial need to centre gender and generational justice 
in all struggles for agrarian and environmental justice. Research on land 
grabs, especially when it aims to be action-oriented, if it is gender- and 
generation-blind, misses out on important opportunities to be transform-
ative. 
 This study has several gaps, owing to the limitations of doing this type 
research, the conditions in which it took place, including the extremely 
fast-changing context in the two countries, and to my own limits, dis-
cussed at length in Chapter 1. The study did not delve into intrahousehold 
dynamics, both gendered and generational, beyond considering what dif-
ferent people shared during group discussions and interviews. Due to its 
ambitious research objectives and scope, the study did not reach the depth 
of findings that it could have. However, it did provide a good overview of 
the issues on the ground, particularly from a gender and generational per-
spective, and indicated a path for future research.  
 Methodologically, the attempt to apply a gender and generational lens 
was not uniform, and more emphasis was often given to gender, as seen 
in the different chapters. Equally, the use of the different frameworks and 
theories may not seem to have played out in an integrated and uniform 
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way across chapters, sometimes seemingly suggesting in a heterodox ap-
proach. Hence, it is important to see the chapters as complementing each 
other and not in isolation from each other, and the study itself as an em-
pirical attempt to do research differently, much beyond the findings them-
selves.   
 
6.2 Contribution and implications for research and action: 
bridging divides  
 
This final section offers some reflections on the implications of the find-
ings for research and action.  
 
Theoretical and methodological implications 
Chapter 1 introduced this thesis as a contribution to land grab studies and 
argued that gender and generational analyses are important not only for 
analytical but also for political reasons. The thesis referred to important 
frameworks and debates in critical agrarian and peasant and land grab 
studies. At the same time, it invoked feminist political economy analyses 
that have exposed the limits of studies that ignore the social dynamics and 
relations that permeate households and communities and shape the distri-
bution, division and return to labour, decision-making and unpaid work 
of women. It is important to acknowledge that key differences exist be-
tween a liberal economic framework that advances the importance of gen-
der equality as a means of improving agricultural productivity and food 
security or reducing poverty (for example Behrman et al., 2012), and a 
feminist political economy approach that advocates an analysis of gender 
and land questions in the broader context of neoliberal economic growth 
and agrarian change, and making the state “more democratic and account-
able to all its citizens irrespective of gender and class.” (Razavi, 2003: 5)  
 The thesis referred to youth and generation studies as reinforcing the 
argument that both gender and generational considerations need to be sys-
tematically addressed for any meaningful analysis of agrarian change. The 
reproduction of farming households and communities critically depends 
on women’s contributions and on new generations’ prospects of accessing 
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and using critical resources, including land. Furthermore, the study has 
shown that patterns of social differentiation, access to, use and control 
over resources and power are gendered and generationed. While this study 
can be considered an initial effort in this direction, more reflection on the 
methodological implications and actual research that brings these two di-
mensions together are needed.  
The thesis also used key concepts and framings from feminist political 
ecology. This was essential to highlight the interconnectedness of the en-
vironmental impacts of land grabbing with changes in agrarian systems 
and relations and the linkages between society, ecologies and nature, or 
‘naturecultures’, as Haraway (2008) defines them. This in turn showed that 
the diverse emotional and embodied relationships to natures and histories 
shape different people’s experiences of access to and use of resources, in-
forming their participation in political struggles and ideas of alternative 
visions of development, as seen in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The concept of 
intersectionality was essential to avoid treating gender, age, ethnicity and 
other social differences as additive and/or discrete categories but to see 
how their interrelatedness produces different experiences for different 
women and men. Finally, this study aimed to respond to Diane Roche-
leau’s invitation to join FPE as a platform for engagement and “networked 
and expanded feminist endeavour to deal with the social relations of 
power and justice connected to cultures, ecologies and economies” and 
engage with “the politics of being, differently”. (2015: 57, emphasis in origi-
nal). Hopefully, the study has done so by expanding the scope and reach 
of FPE and triggering reflections on how to engage with land grabs studies 
differently. 
 Bringing together feminist agrarian political economy, youth and gen-
eration studies and feminist political ecology, this study has affirmed the 
usefulness of a combined analytical approach to understanding agrarian 
and environmental change. Coupled with a firm case for cantering gender 
and generation into analyses of land grabs and agrarian change, the bridg-
ing of divides among disciplines and the theoretical cross-fertilization that 
this requires could be seen as one of the main contributions of this study 
to current debates and practices in land grab studies and beyond.  
In sum, there is a need for more convergence between agrarian political 
economy and political ecology and feminist political economy and femi-
nist political ecology, and between agrarian and environmental social 
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movements and women’s rights and feminist movements. Land grab stud-
ies and politics, as a “politically charged” arena and site of contestation 
and “friction”, can offer a fruitful ground for engagement. The practical 
implications of doing research differently include more systematic atten-
tion to gender and generational analyses and the integration in land grab 
studies of key feminist analytical pointers including attention to the work-
ings of power relations and various forms of social difference at different 
levels and in different historical contexts. It also requires an analysis of the 
contribution of women’s care and unpaid work, the symbolic meanings of 
spaces and practices, and the intergenerational dynamics of reproduction. 
Importantly, such attentiveness needs to be freed of the assumption that 
these social dynamics and relations are confined to the micro, local levels. 
Research that connects across scales is more important than ever at this 
conjuncture when different ideas about development are confronting each 
other. On the one hand, the Sustainable Development Agenda and other 
international agreements have created or renewed a commitment to devel-
opment that balances social, environmental and economic sustainability, 
that leaves no one behind and prioritizes gender equality and social equity. 
On the other hand, there has been an acceleration of initiatives to establish 
the neoliberal paradigm as the only way to move forward, with land grab-
bing in its different forms a clear manifestation. There is a risk that the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) could be used to promote an ap-
proach to growth and development that widens the gap between those 
who have and those who do not, and that risks marginalizing those who 
are cast as inefficient and not producing value (see Chapter 1).  
 Methodologically this pathway to convergence has to go hand in hand 
with a commitment to feminist research ethics (discussed in Chapter 1). 
This problematic has been amply debated in various feminist circles, gen-
erating rich discussions on how best to translate feminist ethical commit-
ments into practice. Intersectionality has built a bridge between theory and 
practice, by providing both a theoretical framework and a methodology. 
Furthermore, intersectionality has mitigated key differences between the-
orists of race, class and gender, and post-modernist and post-structuralist 
feminists by offering a methodology that addresses the key pitfalls of an 
additive approach to multiple identities, also looking at how systemic 
forms of oppression are connected (for a full discussion see Davis, 2016). 
In practice, applying an intersectional approach has been challenging and 
could be seen as one of the limitations of this study, which has only begun 
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to address these important issues. Therefore, a more in-depth rigorous 
discussion might be needed on the methodological implications of doing 
intersectionality in such a fluid and dynamic area of work such as land grab 
studies.   
Finally, this type of research should aim to produce collective political 
and intellectual work that can contribute to a transformation of the current 
socio-economic and ecological order in order to contribute to worlds 
where social justice can prosper (Harding, 2004). As such, a commitment 
to engaged research and scholar activism is almost inseparable from fem-
inist research ethics and epistemologies.   
 
Reflections on bridging scholar-activism, development and feminism, 
and policy implications  
This thesis has been a deeply personal journey, often triggering troubled 
reflections on my research and work. The engagement with feminist po-
litical ecology and grassroots partners sparked reflections on how my ex-
perience as a development practitioner and gender specialist, engaged re-
searcher and feminist could contribute to bridging divides towards 
meaningful transformation. While in this study I have more often referred 
to my positionality as a researcher and activist than as a development prac-
titioner and gender specialist, all along I have pondered ways to bring all 
the dimensions of my engagement together, and use the different venues 
and opportunities that my position offers in an ethical, constructive and 
practical way. In this sense, I was forced to think beyond the divides I 
experience in my own life and consider how to build on and expand my 
understanding and experience of being a femocrat and scholar-activist. 
Let me briefly recall the definition of scholar activism as “rigorous ac-
ademic work that aims to change the world, or committed activist work 
that is informed by rigorous academic research, which is explicitly and un-
apologetically connected to a political project or movement.” (Borras, 
2016: 5). Femocrats, in contrast, are feminists working in development 
who pursue “the gender mainstreaming project inside development bu-
reaucracies” (Goetz, 2004: 137). According to Goetz, in spite of the some-
times disappointing results of gender mainstreaming, the work of femo-
crats should not be all dismissed. 
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 Being a femocrat is hard work, it requires navigating the politics of do-
ing gender work inside organizations that are reluctant to change and with 
government counterparts and partners who may equally be sceptical in a 
global context which has been largely marked by neoliberalist precepts and 
practices. This work calls for diplomatically but firmly contesting gender 
biases, discrimination, and pretence of objectivity, while being strategic 
and attentive to unexpected opportunities and alliances. The efficiency ar-
gument of closing the gender gap in agriculture1 is a point in case (see, 
FAO, 2011). This states that gender equality can have a long-lasting impact 
on economic growth by raising human capital in rural societies. While this 
argument clearly instrumentalizes gender equality and women as tools for 
development in a liberal economic way, its effectiveness in advancing gen-
der equality has been remarkable, even with the most reluctant govern-
ment officials in ministries of agriculture and technical colleagues who 
think that gender, for example, has nothing to do with animal disease or 
pest control. Coupled with the argument of the Sustainable Development 
Agenda of “leaving no one behind”, and the importance of gender equality 
to sustainable development, this has often been a far more effective way 
to convert the sceptics than a head-on discussion on feminism and 
women’s rights that would likely lead to a deadlock. The key point is to 
use these arguments conscientiously and strategically.  
 In recent years, new opportunities and alliances have also materialized 
in the form of increased participation of civil society, farmers organiza-
tions and indigenous groups in policy mechanisms and fora, for instance 
in the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), and international com-
mitments to prioritize gender equality and the empowerment of women 
and girls to achieve the SDGs. Equally, with all the difficulties of paying 
attention to power relations and the predation of some of its discourses 
to justify new forms of land grabs, the global climate change agenda has 
also opened new opportunities for transnational women’s movements to 
contribute to environmental politics (see Section 1.3) with critical analyses 
of climate change initiatives.  
 Within this fluid and permeable context, a femocrat can play a unique 
role in opening doors and facilitating dialogue among parties and actors. 
Femocrats can also expedite the promotion of a re-politicized understand-
ing of gender and the positioning of gender and generational justice on 
the agenda of global policy discussions, whereby social justice-based ap-
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proaches are easier to take forward. It is thus the special duty of any fem-
ocrat to fight from inside the system while creating alliances with like-
minded people, women’s groups, social movements, farmers’ and fishers’ 
organizations, indigenous groups, promoting dialogue among them and 
with governments and expediting their participation in policy fora. Sys-
tematic efforts need to go in the direction of integrating and bridging ra-
ther than dividing, while possibly creating formal spaces and terms of en-
gagement2 (e.g. CFS3). Quite often development organizations, 
governments and social movements are structured and siloed along disci-
plines and areas of interests, making dialogue and integration difficult in-
ternally, let alone with other actors. Therefore, engagement can be difficult 
if not actively encouraged. If a scholarly activist orientation can also be 
promoted in the generation of knowledge in development organizations 
such as FAO, such knowledge, which has a far reach in policy circles, can 
also tilt the development discourse in favour of socially just solutions. It 
is important to highlight that development organizations should not be 
lumped together in one undifferentiated category. Organizations like 
FAO, which have technical expertise and policy advisory roles and con-
vening power but no financial resources, will have a different political trac-
tion and bite than financial organizations, but may be in a better position 
to promote this kind of dialogue.  
 Likewise, in the academe, doing engaged research should imply a basic 
commitment to promoting social justice, and gender and generational jus-
tice. Levien (2017: 1130) has highlighted that “feminist groups can play an 
important role in pushing anti-dispossession movements to become more 
gender equal in their organization and demands”. While this is definitely 
true, it is equally important to ensure that intersectional gender justice be-
comes the common language and business of all engaged scholars and 
agrarian and environmental justice movements. Furthermore, social 
movements, engaged scholarship and scholar activism should also be open 
and proactively reach out to different kinds of allies who may be in non-
conventional loci, including government and development organizations. 
This would help to extend the arena for struggle and build the kind of 
sustainable coalitions that can bridge initiatives from below with initiatives 
from above, thus opening the space for more democratic participation and 
decision-making.  
236 Gender, generations and agrarian change: conclusions and implications 
 
 This is obviously easier said than done. There is often a gap between 
academia, social movements and development practitioners, and their ar-
eas of interest. For instance, an organization such as FAO may not always 
translate its corporate policies on gender equality or partnership into prac-
tices that are implemented equally by all its local offices. At the country 
level, the type of work is often also driven by donors’ interests and prior-
ities, by political pressure, or simply the openness of the government to 
address certain issues. There are also differences within governments at 
national and local levels between different ministries’ priorities and agen-
das. Equally, in academia it would be interesting to see the conditionalities 
that are attached to the different research programmes that are funded, 
and how programmes cross-fertilize each other in order to replace siloes 
with intersections and mutual understanding. In addition, engaged schol-
ars and scholar activists are often biased against and reluctant to reach out 
to development organizations and practitioners and vice versa. Scholar ac-
tivists tend to see all development workers as the cavalry of the neoliberal 
order and necessarily on the other side of the barricade. Development 
practitioners may perceive scholar activists and activists as radical and rev-
olutionary. This is also true in my field where, as a gender specialist, I am 
considered a ‘wanna-be’ feminist without political substance by feminist 
activists, and a radical and simply a nuisance by my own colleagues. There 
can also be a reluctance within organizations, including academic ones, to 
take gender seriously. Often there is a widespread assumption that gender 
is the business of the gender specialist, and gender justice a topic only for 
feminists. However, as Rocheleau and Nirmal (2015: 808) eloquently elab-
orate, as difficult as it may be, a pathway towards convergence seems to 
offer a concrete viable option for creating the space for transformational 
change:  
Bridging and tunneling across the divide between academic, political and 
practical domains continues to be a serious and difficult task, however neces-
sary and rewarding. It will require continuing conversation and partial, con-
tingent inclusion in the work of social movements, to do the mundane but 
crucial work of making new worlds on the ground and bringing to life a large 
world in which many worlds can live and thrive.    
 Personally, equipped with new knowledge and the belief that a project 
which intends to establish agrarian and environmental justice cannot shy 
away from addressing questions of patriarchy, power, gender and genera-
tional inequalities, I have now renewed my commitment to a feminist 
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agenda and ethics in my work. With this has also come more attention to 
power dynamics, and to creating the conditions and space for the policy 
engagement of civil society and grassroots groups. In many ways, I have 
thus come somewhat closer to solving the conundrum that plagues many 
feminists and gender and development practitioners. Can our work make 
a difference while being apparently more appeasing and acquiescent to 
different (political) interests? Some readers, practitioners and scholars 
alike, may readily see how this could apply to their work, but if not, it is 
even more important that they reflect on the difference their work could 
make. Can this be a question and reflection for other practitioners and 
scholars, even if speaking of and acting from different positions and inter-
ests? For instance, making gender and generational analyses a standard 
practice of land grab studies would provide scholar activists with an un-
derstanding of the concrete issues – e.g. biases, oppression, and power 
imbalances - that need to be addressed in activist discourse and practice, 
at local, national and transnational level, to move towards social justice. 
Feminist political ecology can contribute theories and approaches to doing 
this type of research and to bringing agrarian questions closer to their eco-
logical dimension through the lens of intersectional gender justice and so-
cio-natures. Finally, this type of research can create synergies between 
feminist political ecology and agrarian scholar activism based on their 
shared commitment to social transformation. In the end, it might be that 
what we need is not only more, but also more diversely integrated and connected 
research and action that can inform our analyses and politics of agrarian 
and environmental change. How to do this could be the topic for future 
explorations.    
 
Policy implications and call for action 
I wish to conclude this study with some final reflections on policy impli-
cations and a call for action.   
 Promoting policy change around land grabbing is a complex task. How-
ever, this does not mean that we should not try. Incremental change can 
go a long way towards more socially just outcomes, especially if buoyed 
by frictions - à la Tsing (2005) - that accelerate change. For example, fric-
tions can include those created by a policy orientation that facilitates land 
deals and land grabs for private investors and cronies (as seen in Chapters 
2, 3 and 4) and the rise of grassroots movements and forms of political 
reactions from below. The resulting confrontation can also result in 
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changes that are favourable to local claimants and/or create the space for 
dialogue and negotiation. This is why it is important to strengthen mech-
anisms for wider democratic participation, and possibly formalize them, 
as discussed above. In recent years, FAO has put in place policies to pro-
mote partnerships with civil society, academia and the private sector. 
While the policies have effected important changes, these have material-
ized mainly at the global and regional levels. Much more could be done to 
ensure that the same model of participation and consultation is adopted 
at the country level, engaging a vast range of actors, including women and 
youth’s groups. The example of the NLUP in Myanmar confirms that the 
participation of civil society can be crucial in shaping the final outcomes 
of a policy process.     
 This thesis has shown the usefulness of invoking international instru-
ments in policy and advocacy. These include instruments such as the Vol-
untary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and 
Forests in the Context of National Food Security; the Voluntary Guidelines for Se-
curing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty 
Eradication; the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the 
Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security, the recently 
approved UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in 
Rural Areas4; and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The 
use of international legal frameworks, which are legally binding, can be a 
powerful and practical way to keep governments and the private sector 
accountable. Among others, these include: the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. It would be valuable 
if more awareness of these instruments and how to use them could be 
promoted among diverse rural groups, particularly those who have diffi-
cult access to information because of physical (remoteness), practical (lan-
guage) and cultural barriers. This should also include advocacy for policy 
reforms that pay attention to social justice and intersectional gender jus-
tice, such as gender-equitable redistributive land reforms, the recognition 
of customary rights to land, special provisions for women and youth’s se-
cure access to land, and quotas in land institutions at different levels.  
 At the same time, it is critical to strengthen understanding of gender 
equality and social justice among government officials, social movements 
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and community members, at local and national levels. Building the capac-
ity of women and women’s groups, and young women and men, and sup-
porting connections horizontally with other groups and vertically with na-
tional and transnational groups is also needed. Academic institutions, 
especially those studying political economy and ecology, could also pro-
mote a better understanding and systematic use of gender and generational 
analyses and intersectionality. Finally, development organizations could 
step up their commitment to gender equality by earmarking gender budg-
ets, increasing capacity and human resources, improving their understand-
ing and use of intersectionality, and promoting more exchanges and cross-
fertilization with scholar activists and feminist groups. A true commitment 
to social justice and to eliminating oppression, while recognizing that all 
human beings and natures have the equal right to exist differently, could be 
a good place to start.   
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Notes
1 The 2011 FAO report states that by closing the gap between women and men in 
access to productive resources, inputs, services and markets, agricultural outputs in 
developing countries could increase from 2.5 to 4 percent. In addition, there would 
be trickle down socio-economic benefits in terms of improved health, nutritional 
status and education outcomes for children.  
2 As Jonathan Fox (2009: 489) notes, “balanced decision-making processes are es-
pecially difficult to construct, especially across cultural and organizational divides” 
but coalitions can become sustainable “when grounded in shared terms of engagement”.  
3 CFS is made up of Members, Participants and Observers. The membership is 
open to all Member States of the FAO, IFAD or The World Food Programme 
(WFP) and non-Member States of FAO that are Member States of the United Na-
tions. Participants can be from representatives of UN agencies and bodies, civil 
society and non-governmental organizations and their networks, international ag-
ricultural research systems, international and regional financial institutions, and rep-
resentatives of private sector associations and private philanthropic foundations. 
The CFS Advisory Group includes representatives of: 1) UN agencies; 2) civil so-
ciety and non-governmental organizations, particularly organizations representing 
smallholder family farmers, fisherfolks, herders, the landless, the urban poor, agri-
cultural and food workers, women, youth, consumers and indigenous people; 3) 
international agricultural research institutions; 4) international and regional finan-
cial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, regional 
development banks and the World Trade Organization; 5) Private sector associa-
tions and philanthropic foundations (CFS Structure | Committee on World Food 
Security, n.d.) 
4 The Declaration was approved by the Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian 
and Cultural) of the UN General Assembly on 19th November 2018 through Res-
olution no. A/C/73/L.30. Article 2.2 of the Declaration states that:  
Particular attention shall be paid in the implementation of the present Declara-
tion to the rights and special needs of peasants and other people working in 
rural areas, including older persons, women, youth, children and persons with 
disabilities, taking into account the need to address multiple forms of discrimi-
nation.  
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Appendix 1 
Sample form used to collect demographic data 
 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
Case (company)  
Type   
Date and time  
Location  
Interviewer  
Interpreter  
Comments  
 
 
PARTICIPANTS    
 Women Men Total 
AGE    
Under 15    
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15 - 18    
19 - 24    
25 - 35    
36 - 45    
46 - 55    
56 and over    
Cross-check sum    
MARITAL STATUS    
Single never mar-
ried 
   
Married – spouse 
resident 
   
Married – spouse 
away 
   
Divorced or sepa-
rated 
   
Widowed    
Other    
Cross-check sum    
 
MEMBERSHIP    
 Women Men Total 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
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Farmer organiza-
tion 
      
Women’s group       
Political party       
Other (indicate)       
 
 
OCCUPATION    
 Women Men Total 
Farming (own)    
Other employ-
ment – regular 
   
Other employ-
ment - casual 
   
No employment    
Student    
Total    
 
Land and mobilization 
- How were different groups of people involved in consultations/ne-
gotiations and decision-making about land. Were some excluded? 
- Were there conflicts over the giving up of land? If they were re-
solved, how was this achieved? 
- If there are still conflicts, what are they? 
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- Did you participate in any protest against the company/national 
park? 
- Did you participate in any protest against the government? 
- Do you control the use of the land you farm? Who decides the 
crops? Who controls the income from the land? Can you lease it or 
sell it? 
- Did your family’s use of land change after the investment? How and 
why? 
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Appendix 2 
Sample question guide for individual interview 
 
Question guide individual (in the context of household information) 
 
Date:  
Location: 
Name of person interviewed: 
Age:  
Sex: 
Marital Status: 
No. of children 
Ethnic group: 
Religion: 
 
 
1. Own history and family history 
1.1. How long have you lived in the area? 
1.2. Where else have you lived? 
1.3. What is the family situation like? 
1.4. More on land use, agriculture and livelihoods (discussed in 
matrix)? 
 
2. Land tenure 
2.1. How much land do you have?  
2.2. How did you get it (for instance, parents, inheritance, buy, 
clear)? Ask if wife/husband also received land.  
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2.3. Do you have a land certificate? Yes  No  
2.3.1. If yes, does it include all of your land? 
2.3.2. Whose name is on the certificate (husband, wife, 
both)? 
2.4. How is land inherited? Differences between men and 
women? 
2.5. Is access to forests regulated? 
2.6. How do young people get access to land?  
2.7. Role of different household members: work, decisions, rights, 
control of income 
 
3. Livelihoods/gender roles 
3.1. What are the main livelihood activities of your family? 
3.2. What kind of agriculture do you do?  
3.3. Please explain in detail who does what? And differences be-
tween women and men/, youth/adult/elderly 
3.4. Do different household members share labour? Do they pay 
wage labour? 
3.5. Please describe your typical day from morning to evening 
when you go to bed. 
3.6. Who makes decisions about farming (for instance, what 
crops to plant, how much to sell, etc) 
3.7. How much cash income can you get from agriculture? Any 
source of cash income?  
3.8. What is cash income used for? 
3.9. How much cash income can you get from agriculture? Any 
other way to get cash income?  
3.10. What is cash income used for? Who decides how to spend 
the money?  
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4. The Investment/National Park  
4.1. How did you first hear about the project? 
4.2. How do you understand the company/national park? What 
do you know about the company?  
4.3. Were you involved in consultations? Who (else) was in-
volved? 
4.4. What did the village leader and community leader do/say? 
4.5. What role did/do government officials play? Who?  
4.6. What do you know about the legal agreement or other offi-
cial documents? Were women and men involved? How? 
Equally? 
4.7. Did you know about the investment/national park? When did 
you first hear about it?  
4.8. Do you think this investment/national park is good or bad? 
What are some of the consequences that you think it will 
have on your family? 
4.9. Do you participate in community meetings about this? 
4.10. If your husband or someone else participates, do they 
share the information? 
 
Only for MSPP/MAC 
4.11. Were you forcefully removed from your house/land?  
4.12. Were you offered a compensation? How much? 
4.13. Did you accept it? 
4.14. Do you think the compensation was fair? 
4.15. What did you do with the money received? 
 
5. Mobilization / political reactions from below (for Lenya) 
5.1. What is the village doing about the national park? 
5.2.  
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6. Mobilization / political reactions from below (for MSPP/MAC) 
6.1. Did you participate in any protest? What kind? What role 
did/do you play? 
6.2. If not, why not?  
6.3. Who organized it?  
6.4. Where?  
6.5. Whom were you protesting against (company, central gov-
ernment, local government etc)? 
6.6. Where/how did you receive information on the protest?  
6.7. What/who influenced your decision to join?  
6.8. Did/does your husband/wife also participate? Other house-
hold members? 
6.9. Describe the day (how did you get there, what did you take 
with you, what did you do etc)? 
6.10. How did you feel on the day? 
6.11. How do you feel now? 
6.12. Do you think it was successful? 
6.13. Did/do you participate in any other actions?  
6.14. Did /do you receive any support from external organiza-
tions (NGOs, farmers groups, other villages etc.)?  
6.15. Did you/do you receive any trainings? What kind? 
6.16. Do you organize protests with other villages in your com-
mune that have been affected by the company? How? Who 
organizes them? 
6.17. Do you think that protests are useful? Which other actions 
do you think are useful? 
6.18. Are you involved in any groups in the village? (women’s 
groups, farmer groups, etc.) 
6.19. Are you connected with other communities? If yes, how? 
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7. Impact – what are the positive and negative effects of the land 
acquisition/investment 
7.1. What was the impact of the project/company for you and 
your household? 
7.2. Production: what did you cultivate before? What do you cul-
tivate now? Did/do you produce for your own consumption 
and/or for sale (proportion and income)? 
7.3. Employment: income and other labour conditions?  
7.4. Livelihoods 
7.5. Food availability 
7.6. Water 
7.7. Health 
7.8. Environmental change 
7.9. Settlement, displacement and migration 
7.10. Was the impact the same or different for men and women? 
7.11. Did the ELC/project change power relations in the commu-
nity? Who gained or lost? 
7.12. Did the project affect the relation between you and your 
husband/wife and other family members? How?  
 
8. Equality and agency – Impacts of participation in land-related 
political reactions on women’s agency 
8.1. Do you think your relationship with your husband and other 
household members changed after your engagement in acts 
of resistance and/or mobilization? How? 
8.2. Has your relationship with other community members 
changed? Do you think your status within the community has 
changed? How?  
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8.3. How do you feel about expressing your opinions within your 
family and/or community? 
8.4. Do you think your opinions are more/less valued than be-
fore? If so why? 
8.5. Do you feel freer to make decisions on your own than be-
fore? If so, why? 
8.6. Do you feel empowered (self-definition may include: more 
respected, more say in decision-making, more self-esteem, 
etc.) by participation in acts of resistance and/or mobiliza-
tion? If so, how and why? 
 
Other issues, views, comments 
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Appendix 3 
Example of questionnaire on gender division of roles 
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